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HABITS IN ACTION 
A Corrective to the Neglect of Habits in Contemporary Philosophy of Action 
William James Pollard, PhD Thesis, 2002 
Abstract 
I propose that if we pay proper attention to habits, we can correct distortions in 
prevailing accounts of action, and make progress in a number of contemporary 
debates. First I describe the everyday phenomenon of habit, and sketch the context as 
we find it within contemporary analytic philosophy. I then develop a notion of habit 
which has its origins in Wittgenstein, Ryle and Aristotle. The generic notion upon 
which all three thinkers draw is that of a kind of behaviour which is repeated; 
automatic, in the sense that it does not involve deliberation or trying; and responsible, 
since it is under the agent's control. I call such behaviour habitual action. 
Third, I reject the widely held view that the class of rational actions and the 
class of actions which we perform "for reasons" are equivalent. This view, made 
popular by Davidson, distorts our conception of rational actions by taking deliberated 
actions to be the sole paradigm. I suggest that this is an "intellectualist" error, which 
gives too prominent a place to our deliberative capacity in our picture of rational 
actions. I argue, against this, that on many of the occasions that we act habitually, we 
do not act for reasons, although we do act rationally, in ways that I spell out. 
Fourth and finally I outline how broadening our conception of rational actions 
to include many of those we perform habitually allows us to make progress in 
contemporary debates. I focus on the debate in meta-ethics between Humean (Smith, 
Blackburn) and anti-Humean (McDowell) accounts of moral motivation. I argue that 
properly understood, habits form a crucial part of the anti-Humean argument- one 
which has hitherto been obscure in McDowell. I suggest other debates to which an 
understanding of habits could contribute, such as the project of "naturalising" rational 
action. 
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1 
CREATURES OF HABIT 
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their 
simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something - because it is always 
before one's eyes.) 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §129 
1. Noticing Habits 
We are creatures of habit. We have ways of going about our lives that are so simple 
and familiar that we do them automatically, that is, without thinking about them. 
These are habits. Exercising them comes as second nature to us. Habits are involved 
in just about every human activity. Our daily routine of getting up in the morning, 
our walk to our workplace, our polite social interactions, our use of language, and 
even our patterns of thought, all depend upon habits. Unless we could rely on habits 
to take care of the familiar parts of what we do, such activities would simply be 
impossible. Habits free us to think about more important things, or about novel 
features of our situation. 
We have a natural capacity to acquire habits during upbringing. Some of 
them, such as the habits involved in using a language, arise at least partly as a result 
of contact with other people with those habits. Other habits, such as mannerisms, 
arise without the assistance of others. Thankfully our parents saw to it that the habits 
we cultivated were by and large good ones, keeping bad habits to a minimum. 
Habit acquisition does not of course end when adulthood arrives. If we 
practise a certain kind of behaviour for long enough, there is a good chance that it will 
become habitual. That is, we will come to do it automatically. That is how new ways 
of doing things are learned and kept, and how we become accustomed to new 
environments. In this way our persisting capacity for habit acquisition is extremely 
useful. But we also acquire habits unintentionally, and this can sometimes be a 
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nuisance. We have all found ourselves with habits that, on reflection, we would 
rather not have. For habits, once acquired, can be hard to lose. 
In being repeated and automatic, exercises of habits seem similar to reflexes 
and bodily processes such as the heartbeat and digestion. But they are also 
importantly distinct from such phenomena. We agents cannot do much about our 
reflexes or bodily processes. Even if I wished to stop my heart from beating, I doubt 
that I could (though perhaps I could slow it down). And it is impossible for me to 
resist the extension of my leg if my knee is struck in the right place. These are things 
that happen to us. It would not normally make sense to hold each other responsible 
for these occurrences, or their results. 
Exercising habits, in contrast, seems to be something we do. We can decide 
not to exercise a given habit on a particular occasion. We can override our habits for 
good reason, or on a whim. That is how we are able to lose them (or at least attempt 
to). And unlike reflexes and bodily processes, we can properly be held responsible for 
the exercises of our habits, or for their results. If I continue to drive on the left when I 
leave the ferry in Calais, the fact that it is a habit of mine does not free me from blame. 
We are personally responsible for our exercises of habits. In this way, habitual 
behaviours are unlike reflexes and bodily processes. 
These statements about habits are platitudes. The fact is that habits are so 
familiar that in the normal run of things, we tend not to notice them, and they escape 
such remark. They form part of the background to our lives. 
Of course habits do attract our attention from time to time. One sort of context 
in which we notice them is when things around us aren't as they usually are. For 
instance, when my keys are not on their usual hook, I still reach for them on my way 
out, "through force of habit", we might say by way of explanation. To our 
amusement my partner calls me by the name of her ex-partner, through a well-worn 
habit. We also refer to habits in order to say something about an individual's 
distinctive characteristics: "Geraldine is extremely sociable"; "George is always late 
for seminars"; "I go sculling regularly". These sorts of expression pick out 
idiosyncrasies - we could call them "individual habits" or "character traits", which 
contribute to making people who they uniquely are. 
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But although we tend to mention habits only to refer to unusual situations or 
features of people, they are nevertheless at work in the background all the time. 
When my keys are in their normal place, a habit helps me to locate them without 
effort, and allows me to keep thinking about the day ahead. My partner, in the main, 
gets my name right without having to remind herself. Thanks to habit. This 
harmonious conduct, remarkable though it is, will rarely merit comment in everyday 
life. 
In a similar way, we all share innumerable habits that resist remark simply 
because we all share them. Many habits of etiquette, habits of language, and habits of 
reasoning are like this. Again, this commonality might be thought something of a 
miracle. But in our daily lives, our other preoccupations mean that we must take such 
things for granted. Referring to widely shared habits does not help to distinguish 
individuals, or serve any other obvious explanatory purpose in the usual run of 
things. As a result, shared habits, like our well-functioning individual habits, go 
unnamed and unnoticed. Habits of both sorts are subject to Wittgenstein' s homily 
quoted above: we may be unable to notice these habits because they are always before 
our eyes. 
But are habits important, as the homily also suggests? And if so, how? This 
thesis gives a positive answer the first of these questions, and provides something of 
an answer to the second. 
2. Philosophy and Habits 
Philosophers don't notice habits very much either. At least that is true of those who 
work within the philosophical tradition we call "analytic", a term which roughly 
marks out the philosophy that has been practised in Great Britain and America since 
around 1900. If we look to the places that we might expect to see serious treatments of 
habit, such as the philosophy of action (a subject which tends to be subsumed under 
the philosophy of mind), or to moral philosophy, if habits are mentioned at all, their 
treatment is cursory. 
In his introduction to The Philosophy of Action, a collection of influential essays 
spanning the past 40 years, Al Mele (1997) notices that "Our ordinary explanations of 
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human actions draw upon a rich psychological vocabulary" (p. 1). These include 
"beliefs, desires, reasons (construed as psychological states by some), intentions, 
decisions, plans, and the like". No mention of habits here. But there is a glimmer. 
"Occasionally," he notices, "we advert as well to finely distinguished traits of 
character." Perhaps these are habits. But neither his lucid 26 page introduction, nor 
any of the otherwise excellent essays he collects, make anything of these latter items. 
Philosophers of action tend to be preoccupied with the debates begun by Donald 
Davidson (1980), who argued in 1963 that reasons are the causes of actions. Is 
Davidson right? If not, and reasons are not the causes, what are they? And then, 
what, if anything, does cause actions? In these discussions habits have played no role. 
The temptation to understand actions as originating from some faculty of thought 
remains part of our Cartesian heritage; one in which habits have no clear place. 
Moral philosophy fares only slightly better. Hume, Kant and Mill remain 
influential figures in this field, and habits do not feature in their accounts of the moral 
life at all. However, the recent revival of the ethics of Aristotle, sparked by the 
publication of Elizabeth Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958), promised to 
change all this. For Aristotle, the moral virtues, usually understood as "stable 
character traits", such as patience, temperance and charity, are essential for moral 
action. And in Book 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics, we find Aristotle proclaiming that 
the virtues are acquired through nothing less than (what it translated as) "habit" .1 But 
even in this burgeoning neo-Aristotelian tradition, which includes such thinkers as 
Philippa Foot (1978), Alasdair Macintyre (1981) and John McDowell (1998), the 
significance of the specifically habitual nature of virtue remains under-appreciated. 
At best, habit is taken to provide a story about how we acquire the capacity for moral 
action. And this story is generally assumed to be compatible with some kind of 
psychological account of those actions. 
What might explain the current attitude to habits? Philosophers like Gilbert 
Ryle (1949) and Peter Winch (1958) were influential in the middle of the 20th century 
and both were highly dismissive of habits. They argued that habits had no role in a 
11103a14-19. 
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proper understanding of intelligent or meaningful behaviour. We could also 
speculate about whether the support for these views was partly due to historical 
forces in play at the time, and in particular the associations of habits with the 
disparaged "behaviourism" in psychology proposed by J. B. Watson (1919) and B. F. 
Skinner (1953). But whatever the historical explanation, it is now usual for 
philosophers, when they talk of habits at all, to talk of them as "mere" and associate 
them with behaviour which is "blind" or "non-rational". 
Not all analytic philosophers have this disparag-ing attitude to habits. For 
example, Philip Pettit (1993) has recently tried to incorporate habits into his account of 
"rule following" behaviour (a topic about which I shall say much more in Chapter 2). 
But Pettit is exceptional in recent literature. A search of the Philosopher's Index reveals 
that those who think habits might have a role in understanding intelligent actions are 
few and far between. Nathan Brett wrote an article called "Human Habits" in 1981, in 
which he rejects the assumption, traced to Ryle and Winch, that habits are "neither 
intelligent nor purposeful" (p. 357). And R. S. Peters defends a role for habits in 
intelligent behaviour in a number of places (1958, 1963). But already we are going 
back a number of decades. Other recent literature on habits tends to be exegetical 
(Mixon 1980; Wright 1994; Crocker 1998) or to be found in journals of education 
(Hamm 1975; Gotz 1989). Whilst some of these sources are helpful in providing 
suggestions for the investigation I have in mind, none provide detailed treatments. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the gap in the current philosophical literature is 
a mixed blessing. On the positive side, it means that there is something to investigate. 
Something that may have escaped the notice of contemporary philosophers, to which 
we might profitably address ourselves. On the negative side, of course, the lack of 
awareness of habits means that the resources for prosecuting such a task are limited. 
But two writers from the middle of the 20th century will prove helpful here. 
think Ryle (1949) is one of them, despite his, on the face of it disparaging, attitude to 
habits mentioned above. For I believe he is working with an impoverished 
understanding of the idea. And if we correct for this we can see that Ryle has 
important things to say about how certain kinds of habit are philosophically 
important. I also think Wittgenstein (1953) in his later work, relied on an 
11 
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understanding of habits, though the translation brings with it little in the way of 
explicit indications that this should be the case. I shall assess the work of these two 
writers, as well as Aristotle's contribution to our understanding of the notion, in 
Chapter 2. This will provide the material for a critique of some contemporary analytic 
debates, whose neglect of habits is to their cost. Or so I shall argue. 
Since time and space is limited, the breadth of material covered must also be 
limited, however arbitrarily. I here restrict myself to mainstream analytic sources. It 
is with some regret that I do not explore the work of founding "pragmatist" 
philosophers such as William James, John Dewey and Charles Peirce, despite the fact 
that they may all have more or less important places for habits in their thinking. And 
neither do I offer a treatment of any writer from the "continental" tradition, though I 
am aware that the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer and Pierre Bourdieu could provide rich resources. The contribution of these 
traditions to the present topic will have to be assessed elsewhere. 
3. Intellectualism 
Philosophers are creatures of habit too. And philosophical habits, like others, are hard 
to break. Ironically, ignoring the philosophical significance of habits may be one of 
them. But there is another habit of thought to which today's analytic thinkers are 
introduced in their philosophical infancy. And that is the habit I call intellectualism. 
Intellectualism, as I understand it, is the unwarranted privileging of our capacity to 
reason. Like any unwarranted move, intellectualism is somethin~ to be avoided in 
philosophy, even on a single occasion. But calling intellectualism a habit captures two 
of its most pernicious features. We do it repeatedly; and we do it automatically, that 
is, without thought. And.philosophers should know better. Intellectualism, then, is a 
bad philosophical habit. .: · .· 
Intellectualism pervades current philosophy of action. We saw something of 
this above in Davidson's thought. Davidson thinks that the reasons for which agents 
act are made up of two elements from their psychology: a positive attitude towards 
actions of a certain kind (a "pro attitude"), and a belief that the action in prospect is of 
that kind. And Davidson thinks that this model can work for all actions which are 
12 
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done, as he says, "intentionally". I think Davidson's intellectualism consists in the 
fact that all intentional actions are correctly modelled on those. upon which we 
actually perform some process of reasoning, ending with a decision to act in a certain 
way, that is, deliberation. And habitual actions just don't seem to be like that. 
Davidson's ideas in this respect are hardly unusual. His ideas about reasons 
for actions have their roots in Hume, who, in his Treatise divides human psychology 
into "reason" and "passion", and claims that "reason is, and ought only to be, the 
slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey 
them" (Hume 1740, p. 415). Since Humean "reason" is instrumental, in the sense that 
it cannot by itself motivate our actions, though for the action to be rational it must 
"guide" them, every action proper requires a contribution from both sides: a belief 
and a desire (the term "desire", like Davidson's "pro attitudes", being rather liberally 
understood to cover a whole range of attitudes and emotions). Davidson is not the 
only contemporary writer to defend this kind of view. ·Other recent defences have 
been given by David Lewis (1988, 1996), Simon Blackburn (1984a, 1994, 1998) and 
Michael Smith (1987, 1994, 1998). ·But more often than not, this Humean structure for 
the explanation of actions is simply assumed to be correct. 
Why should we accept it? If the phenomenology of habits is any kind of 
guide, attributing beliefs and desires to an agent who is exercising a habit seems 
simply to be a l?rejudice: Habits spare us from feeling desires and entertaining beliefs, 
at least as they concern particular actions. And if anything like a "decision" is made 
when we exercise a habit, it appears quite unlike the conscious decisions which we all 
make from time to time. Are we really doing all these things as it were "behind the 
scenes"? Most philosophers will be ready with replies to such questions, which will 
require detailed treatment. But it looks at least possible that the Humean picture has 
an intellectualist cas~ to answer. 
Humean accounts of action have come under attack in recent years. John 
McDowell, in many influential papers (collected in his 1998), has been a prominent 
anti-Humean. Others include Arthur Collins (1987, 1997), Jonathan Dancy (1992, 
2000), Warren Quinn (1993) and Rowland Stout (1996). Anti-Humeans have rejected 
many aspects of the Humean view. For instance, McDowell (1978), Dancy (1992) and 
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Quinn (1993) reject the claim that desires are necessary for action. McDowell (1995b) 
and Collins (1997) reject the idea that beliefs are essential. Stout (1996) has rejected 
both views. A promising feature of some of these arguments, such as those of Collins 
(1987, Ch. 6) and Stout (1996), is that the anti-Humean moves are based on a novel 
understanding of actions as teleological phenomena, that is, as processes that aim at 
some given outcome. Thus a belief-desire explanation is useful insofar as it specifies 
an outcome, but it does not form part of a proper teleological explanation of the action 
at all. 
But even these relatively radical writers retain a central assumption. The 
assumption is that all actions, or at least all of the "rational" ones, are done, as it is 
said, "for the agent's reasons," or equivalently, "for reasons." And I think that given 
the way the idea of a reason is currently understood, even anti-Humean philosophers 
are guilty of intellectualism. For I don't think that habitual actions are done for 
reasons at all. They do not result from desire, from thought, and neither do they aim 
at anything in particular. But I don't think that disqualifies them from being rational. 
This is potentially an even more radical rejection of the Humean view than any yet 
proposed. If I am right, this thesis will be a significant contribution to our 
understanding of rational actions in general, and the idea of actions for reasons in 
particular. 
There is an obvious reply to this intellectualist charge, which is to deny that 
exercises of habits are bona fide actions. Exercises of habits, the reply goes, are not 
sufficiently "intentional" as the preferred (and to my mind rather unhelpful) 
terminology has it, for them to count as such. But I think that this cannot be sustained 
without either distorting the idea of a habit so that it is little more than a reflex, or by 
presupposing an already intellectualised conception of what an action is. Either way, 
largely due to these sorts of prejudice, exercises of habits stand little chance of being 
actions proper. 
My diagnosis is that intellectualism has become so habitual in our current 
thinking about action, that characterising actions without being intellectualist has 
become if not unthinkable, then unthought. What I want to suggest is that once cured 
of our intellectualist prejudices about the kinds of things actions, rationality and 
14 
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habits are, we should admit exercises of habits into the class of rational actions. 
Redefining these things in non-intellectualised ways will take work. But that is the 
task at the heart of this thesis, and it will occupy Chapters 3 to 6. 
Ridding philosophy of prejudice is worth doing in its own right, and the 
prejudice of intellectualism is no exception. But I think the pay-offs may extend far 
beyond admitting habitual actions into the class of rational actions. For the emerging 
anti-intellectualist philosophy of action promises to provide novel solutions to 
entrenched problems. Some of these problems, as they occur in the field of meta-
ethics, will be addressed with the clarifications in hand, in Chapter 7. Others will 
have to be pursued elsewhere, and I shall mention some in Chapter 8. 
4. Naturalism 
This thesis is conducted against a background in which philosophers want to be 
naturalists, and I am no exception. That is to say, when we propose an account of 
some phenomenon, a requirement of that account is that it should be possible to offer 
a plausible story about how that phenomenon is a part of the same world that is 
revealed to us by the natural sciences, which, for the sake of argument, we can take to 
include physics, chemistry, biology and zoology. The assumption is that the 
disclosures of these sciences are straightforwardly natural, whereas for the 
phenomenon at hand, this needs to be shown. Crucial to the plausibility of such a 
story is that it should not depend upon any mysterious entities, leaps of faith or 
otherwise problematic moves. At least this much is Darwin's legacy to philosophy. 
Action naturalism is the view that we can construct a naturalistic story about 
actions in particular. I intend the argument of this thesis not only to be compatible 
with action naturalism, but also to strengthen that view. However, naturalism comes 
in a number of varieties, and in saying this, I have in mind a particular sort of 
naturalism which many will not find acceptable. I briefly describe what sort of 
naturalism this is not, before describing what it is, and how the present project might 
strengthen it. 
Popular kinds of naturalism attempt some kind of reduction of a given 
phenomenon to some other sort of thing, which is assumed to be less problematic. 
15 
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Paradigm reductions include the claim that water is H20, or that heat is mean kinetic 
energy. If a reductive strategy is adopted to actions, a popular strategy is to reduce 
them to bodily movements of a certain kind.2 Davidson (1980) has been more influential 
than most in defending this sort of reduction. Bodily movements are described in 
terms of the spatia-temporal location and trajectory of the agent's body (which need 
not actually be moving to count as such). Bodily movements are thought to be less 
problematic than actions because that puzzling phenomenon of agency is absent from 
such descriptions. Hence they are naturalistically respectable. All that remains is to 
distinguish those bodily movements which are also actions, from those which are not 
- pushings, reflexes, bodily processes, and so forth. This is most often done in terms 
of the movement's having a certain kind of etiology (e.g. Davidson 1980; Goldman 
1970; Dretske 1988). According to these standard reductions, then, an action is 
nothing but a bodily movement that has been caused in the right sort of way. 
Whatever the reductive base, however, a reduction violates what might be 
called Butler's law. Bishop Butler (1726) wrote in the preface to his Sermons, 
"Everything is what it is, and not another thing" (p. 14). And this is something that 
the reductive naturalist, it seems to me, flouts. In saying that x really is y, or x is 
nothing but y, even with the laudable aim of naturalism, is to deny the reality of x in 
favour of y. Reducing x to y claims more than to have provided one sort of 
explanation of x. There is an identif:tJ between x andy being posited, and that is what 
Butler would, I think rightly, object to. 
A non-reductive naturalism, in contrast, finds continuity elsewhere. And in 
the variety that I endorse, that might be termed continuihj in forms of life. I find this 
:;.'·idea in the later work of Wittgenstein (1953), and in the writings of McDowell (1995a, 
1996), who is himself influenced by Wittgenstein, as well as Aristotle. The idea is 
roughly that one kind of entity can be understood to be related to entities of another 
kind, by tracing the natural history of the lives in which those entities occur. So, for 
2 Jennifer Hornsby (1980) has pointed out that the phrase "bodily movement" is ambiguous and has both 
transitive (John moves his arm) and intransitive (his arm moves) senses. It is the intransitive sense I 
mean here. 
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instance, a naturalising account of water (if such be needed) would trace the life in 
which the term "water" is used, and would relate to the term "H20" presumably via 
some account of the scientific investigations into the structure of the stuff, and their 
historical development, culminating in the common conviction that "H20" is a proper 
way of formulating what we hitherto knew only as "water". Those who are optimistic 
about such a naturalism may go on to suggest that the motivation to ask whether 
water really is H20, and posit identities, should now seem less pressing. But the 
success of non-reductive naturalism does not depend on that motivational matter. 
The same thing goes for action naturalism. Our first naturalising move should 
be to trace the life in which the term "action" occurs back to a life in which our 
preferred naturalistic materials occur. McDowell's "naturalism of second nature" 
does just this.3 
McDowell begins with the assumption that our capacity for "mere behaviour", 
as opposed to action proper, is naturalistically respectable. This seems reasonable 
since it is a capacity we share with other animals. The continuity between our 
capacity for action and the capacity for mere behaviour is, for McDowell, supplied by 
the natural process of upbringing, during which we acquire a "second nature" . 
McDowell finds the germ of this idea in Aristotle's writings on ethics: 
The notion [of second nature] is all but explicit in Aristotle's account of how ethical 
character is formed. Since ethical character includes dispositions of the practical 
intellect, part of what happens when character is formed is that the practical intellect 
acquires a determinate shape ..... human beings are intelligibly initiated into this stretch 
of the space of reasons by ethical upbringing, which instils the appropriate shape into 
their lives. The resulting habits of thought and action are second nature. (McDowell 
1996, p. 84)4 
Though the above remarks concern specifically "ethical" upbringing and character, 
McDowell goes on to say that they apply quite generally. 
3 See especially McDowell (1996, pp. 78-86). 
4 "The space of reasons" is a metaphor McDowell borrows from Wilfrid Sellars {1956). 
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The point is clearly not restricted to ethics. Moulding ethical character, which includes 
imposing a specific shape on the practical intellect, is a particular case of a general 
phenomenon: initiation into conceptual capacities, which includes responsiveness to 
other rational demands besides those of ethics. . .. If we generalise the way Aristotle 
conceives the moulding .of ethical character, we arrive at the notion of having one's eyes 
opened to reasons at large by acquiring a second nature. (McDowell1996, p. 84) 
Thus, according to McDowell, we have the materials for a naturalism for rational 
actions as such, without reductive methods, and hence without reference to bodily 
movements of any kind. 
Now I do not want to say that McDowell's naturalism is unproblematic.S 
Indeed I think some of the details of just how we acquire our capacity for action are 
left if not wholly mysterious, at least shrouded in metaphor. What is it, for instance, 
to "have one's eyes opened to reasons at large"? And how is upbringing supposed to 
confer the possession of psychological states like beliefs and desires, onto an ·· 
individual? But spelling out these and other details aside, I think that as an overall 
strategy for adion naturalism, McDowell's is the best on offer. It is this kind of action 
naturalism that I shall assume to be right. 
The above passage also suggests how a thesis on habits could contribute to 
such a naturalism. For it is striking that McDowell explicitly says that second nature 
comprises "habits of thought and action". Indeed the very phrase "second nature" 
captures. something distinctive about habits already mentioned, that is, that we 
perform them automatically. So it begins to look as though the phenomenon of habit 
is going to be a key resource in a naturalism of second nature. If further motivation 
for an investigation into habits were needed, we have it here. And in the final chapter 
I shall be in a position to say how this kind of naturalism is strengthened by what I 
present in the intervening pages. 
s For criticism see for example Wright (1996) and Williams (1996). 
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5. Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into six central chapters, sandwiched between this introduction 
and a concluding chapter. 
Chapter 2 is exegetical, and locates the project of anti-intellectualism in a 
historical tradition. I consider the work of three thinkers each of whom oppose a 
distinctive variety of intellectualism in a distinctive way. The thinkers are Aristotle, 
Ryle and Wittgenstein. What is notable about these three thinkers is that they each 
oppose intellectualism by drawing on notions which can be seen as kinds of habit. 
The notions in question share the three features of habitual actions of being at once 
repeated, automatic and responsible. Thus the provenance of the present anti-
intellectualist project will be secured. 
In Chapters 3 and 4 I offer a definition of habitual action, thus filling a notable 
gap in current analytic philosophy of mind and action. I begin in Chapter 3 by 
defining the idea of habitual behaviour, that is a behaviour which is both repeated 
and automatic. In Chapter 4 I develop the suggestion that we are personally 
responsible for at least some of our habitual behaviours. I do this by arguing that we 
have a certain kind of control over them. It is because we are personally responsible 
for our exercises of habits that they deserve to be called habitual actions. This marks a 
departure from existing intellectualist accounts of action. 
Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the issue of ~hether habitual actions can be 
regarded· as rational. In Chapter 5 I argue that according to the orthodox view of 
rational actions, according to which all rational actions ·are actions for reasons, 
habitual actions are not rational. However, I suggest that since this criterion for 
rational action is infected by intellectualism, we need not accept it. In Chapter 6 I 
consider an alternative conception of rational action which is not intellectualist. I 
develop suggestions made separately by Bas Van Fraassen (1989) and Bernard Gert 
(1998) which I term the permissive conception of rational action. I argue that this notion 
of rational action allows us to admit a large class of habitual actions into the class of 
rational actions. I also suggest that there is a class of habitual actions that can be 
regarded as rational in another sense, namely, that they are reasonable things to do. 
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In Chapter 7 I describe one way in which the anti-intellectualist philosophy of 
action which admits habitual actions, can solve problems in current debates. The 
debate in question is in the field of meta-ethics, and takes place between Humeans 
Smith and Blackburn on the one hand, and anti-Humean McDowell on the other. I 
suggest that as things currently stand the Humeans have the best of the arguments. 
But I argue that equipped with the idea of an action which is at once rational and 
habitual, the anti-Humean can offer new replies to Humean arguments. McDowell's 
own intellectualism has hitherto prevented these replies from emerging. This 
resolution has implications for important issues in meta-ethics, such as that of moral 
cognitivism. 
In Chapter 8 I sketch out some of the implications for the philosophy of action, 
and directions in which this research may profitably go forward. In particular I say 
how attention to normal cases is promoted in importance, and how action naturalism 
can be significantly enhanced. 
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1. Curing Intellectualism 
Intellectualism, the unwarranted privileging of reason and reasoning, is a perennial 
philosophical malady. Different strains of intellectualism arise in each generation of 
thought, each requiring a distinctive anti-intellectualist medicine, in the form of 
argument. But if the maladies they treat have something in common, it would be 
surprising if the medicines themselves did not share some features. And in the 
h·eatment of intellectualism, this is what we find. 
In this chapter I examine the work of three historical thinkers who oppose 
forms of intellectualism. Those thinkers are Aristotle, Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. I do not claim that these thinkers exhaust the history of anti-
intellectualism, or even that they exhaust the history of a certain kind of anti-
intellectualism. But I do think that in the context of a thesis on habits, the similarities 
between their projects is both sh·iking and significant. 
For each thinker I do three things. . First, I describe the particular 
intellectualism to which the thinker responds. Second; I describe their anti-
intellectualist argument. Finally I link together this anti-intellectualist argument with 
those of the other two, by showing that they employ the notion of a behaviour which 
is repeated, automatic and responsible. ·The conclusion will be that for all three 
thinkers, the secret ingredient to the anti-intellectualist medicine is the notion of a 
habit. 
This result will serve to motivate, and the discussion will inform, the detailed 
explication of the idea of a habit, a task which wmbe undertaken in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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2. Aristotle 
In "Aristotle on Learning to be Good" Myles Burnyeat (1980) suggests that "Aristotle 
knew intellectualism in the form of ~aerates' doctrine that virtue is knowledge" (p. 
70).1 It would, however, be misleading to say that Aristotle rejected the equation of 
virtue with knowledge wholesale. For we shall see shortly that Aristotle was content 
with an non-intellectualist interpretation of that doctrine. What Aristotle objected to 
was an intellectualist interpretation. 
McDowell (1979) spells out this intellectualist interpretation as follows: 
We tend to assume that the knowledge [in which virtue consists] must have a stateable 
propositional content (perhaps not capable of immediate expression by the knower). 
Then the virtuous person's reliably right judgements as to what he should do, occasion 
by occasion, can be explained in terms of interaction between this universal knowledge 
and some appropriate piece of particular knowledge about the situation at hand; and the 
explanation can take the form of a "practical syllogism", with the content of the universal 
knowledge, or some suitable part of it, as major premise, the relevant particular 
knowledge as minor premise, and the judgement about what is to be done as deductive 
conclusion. (McDowell 1979, p. 57) 
The above interpretation of the Socratic doctrine is intellectualist because it requires 
that the virtuous person's conception of how he should behave can be "codified" in 
such a form that it could play its supposed role of in the above mentioned practical 
syllogism. By any standards, such knowledge requires that the virtuous agent has 
considerable powers of reasoning. This I call Socratic intellectualism. 
There are a number ·of reasons why Aristotle might have found Socratic 
int.ellechu~lisi1tlo .. be problematic. McDowell, for instance, suggests that it is difficult 
·to see how th~·practical knowledge required for virtue could formulated: 
1 In this section I rely on interpretations of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics by Myles Burnyeat (1980), John 
McDowell (1979, 1995a) and John M. Cooper (1986) which I take to be compatible with one another. 
Where I refer to the primary text I employ Ross's revised (1984) translation. However, I substitute tl1e 
term "virtue" for t11e term "excellence" (arete) tl1roughout, consistent witll tile commentaries consulted. 
Nicomachean Ethics is abbreviated NE followed by book number, section number and Bekker reference. 
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If one attempted to reduce one's conception of what virtue requires to a set of rules, then, 
however subtle and thoughtful one was in drawing up the code, cases would inevitably 
turn up in which a mechanical application of the rules would strike one as wrong- and 
not necessarily because one had changed one's mind; rather, one's mind on the matter 
was not susceptible of capture in any universal formula. (McDowell, 1979, p. 58)2 
What is more, it seems that even if we could come up with such a universal formula 
for a certain virtue, there is a problem of accounting for how individuals come to learn 
it, exposed as they are to only a finite sample of experiences. There are other 
difficulties with Socratic intellectualism, but we need not pursue them here.3 
Aristotle's solution was to offer an interpretation of the Socratic idea that 
virtue IS knowledge which did not suffer from the problems of the intellectualist 
reading. Here is how McDowell presents the idea that the particular virtue of 
kindness can be thought of as "knowledge": 
A kind person has a reliable sensitivity to a certain sort of requirement that situations 
impose on behaviour. The deliverances of a reliable sensitivity are cases of knowledge; 
and there are idioms according to which the sensitivity itself can appropriately described 
as knowledge: a kind person knows what it is like to be confronted with a requirement of 
kindness. The sensitivity is, we might say, a sort of perceptual capacity. (McDowell 
1979, p. 51) 
Rather than understanding the possession of a virtue as having knowledge of 
some universal principle about how to act kindly in any given situation, that is a 
knowledge-that such-and-such is to be done, McDowell suggests that it is better 
understood as a "sensitivity", or a kind of knowledge-how. This latter is a disposition 
. to act in appropriate ways, which need not be explained in terms of the apprehension 
2 In the paper quoted, McDowell goes on to use a Wittgensteinian argument against the idea of 
codifiability, an argument which we shall encounter in §6. Though the argument may support Aristotle's 
view, tl1ere is no suggestion that it was actually proposed by Aristotle. 
3 McDowell points out two. First, we can only explain a person's acting non-virtuously as "ignorance", 
which means that "paradoxically, failure to act as a virtuous person would cannot be voluntary, at least 
under that description" (1979, p. 54). Second (pp. 55-6) the intellectualist interpretation leaves us without 
a distinction between virtue and continence, a distinction which Aristotle seeks to preserve. 
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of a proposition. Assuming that this distinction is a good one, the suggestion is that if 
we interpret the Socratic thesis in the way McDowell suggests, we can overcome the 
difficulties with the intellectualist interpretation. For we can drop the idea that being 
virtuous depends upon the codifiability of a virtuous person's conception of how to 
act. Somebody can be said to have the knowledge-how - say, how to act kindly -
without having implausibly to attribute to them the knowledge-that, in this case, that 
kindness consists in nothing more than knowledge of the proposition to the effect that 
they should do such-and-such things in so-and-so situations. 
To conceive of virtue in this non-intellectualised way is not to give up on the 
idea of explaining the knowledge in which the particular virtue of kindness consists, 
because it is still possible to formulate "generalisations" about how kind people 
behave, for instance, "they help others in adversity". The mistake would be to think 
of such generalisations as attempts to reduce the particular virtue to universal 
principles. As Aristotle says, "the best generalisations about how one should behave 
hold only for the most part" (NE 1.3 1094b13-27; quoted by McDowell 1979, p. 58). 
Conceiving of virtue as knowledge-how also facilitates a plausible account of how 
people become virtuous: not by somehow grasping universal principles, but by 
practice at the right kinds of behaviour, which in turn equips them with the relevant 
capacities. 
3. Three Features ofVirtues 
I want now to draw attention to three of the features of an Aristotelian virtue that, I 
shall later argue, the notion of a virtue shares with notions deployed by Ryle and 
Wittgenstein in their arguments against intellectualism. Virtues, I want to say, 
represent behaviours that are repeated, automatic and responsible. 
First, it is not difficult to show that virtues are repeated. Here is Aristotle on 
the acquisition of virtues: 
Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and 
later exhibit the activity ... ; but virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in 
the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do, we learn by 
doing, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too 
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we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing 
brave acts. (NE 2.1 1103a26-b2) ... 
Thus, in one word, states arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we 
exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states correspond to the differences 
between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits [ethike] of one 
kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather nil the 
difference. (NE 2.1 1103b20-6) 
For Aristotle, then, we acquire the "states" which are the virtues, in just the same way 
as we acquire other practical abilities, that is, by practice.4 But it would be a mistake 
to think that for Aristotle, repetition is merely a way of acquiring virtues, which are 
from then on unchanging states of the agent. Rather, just as to remain a lyre-player 
one must continue to play the lyre, to remain virtuous, an agent must continue to be 
practise the virtues. There is no requirement in Aristotle that there is an end-point to 
the process.s 
There may, however, seem to be a problem at the beginning. In the above 
passage Aristotle writes "virtues we get by first exercising them". But how can 
somebody exercise a capacity that she does not already possess? Certainly, if all the 
information about a person that we have is that they seem to have acted in the way a 
virtuous person would have done just once, there may not be a fact of the matter 
about whether this really is an exercise of virtue, and we may not know what to say. 
Perhaps we could justify our calling the action virtuous by referring to the similarity 
with the actions of other agents which we know to be virtuous. If we were to allow 
this, we would thereby concede that the particular individual herself need not have 
repeated the action for it to be an exercise of virtue, though others must have done. I 
am not sure if Aristotle would allow this. But even if he would, the issue only affects 
the very first apparent exercise of a virtue, whose status may anyhow best be thought 
4 Burnyeat (1980) reminds us that such remarks should be read not just as embodying his conception of 
virtue, but also as Aristotle's spelling out tl1e prerequisites for his lectures, i.e. tl1at fue students should 
already have acquired fue virtues. 
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of as indeterminate. First attempts aside, it seems that repetition can be established 
with reference only to the behaviour of a single individual. I shall follow this 
individualistic understanding of repetition from here on. Let us accept, then, that 
Aristotelian virtues require the repetition of virtuous actions, both to acquire them, 
and to maintain them. 
In what sense are virtuous actions "automatic"? Here we can return to 
McDowell's suggestion described in Chapter 1, §4, that virtues are part of our "second 
nature". The thought is that the phrase not only captures the way our virtues are 
acquired naturally (a process consistent with action naturalism as described); but it 
also suggests something about the way in which virtues are exercised once they are 
acquired, and that is "naturally" in the sense that such actions come easily to the 
agent. 
We use the term "second nature" to pick out this proficiency when we describe 
people who are particularly skilled at some activity. Pulling an oar is second nature to 
Steve Redgrave; running down the wing comes as second nature to Ryan Giggs. This 
chimes with Aristotle's analogy between the acquisition of virtues with the 
acquisition of "arts" such as building and lyre-playing. What marks out the expert 
builder or lyre-player from the novice is that they do it "naturally", which is to say 
effortlessly. This characteristic proficiency, one would like to say, is a result of the 
practice (though it may require other things - like natural talent- in addition). But 
whatever the relation to practice, we have here a sense in which virtuous actions can 
be said to be "automatic". 
What marks this effortlessness? One suggestion would be that no deliberation 
is involved in acting virtuously. However, those who have only a rudimentary 
understanding of Aristotle may well balk at this suggestion. For isn't virtuous action 
supposed to be a matter of judging the mean between two vices, a process which must 
be deliberative? In support of this view consider a plausible reading of some passages 
in Aristotle, where virtues do seem to involve both reasoning and choice: 
s See for example Sabina Lovibond's (1996) treatment of how the ongoing process of moral education 
works. 
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Virtue, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being 
determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would 
determine it. (NE 2.61106b36-1107al-2)6 
But I think it would be a mistake to conclude from this that for Aristotle virtuous 
action involves deliberation. John M. Cooper (1986) has suggested that this and other 
similar passages in Aristotle, need not be read as implying that any actual process of 
deliberation or choice goes on before an agent acts virtuously. Cooper finds the 
suggestion that deliberation and choice precede every moral action unsatisfactory 
because of the many common experiences we have of acting morally, without any 
apparent prior deliberation. Cooper writes, 
Deliberation is called for principally or only in difficult or delicate cases, where the facts 
are complicated, or their bearing on the interests or principles in question is not easy to 
assess, or where a very great deal hangs on the decision's being correct, and so on. 
Certainly, cases of routine action do not call for deliberation? Furthermore, many overt 
decisions are reached without going through any sort of calculation (at least none that is 
explicit). (Cooper 1986, p. 6) 
Rather confusingly, Cooper here uses the term "decision" to be applicable equally to 
those actions upon which we deliberate, and those for which- he wants to argue- we 
do not. So we should not read "decision" as enta~ing any intellectual endeavour. 
Cooper then goes on to say how this interpretation need not be thought to be 
in tension with Aristotle's other views. 
Aristotle's insistence that moral decisions are all of them "choices", and therefore 
supported by deliberation, can be defended ... provided one understands by this only 
6 Another passage on virtuous acts has a similar implication: "The agent must be in a certain condition 
when he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and 
choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable 
character" (NE 2.4 1105a30-2). 
7 Here Cooper references Aristotle: "in the case of exact and self-contained sciences there is no 
deliberation, e.g. about the letters of tl1e alphabet (for we have no doubt how they should be written)" 
(NE 3.31112a34-b2). 
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that moral decisions are always backed by reasons which, when made explicit, constitute 
a deliberative argument in favour of the decision. Insofar as those are one's reasons it is 
as if one had deliberated and decided accordingly (even if one actually did no 
deliberating at all). (Cooper 1986, pp. 9-10) 
If this is a correct reading of Aristotle, then it follows that the exercise of a virtue need 
not be understood as involving deliberation. s 
Of course, the fact that virtuous actions may not involve deliberation does not 
yet show that they always lack deliberation, or that they must. But I think we can rule 
out various sorts of deliberation nonetheless. For whilst it may be plausible to say 
that a virtuously acting agent might deliberate about some of the details of how to 
conduct herself in a particular case - and Cooper suggests the sorts of details that 
might detain her in the passage quoted earlier, such as complexity or importance - she 
will not presumably have to decide whether to exercise the virtue in question. Should 
that latter question arise, we would have reason to doubt that the agent has the virtue 
at all. Presumably too, in the sorts of context with which the agent is most familiar, 
that is, those which are similar to or identical with the contexts in which she has 
practised the virtue, we can expect no deliberation whatever to take place, simply 
because it will be unnecessary, and waste time.9 So it seems plausible that many 
virtuous actions, perhaps including those which we would regard as paradigms, will, 
for good reason, lack any deliberation whatever, and in that sense can be said to be 
automatic. And nothing Aristotle says suggests that such actions would thereby forgo 
their status as virtuous, nor indeed, as I shall later suggest, as rational. 
Finally we must ask in what sense agents are "responsible" for their exercises 
of virtue. Implicit here is a distinction between the kind of responsibility that persons 
s In a recent book Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) argues for a similar point about the irrelevance of one 
particular kind of reflection in virtuous action. She claims that her argument entails "not only that 
occurrent thoughts somehow equivalent to 'This is right, virtuous, noble, my duty', or what have you, are 
not necessary for moral motivation; they are not sufficient either" (p. 160). 
9 I am indebted here to some of Christopher Hookway's remarks in his (2000), though they do not 
directly concern Aristotle, and in conversation. 
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have, as a result of which they are praise or blameworthy, and the kind of 
responsibility which we might attribute to a merely physical cause, such as the rainfall 
being responsible for the river's filling, for which attributions of praise or blame make 
no sense. Call them respectively personal and causal responsibility.IO Are we 
personally responsible for virtuous actions? The materials for an answer are found in 
the following passage from Aristotle: 
For all men think that each type of character belongs to its possessors in some sense by 
nature; for from the very moment of birth we are just or fitted for self-control or brave or 
have the other moral qualities; but yet we seek something else as that which is good in 
the strict sense - we seek for the presence of such qualities in another way. For both 
children and brutes have the natural dispositions to these qualities, but without thought 
these are evidently hurtful. Only we seem to see this much, that, while one may be led 
astray by them, as a strong body which moves without sight may stumble badly because 
of its lack of sight, still, if a man once acquires such thought that makes a difference in 
action; and his state, while still like what it was, will then be virtue in the strict sense. 
(NE 6.131144b1-14). 
Here Aristotle distinguishes between "natural virtue", which is possessed by 
children and non-human animals, and "virtue in the strict sense", which is the sense 
which we have been discussing. He also gives us an explanation of that distinction. 
So the courageous behaviour of a lioness defending her cubs is only regarded as a 
natural virtUe because the lioness lacks "thought that makes a difference in action". I 
understand this as the capacity to deliberate upon, and act in the light of, reasons. By 
conh·ast, a rational agent courageously defending her children would count as 
exercising virtue in the strict sense, because she does have this rational capacity. This 
is why I think we can say that Aristotle did not think of the virtues as mere 
dispositions to respond to certain situations in certain ways, like reflexes, or animal 
behaviour, to which (at least arguably in the case of the lion) only causal 
10 Writers who discuss free will often refer to a distinction between causal and "moral" responsibility, see 
e.g. Fischer & Ravizza (1998, pp. 1-2). Since nothing for them turns on the nature of moral, as opposed to 
any other sort of responsible human activity, I take it they can be read as meaning the same thing by 
"moral" as I mean by "personal". 
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respO':tsibility attaches, but as something more. That something more is explained in 
' 
terms of what he shortly afterwards calls the "presence" of the capacity to act for 
reasons.1 1 That this capacity should be present in virtuous actions is consistent with 
what I have said about their being· automatic, since we need not read this in an 
intellectualist way, as the operation of the capacity to act for reasons. The capacity's 
being there, as it were, in the background, is enough. In the Chapter 4 I shall say more 
about how the presence of this rational capacity gives us the kind of control over our 
actions that we need to be personally responsible for them. For now, we can conclude 
that for Aristotle, agents are indeed personally responsible for virtuous actions. 
In sum, whatever else it is, the notion of a virtue that Aristotle employs to 
undermine Socratic intellectualism, is a notion of a kind of behaviour which can be 
understood as being repeated, automatic and responsible. This is not to say that it is 
only by employing a concept with these .three features that Socratic intellectualism 
could be avoided. But if Aristotle's project is successful, as many think it is, it owes 
much of its success to using these familiar features of human behaviour, and not 
problematic entities such as universal principles. Aristotle for one, then, saw the anti-
intellectualist potential of the idea of a habit. 
4. Ryle 
A second philosopher who I think employs a notion akin to that of a habit to combat 
' ,, 
ih.tellechwlism is Gilbert Ryle in The Concept of Mind (1949). 12 In this work Ryle 
expresses his conviction tl1at even though we often speak about mental phenomena as 
being "inside" people's heads, if we interpret such talk literally, we thereby commit 
ourselves to the "Cartesian" pichtre of the mind. According to this pichtre, there are 
hvo kinds of substance: that which is extended in space, and that ;vhich is not. 
11 "[Virtue] is not merely the state in accordance with right reason, but the state that implies the presence 
of right reason, that is virtue; and practical wisdom is right reason about such matters. Socrates, then, 
thought the virtues were forms of reason (for he thought they were, all of them, forms of knowledge 
[that]), while we think they involve reason." (NE 6.13, 1144b26-9) 
12 Page references in this section and the next are to this work unless otherwise stated. 
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"Mental" terms are supposed to refer to substances of the second kind, the existence 
of which we can know with certainty by introspection; whereas "physical" terms, 
which include those which refer not only to tables, chairs and the like, but also to the 
living human body, are supposed to refer to substances of the first kind, the existence 
of which we can coherently doubt. This is a clear case of intellectualism, since it is 
highly optimistic about reason's capacity to operate on itself. 
According to Ryle, this dualistic picture brings with it a set of intractable 
philosophical problems (pp. 13-17). These include the problem of interaction: how 
can "the mental" be causally related to the "non-mental", as it seems, at least 
sometimes, to be? And then there is the epistemological problem of other minds: 
though it seems I can be fairly confident that other people have "bodies", how can I 
know that they also have "minds" like mine? Ryle's suggestion is that the only way 
of avoiding such difficulties is to drop the Cartesian picture of mind which they 
presuppose. The aim of his book is to show this picture to be an "intellectualist 
legend" (p. 30), or as he famously puts it, "the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine" (p. 
17). As with other dogmas, Ryle thinks that we can get on much better without it. 
It need hardly be said that the Cartesian intellectualism that Ryle attacks is not 
one which concerned Aristotle. As a matter of historical fact, in Aristotle's time that 
account of mind had yet to be conceived. What is more, the Cartesian ghost does not 
haunt only moral agents, but agents per se. Ryle' s target is thus broader. In view of 
the differences in their aims, one would expect Ryle' s rejection of intellectualism to 
differ from Aristotle's. But whilst there are differences, they are in some respects 
remarkably similar. 
To exorcise the Cartesian ghost, Ryle attempts to show how many of our 
references to supposedly "inner" items can instead be understood as indirect 
references to overt behaviour. This is not the naive and implausible suggestion that a 
reference to a mental item, such as my belief that the windows need painting, is just 
reference to my present behaviour. Obviously I can have the belief without doing 
anything at all at the present time. Rather, it is a reference to what my future 
behaviour will, or might, be, given various possible future circumstances. My belief 
that the windows need painting just is my being disposed to say that they need 
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painting when the topic comes up, my being disposed to buy paint and brushes in 
preparation for painting them, to begin painting them in fine weather, or perhaps 
being disposed to ring up decorators, direct them to the windows in question, and so 
on. Ryle' s recommendation, then, is to understand mental terms as references not to 
what I am now doing, but to what I am disposed to do, that is, behavioural 
dispositions.l3 
Ryle agrees with the Cartesian premise that the mental is something "not 
present" in a particular piece of behaviour, but rejects the Cartesian conclusion that it 
must therefore be "present" in some other "place", such as in the Cartesian "inner 
theatre". Rather, Ryle thinks that the mental is "not present" in the sense that what 
somebody will (or might) do is "not present" in what they now do. The idea of a 
disposition is the idea of a set of possible and actual behaviours which extend beyond 
any particular instance of behaviour. Ryle writes "a disposition is a factor of the 
wrong logical type to be seen or unseen, recorded or unrecorded" (p. 33). That is not 
to deny the reality of the mental, as some have suggested, though it is to deny that 
looking at or behind a single example of present behaviour is our only access to the 
real.14 If the mental is understood to be logically inseparable from behaviour thus 
construed, the intractable problems associated with dualism simply do not arise, or at 
least not in that form. This bold claim about the meaning of mental terms is often 
termed logical behaviourism.1s 
13 In this section I follow Ryle in his liberal use of the term "disposition", to apply to both physical 
substances and objects as well as persons. I shall restrict the use of this term in subsequent chapters, 
because I think calling habits "dispositions" is liable to give an unwarranted sense that a reductive 
naturalism has been sought, and to obscure a number of the unique features of habits. 
t4 This is to disagree with a recent reading of Ryle by Stephen Mumford (1998). According to Mumford, 
Ryle thinks that, "to ascribe a disposition is not to ascribe a property but merely to say how something 
will behave in certain circumstances. Dispositional properties are, on this view, logical fictions; what 
really exist are regularities of events" (p. 4). But nothing Ryle says prevents him from saying that how 
something will behave in certain circumstances just is to ascribe a property to it. Certainly, Ryle has no 
theory of properties which would prevent this. 
15 The "logical" part distinguishes it from other forms of behaviourism, such as the methodological 
behaviourism of] B. Watson (1919) and B. F. Skinner (1953). 
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When we compare Ryle's opposition to intellectualism with Aristotle's, then, 
we find many differences. What of the similarities? 
5. Three Features of Behavioural Dispositions 
What Aristotle and Ryle have in common is that they both use notions of a behaviour 
which is at once repeated, automatic and responsible. In Ryle' s case the notion is that 
of a behavioural disposition, which he wants us to understand as a variety of 
knowledge-how, as opposed to knowledge-that, something that I earlier (§2) said of 
Aristotelian virtue.16 But even given that behavioural dispositions are knowledge-
how, we cannot simply conclude that they will be subject to the same treatment as 
virtues. For within the class of behavioural dispositions Ryle distinguishes between 
"mere habits" and "intelligent capacities" (pp. 41-4), and he is dismissive about the 
former. He writes that "the common assumption that all second natures are mere 
habits obliterates distinctions which are of cardinal importance for the inquiries in 
which we are engaged" (p. 42).17 This may signal problems not only for my 
interpretation of Ryle, but also for my broader claims about habits. But there is a way 
of understanding Ryle which leaves both projects intact. How, then, does Ryle draw 
the distinction? 
"Mere habits" are distinct from intelligent capacities in four respects (pp. 42-
3): (i) in the amount of "care, vigilance, or criticism" needed to exercise them- none is 
16 The claim that Ryle's distinction is a good one has recently been questioned by Stanley and Williamson 
(2001), who argue that "knowledge-how is simply a species of knowing that" (p. 411). However, not 
only do they rely on extremely weak (and thus contentious) criteria of propositional knowledge, and 
deploy the (to this reader) opaque idea of a "practical mode of presentation", I think their argument 
against Ryle's positive account (p. 416) may trade on an equivocation between the knowledge required to 
describe how to do something, and the practical skill of doing it. It is the latter interpretation, and not the 
former, that I take it that Ryle intends. 
17 I take the "common assumption" to be akin to that of the (influential at the time) methodological 
behaviourists such as Skinner and Watson (seen. 15). Ryle's thought is that a convincing case against the 
Cartesian picture can only be made by explicating the more "sophisticated" dispositions that Ryle terms 
"intelligent capacities", because it is generally only the exercise of these capacities that tempts us into 
Cartesian myths. 
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required for mere habits; (ii) in the way in which each performance affects future 
performances - exercising a mere habit has no such effect: "one performance is a 
replica of its predecessors"; (iii) in the way they are learned - mere habits are learned 
by "drill", that is, "the imposition of repetition", in contrast to "training", which 
involves both drill and "the stimulation by criticism and example of the pupil's own 
judgement"; and finally (iv) in the range of performances that can arise from one of 
them mere habits are "single-track", whereas intelligent capacities are 
"heterogeneous" .1s 
Ryle' s distinction has come in for criticism.19 However, whilst the distinction 
may have its problems, it is still possible to argue that both mere habits and intelligent 
capacities have our three features, so problems with the distinction do not count 
against my claim. 
First, given Ryle' s distinction it is easy to settle the question of whether 
behavioural dispositions are repeated. The acquisition of both mere habits and 
intelligent capacities involves drill. There is also evidence that Ryle thinks that 
dispositions of both kinds need to be practised continually to be correctly attributed, 
as was the case for the virtues. 20 
However, when we turn to the questions of whether the exercises of 
behavioural dispositions are automatic and whether they are responsible, things 
become much less straightforward. For Ryle mere habits certainly seem to be 
automatic. He writes: 
1s This last distinction originates in Aristotle, see Makin (2000). 
19 See for instance Nathan Brett (1981), who attack's Ryle's distinction in order to argue that there is no 
inconsistency between "rule following" behaviour and acting habihtally. 
20 For instance, when discussing whetl1er a marksman's bull's eye was a fluke or a good shot Ryle writes 
that, amongst other things, "we should take into account his subsequent shots" (p. 45). Later on, "When 
we say that someone acts in a certain way from sheer force of habit, part of what we have in mind is ... 
that in similar circumstances he always acts in just this way" (p. 106). 
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When we describe someone as doing something from pure or blind habit, we mean that 
he does it automatically, and without having in mind what he is doing. He does not 
exercise care, vigilance, or criticism. (p. 42) 
But then it seems to follow that when an agent manifests an intelligent capacity, he 
does exercise "care, vigilance, or criticism", and therefore does not act automatically. 
So intelligent capacities seem to provide a counter example to the claim that 
behavioural dispositions are automatic. 
But I think this conclusion would be a mistake. In his criticism of Ryle's 
distinction, Nathan Brett (1981) gives an example of a dentist who washes his hands 
before each appointment (pp. 363-5). Whilst there is undoubtedly good reason for the 
dentist to do this, it has become a habit, so he does not deliberate about whether to do 
it each time. In this sense it is automatic. This activity also counts as an intelligent 
capacity because (i) hand washing requires care and vigilance (if not also criticism); 
(ii) in view of this care, it is open to the dentist to improve upon his habit, say, by 
being more thorough; (iii) the learning of the habit would not typically have involved 
mere drill, but instruction too; and (iv) there are no good grounds for thinking of 
hand-washing as "single-track", for there may be infinite small variations between 
successive exercises. 21 Brett's point, then, is that none of these features of intelligence 
are incompatible with the fact that the agent acts automatically. I am not sure 
whether this conclusion would be satisfactory to Ryle, but I speculate that it would 
not be fatal to his anti-Cartesian project. So both mere habits and intelligent capacities 
can be automatic. 
Another difficulty arises when we ask if we have personal responsibility for 
manifesting both sorts of dispositions. Whilst Ryle would no doubt agree that we are 
personally responsible for our intelligent capacities, I doubt that he would say the 
same of mere habits. He writes, for instance: 
21 Brett writes "a close look at either the facts about human habits or the language we use in talking about 
them would lead us away from the view that these must be 'single-track' dispositions yielding responses 
which are 'exact replicas' of one another" (1981, p. 369). 
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The practices are not learned until the pupil's responses to his cues are automatic, until 
he can" do them in his sleep", as it is revealingly put. (p. 42) 
An action done from pure habit is one that is not done on purpose and is one that the 
agent need not be able to report having done even immediately after having done it; his 
mind may have been on something else. (p. 127) 
These quotes suggest that for Ryle the agent is not responsible for her merely habitual 
behaviours, but rather her body, through drill, becomes "programmed" to react in a 
certain way. The reaction is little more than a reflex.22 On any sensible view we are 
not personally responsible for the manifestations of our reflexes. 
However, when we look at the examples of mere habits that Ryle gives, it 
seems that we would say that we are responsible for their exercise, and so the 
assimilation with reflexes would be a mistake. Ryle' s examples of mere habits include 
the recruit who learns to slope arms, and the child who learns the alphabet and 
multiplication tables (p. 42). Even though we might learn these things by drill, we do 
not thereby relinquish responsibility for their exercise. We can see this by reflecting 
on the fact that we have a certain amount of control over such behaviours. 
Specifically, it is always open to an agent who has been drilled in these things not to 
exercise a mere habit on a particular occasion. The rebellious recruit could defy the 
orders given to him; and there may be occasions on which sloping arms might 
actually cause harm (doing it in a confined space, for example). In such cases, the 
recruit would be culpable for the merely habitual behaviour because he should have 
been sensitive to other factors. This shows that a "merely" habitual behaviour is not 
an uncontrolled response, like a reflex, but is under the agent's control and could 
therefore count as something that the agent does. This thought will be developed in 
Chapter 4. 
In sum, even if we accept Ryle's distinction between mere habits and 
intelligent capacities, they both represent the idea of behaviours that are repeated, 
automatic and responsible. In these respects at least, then, the idea of a behavioural 
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disposition which Ryle uses to combat intellectualism, can be thought of as kindred to 
Aristotle's idea of a virtue, which is used to an analogous end. 
6. Wittgenstein 
The third and final philosopher whose work I want to consider is the Wittgenstein of 
the Philosophical Investigations. Like Aristotle and Ryle, Wittgenstein had his own 
intellectualist ghosts to exorcise, and in doing so, he, like them, employed a number of 
notions which share the same three features. 
One of Wittgenstein' s aims in the Investigations is to explicate the phenomenon 
of linguistic meaning: to say what it is for a speaker to "mean" something by a word 
or sentence, or, as it is sometimes put, to use a word or sentence "with 
understanding" .23 Early on in the book Wittgenstein writes: 
For a large class of cases- though not for all- in which we employ the word 'meaning' it 
can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. (PI §43) 
It is not until later in the book that we see how this might be part of an anti-
intellectualist solution to a problem that has hitherto been addressed in intellectualist 
ways. 
22 Ryle explicitly groups mere habits witl1 reflexes, for instance, when he talks of them boili as being 
"single-track dispositions" (p. 46). 
23 I say iliat Wittgenstein sought to "explicate" meaning in order to distinguish his aspirations from 
anotl1er twentieili century project of constructing a "tl1eory" of meaning. A ilieory (or "analysis") of 
meaning explains what it is for any word or sentence to be meaningful in terms which do not themselves 
draw on ilie idea of meaning. Examples of such ilieories include tl10se which understand meaning in 
terms of "truth conditions" (e.g. Davidson), or "assertability conditions" (e.g. Dummett). Wittgenstein 
notoriously did not offer ilieoretical accounts of iliis kind for any concept, (ironically) precisely because of 
what he took meaning to be. According to his own conception of meaning as "use", he thought that the 
proper approach to giving an account of any concept is to examine the actual uses to which ilie term 
expressive of that concept is generally put, and to describe iliose uses as accurately as possible, iliat is, to 
explicate it. Such explication displays tl1e concept's meaning, and is prior to any ilieory construction 
which is thereby shown to be an optional exercise at best. The concept of linguistic meaning itself is no 
exception to iliis approach. 
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The passages which present the intellectualist conception of meaning to be 
rejected are found within the portion of the Investigations known as "the rule 
following considerations" (PI §§138-242). Here, Wittgenstein identifies a feature of all 
meaningful word or sentence use. Namely, all meaningful word or sentence uses are 
not merely subject to "factual" judgements of the form "A uttered such-and-such". In 
that respect they resemble any happenings, irrespective of meaningfulness. Rather, in 
addition to being subject to such factual judgements, in virtue of being meaningful, 
these uses are also subject to judgements to the effect that "such-and-such" is in some 
sense an "appropriate" or "correct" thing to say in the circumstances; as we might call 
them, "normative" judgements. We can only make sense of the use of a word being a 
"mistake" against a background of there being a "correct" way to use it. Wittgenstein 
notices that in respect of having this normative feature, meaningful word or sentence 
uses are akin to many other performances, all of which we might call instances of 
"following a rule". Wittgenstein' s example of a non-linguistic rule is that of 
continuing a number series (PI §143). Thus for Wittgenstein, in respect of the 
normativity of rules, the investigation into linguistic meaning expands into the more 
general investigation of what it is to follow any rule. 
Wittgenstein illustrates the normativity of mathematical rules with his famous 
example of the pupil who applies the rule "+2" in the usual way for numbers up to 
1000 and then writes down "1000, 1004, 1008, 1012" (PI §185). We can certainly 
conceive of individuals who might apply the rule in this way, but Wittgenstein is 
concerned to discover in what the correctness we find to be lacking consists. This 
then is the problem of rule following. 
It is at this point that Wittgenstein considers an account of rule following 
which deserves the name "intellectualist". This is the idea that understanding a rule 
consists in having some "interpretation" of the rule which determines how the rule is 
to be properly applied. So having such an interpretation is the agent having some 
item of "knowledge" which discloses to the agent how the rule should actually be 
applied on any future occasion. According to this view, the item of knowledge 
features in the explanation of any instance of the rule's correct application (§§186-8). 
Such knowledge might be the kind of thing that comes to us "in a flash" when we 
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study a series of numbers and suddenly see how to go on (§§191, 197).24 On this view, 
the distinction between correct and mistaken applications of a rule consists in whether 
the performance is appropriately" guided" by the supposed knowledge, or not. 
This intellectualism about rule following has clear affinities with the 
intellectualist interpretation of the Socratic thesis that Aristotle attacked, discussed in 
§2.25 Both the intellectualist notion of virtue, and the intellectualist account of rule 
following suppose that what explains these capacities is knowledge of some 
"universal principle". But like Aristotle before him, Wittgenstein did not think that 
such notions were required to make sense of the phenomenon in question. 
"But how can a rule show me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on some 
interpretation, in accord with the rule?" - That is not what we ought to say, but rather: 
any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it 
any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning. 
"Then can whatever I do be brought into accord with the rule?" - Let me ask this: 
what has the expression of a rule- say a sign-post- got to do with my actions? What sort 
of connexion is there here? - Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to this 
sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it. 
But that is only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that we now 
go by a sign-post; not by what this going-by-the-sign really consists in. On the contrary; I 
have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a 
regular use of sign-posts, a custom (PI §198). 
I follow McDowell (1984) in thinking that the above passage contains an outline of 
Wittgenstein' s response to intellectualism. But rather than justifying that reading of 
24 Another metaphor for the same idea is that of the rule as a "super-rigid machine" which determines all 
the steps (§§193-4). See also Wittgenstein's discussion of the "cube" (§140). 
zs McDowell (1979) implicitly connects these two kinds of intellectualism because he employs 
Wittgenstein's argument (below) to combat Socratic intellectualism (seen. 2 above). 
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Wittgenstein, I want simply to defer to McDowell on this matter, whom I read as 
follows. 26 
Wittgenstein' s argument against the intellectualist account of rule following 
has two parts: one negative; the other positive. The negative argument rejects two 
ideas. First, if having an interpretation of the rule were all there was to following it, 
then we generate a vicious regress. For even if we concede that such an interpretation 
were available, there would still be a question of how the rule follower should follow 
the interpretation. If the intellectualist were to invoke his account of rule following at 
this point, then any such guidance must in turn be determined by a further 
interpretation, whose correct application must in turn be guided by some further 
interpretation, and so on ad infinitum. The regress is vicious because the question of 
how the rule follower should act is never settled. Hence the capacity to follow a rule 
cannot be what the intellectualist takes it to be. 
In rejecting the intellectualist account, however, Wittgenstein wanted to avoid 
a second, and equally unattractive account. Here is how McDowell puts things: 
Wittgenstein's problem is to steer a course between a Scylla and a Charybdis. Scylla is 
the idea that understanding is always an interpretation ... Charybdis [is] the picture of a 
basic level at which there are no norms. (McDowell1984, p. 242) 
We have already seen both the attractiveness and the perils of Scylla. What then of 
Charybdis, "the picture of a basic level at which there are no norms"?27 This idea is 
that following a rule is, at its most basic, a mere mechanical response to some 
stimulus. This view might seem attractive to anybody with naturalistic sympathies, 
because it dispenses with spurious items of knowledge, and instead promises to 
explain our capacity to follow rules with reference to nothing more than the 
dispositions of physical phenomena to behave according to causal laws. But this kind 
of reduction creates a problem, because at the "basic level" we no longer have any 
26 In particular this is to follow McDowell in his rejection of Kripke's (1982) "sceptical" reading of the rule 
following passages. 
27 This is a position which, according to McDowell, Crispin Wright (1980) mistakenly occupies. One of 
the purposes of McDowell's paper is to reject Wright's interpretation. 
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grounds for saying that a given response is "correct" or "incorrect". To borrow 
McDowell's example (pp. 234-5), if we insist on understanding an utterance of "This is 
yellow" as a mechanical response to a yellow flower, we thereby forfeit the right to 
say that the utterance was "meaningful". We have not explained the normativity of 
meaning, but denied it. Hence the reduction of rule following to the "basic level" 
cannot succeed. 
Having considered and rejected two wrong accounts of rule following, 
Wittgenstein makes his positive proposal, that it is possible to steer a course between 
Scylla and Charybdis. McDowell asks: 
How can a performance both be nothing but a "blind" reaction to a situation, not an 
attempt to act on an interpretation (avoiding Scylla); and be a case of going by a rule 
(avoiding Charybdis)? The answer is: by belonging to a custom, practice, or institution. 
(McDowell, 1984, p. 242). 
The idea is that when we understand an instance of rule following as part of a 
"custom", "practice" or "institution", this gives us a way of understanding a 
performance as subject to normative judgements, whilst avoiding both Scylla and 
Charybdis. By understanding a putative instance of rule following as part of a 
"custom" (practice, institution), we identify a sense in which that performance can be 
judged "correct" or "incorrect", that is, by making reference to the way the rule is 
normally applied within that "custom" (practice, institution). This is not to say that 
reference to custom delivers certainty about the status of a given performance, 
because there is still contingency in any judgement of what counts as "more of the 
same". But it is to say that if we are to look anywhere to understand the sense in 
which we count one performance as "correct", another as "incorrect", customs are the 
place to look. The solution avoids Scylla because the notions of "custom" (practice, 
institution) are not conceived of as "inner" states of agents, but, on the contrary, 
express what is plain for us all to see in our everyday ways of doing things. And we 
avoid Charybdis by refusing to identify a customary behaviour with a mere causal 
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response. As Wittgenstein writes "To use a word without a justification does not 
mean to use it without right" (PI §290).28 
This in very broad outline is what I take to be Wittgenstein's solution to the 
problem of rule following. The implications are extremely wide ranging, not just for 
philosophical accounts of meaning and normativity, but also for our conception of the 
kinds of thing that philosophy itself can deliver. The question for now, however, is 
this: do the notions that Wittgenstein uses in his solution to the problem of rule 
following have the three features of being repeated, automatic and responsible? To 
answer this question we shall need to find our way through a controversy which has 
sprung up around Wittgenstein's comments on rule following. 
7. The Spurious Role of the Community 
There is much disagreement about how the notions of "custom", "practice" and 
"institution" should be understood. Specifically, there is controversy over how these 
ideas are related to the idea of a "community". Some claim that Wittgenstein' s central 
point is that they are. If this is indeed his point, then the claim that Wittgenstein's 
anti-intellectualism depends upon employing notions which share the same features 
as Aristotle and Ryle' s projects, could be weakened, since we have had no need to 
refer to anybody but the individual agent in characterising their solutions. We must 
therefore consider this debate if we are to argue convincingly that Wittgenstein's anti-
intellectualism is of a piece with theirs. 
In the 1980s and 1990s many philosophers were polarised on the issue of 
whether Wittgenstein uses the notions of "custom", "practice" and "institution" in 
order to draw our attention to the fact that the normativity inherent in rule following 
in general and meaning in particular is essentially social.29 One group of 
philosophers, who became known as communitarians, took Wittgenstein' s use of 
2s Although this passage lies outside the portion identified as the "rule following considerations", I 
follow McDowell (1984, p. 241) in thinking it to be relevant here. 
29 Though the debate was initiated in an exchange between A. J. Ayer (1954) and Rush Rhees (1954), it 
was given new life by Kripke's (1982) reading of Wittgenstein. 
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terms like "custom" to mean "social custom".3° They tried to argue that the point of 
Wittgenstein' s rule following passages was to advance a theory according to which 
rule following is "essentially social", and hence the idea of a "solitary" rule follower 
made no sense (though there is disagreement upon what being "solitary" could 
amount to).31 
Communitarianism has been rejected by individualists, who deny that 
Wittgenstein meant to implicate the community, and argue that the idea of "solitary" 
rule following makes perfectly good sense.32 For instance, Baker and Hacker write: 
The pivotal point in Wittgenstein's remarks on following rules is that a rule is intemally 
related to acts which accord with it. The rule and nothing but the rule determines what 
is correct. This idea is incompatible with defining" correct" in terms of what is normal or 
standard practice in a community. (Baker & Hacker, 1986, pp. 171-2). 
Baker and Hacker here propose that what is objectionable about the communitarian 
interpretation is that thinking of correctness in terms of communal practice is 
"incompatible" with another, better, definition of correctness. However, I do not 
think that we need to read Wittgenstein as advancing a positive claim like the one 
suggested here in order to oppose the communitarian view. 
One source of opposition to communitarianism comes from the rule following 
passages themselves. Although McDowell is right that Wittgenstein uses the terms 
"custom" (PI §198), "practice" (PI §202) and "institution" (PI §199) to give his account 
of rule following, Wittgenstein also uses the terms "use" (PI §199) and "technique" (PI 
3o Communitarians include Rush Rhees (1954), Saul Kripke (1982), Norman Malcolm (1986, 1989), Robert 
Fogelin (1987), Meredith Williams (1991), T. S. Champlin (1992) and David Bloor (1997). 
31 All agree that "solitary" does not here mean mere physical isolation. Aside from this, interpretations 
differ. Kripke thinks that an individual "considered in isolation" (1982, p. 110) could not be said to 
follow rules. Malcolm thinks that an individual's lack of teaching (1986, p. 159), or her not being subject 
to other people's corrections (1986, p. 175) are the marks of solitariness. Implicit here are views about 
what it is to be a member of a community. 
32 Individualists include Baker & Hacker (1984, 1985, 1990), Simon Blackburn (1984b) and Colin McGinn 
(1984). 
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§199). Of the five terms, these latter two do not obviously imply any connection to a 
community, but are more naturally thought of as applicable to individuals.33 
However, this textual argument is not decisive. 
There are two further difficulties for the communitarian. First that the 
communitarian has yet to say exactly how the community is implicated in rule 
following. As McDowell puts it, 
if regularities in the verbal behaviour of an isolated individual, described in norm-free 
terms, do not add up to meaning, it is quite obscure how it could somehow make all the 
difference if there are several individuals with matching regularities. (1984, pp. 252-3) 
In the absence of such an articulation, the communitarian claim is weakened.34 
Unfortunately this leaves us without an interpretation of Wittgenstein' s use of 
apparently communal notions such as "custom", and leaves the individualist view 
looking more plausible than perhaps it should. 
A second objection affects both communitarians and individualists alike. The 
point is simple. It is a mistake to read Wittgenstein as offering any general account of 
what the correctness of rule following comes to. This is supported by the fact that 
Wittgenstein uses the range of terms that he does to explicate the phenomenon, and is 
consistent with a broader view of how Wittgenstein thinks philosophy should be 
done. 
33 It is perhaps because McDowell underplays such terms that Blackburn (1984b) reads McDowell as 
advancing a version of communitarianism. In favour of the attribution McDowell writes, for instance, "it 
cannot be denied that the insistence on publicity in Kripke's reading corresponds broadly with a 
Wittgensteinian thought" (1984, p. 243). However, in a later paper McDowell goes on to distance himself 
from any "constructive" account of how meaning is possible, which any version of communitarianism 
would represent: "I now think [the paper "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule"] is too hospitable to this 
kind of reading" (1993, p. 275, n. 6). McDowell rejects Blackburn's attribution explicitly at 1984, p. 253, n. 
49. 
34 This would include the notions of community membership implicit in Kripke and Malcolm; see n. 31 
above. 
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Wittgenstein is well known for stressing the importance for our understanding 
of concepts of what he calls "family resemblance" terms (PI §66-77). His examples of 
such terms include "game", "good" and "number". For Wittgenstein, it would be a 
mistake to try to identify the common features of all things to which we apply such 
terms, and think of these features as representing the "essence" of the notion, or the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the term's correct application. Even if we 
could identify a set of common features, this would not tell us what the term in 
question "really means". It is plausible that terms such as "rule", and hence "rule 
follower" would fall into the same category.3s Therefore, in view of his general 
opposition to the idea that the primary role of philosophy is to advance "theories" (PI 
§109) or "theses" (PI §128), the idea that Wittgenstein is making any general claim 
about the correctness of rule following, whether individualist or communitarian, 
requires defence. 
If this interpretation is right, Wittgenstein is not committed to any view about 
the normativity of particular rules. For any given rule, it is quite open to Wittgenstein 
to say that the criteria for its correct application are "communal" or "individual" in 
some sense. The sense, or senses, of correctness associated with any given rule may 
be attributed according to communal or individual standards, or indeed both. We 
need to look in detail at the ways in which the rule is, or is not, related to other people, 
by looking at all aspects of how the rule features in the life of the rule follower. This 
will include considering how the rule is learned: is it taught, picked up by copying, or 
is it in some sense self-taught? We need to consider whether following the rule 
essentially requires the presence of others, as in the rules of conversation, or those of 
team games. And we should take into account whether others have a role in 
correcting misapplications of the rule, or whether mistakes will be picked up by the 
35 Wittgenstein mentions a diverse range of "rules": not just mathematical rules like "+2" (PI §185), and 
"rules" of word use (PI §80-2), but also sign-posts (PI §198); the rules of chess (PI §197); rules which work 
like natural laws which are inferred from watching others follow them (PI §54); rules which we make up 
as we go along (PI §83); and rules which we alter as we go along (PI §83). 
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rule follower hersel£.36 These are all facts about particular rules that can be 
determined empirically. The mistake is to think that such facts are available for rules 
in general. 
If this is right it is reasonable to conclude that Wittgenstein' s employment of 
five different terms to explicate rule following, some of which suggest links to a 
community, others which do not, is no oversight. He is rather drawing our attention 
to the diversity of examples of rule following. It follows that the suggestion that 
Wittgenstein is making a general claim about the community's essential involvement 
or non-involvement in rule following is incorrect. 
8. Wittgenstein's Actual Solution and Three of its Features 
Nevertheless, I think that there is one general point that Wittgenstein has to make 
about rule following, though in comparison with the issue considered above it has 
received little attention.37 The general point is not that rule following is essentially 
connected with the community, or indeed essentially unconnected with it. It is rather 
that rule following is an activity that an individual learns, and subsequently goes on 
to perform. Whether the activity is learned from others, executed amongst others, or 
corrected by others, as we would expect when the activities in question are "customs" 
or "institutions", are factors which we can reasonably expect to vary from activity to 
activity. And others may not be involved in the acquisition of rules at all. What 
Wittgenstein suggests is central to all rule following activities, whether "techniques", 
"customs", "uses", "institutions" or "practices", is that they are all learned reactions.3B 
And it is in this respect that rule following action has a close affinity with the notions 
employed by Aristotle and Ryle. 
36 It is no coincidence that these roles for the community correspond to those suggested by 
communitarians such as Malcolm (seen. 31 above). 
37 A notable exception is Meredith Williams (1994). 
38 We might speculate on the reasons for the neglect of this aspect of Wittgenstein's solution. Perhaps it is 
symptomatic of the same prevailing philosophical blindness that leads philosophers to neglect habits 
themselves. 
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Wittgenstein repeatedly emphasises the importance of "learning", "teaching" 
and "training". Here are some examples from the rule following sections themselves: 
How does [the pupil] get to understand this notation? - First of all the series of numbers 
will be written down for him and he will be required to copy them ... And here already 
there is a normal and an abnormal learner's reaction. (PI §143) 
What is the criterion for the way the formula is meant? It is, for example, the kind of 
way we always use it, the way we are taught to use it. (PI §190) 
"Then can whatever I do be brought into accord with the rule?" - Let me ask this: what 
has the expression of a rule - say a sign-post- got to do with my actions? What sort of 
connexion is there here?- Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to this sign 
in a particular way, and now I do so react to it. (PI §198)39 
In this last remark, recall, Wittgenstein is offering the idea of a learned reaction as an 
alternative to the intellectualist picture that McDowell calls Scylla. If this is right as a 
reading of Wittgenstein, and there is plenty of support for this view from Meredith 
Williams (1994), we can now ask how Wittgenstein's idea of a learned reaction can be 
seen to be the idea of a behaviour which is repeated, automatic and responsible. 
Wittgenstein is clear about the role of repetition. He writes "It is not possible 
that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule" (PI 
§199). So there is no difficulty with the status of the initial attempt at rule following, 
as there may have been for Aristotle's virtues (see §3). The repetition in learned 
reactions consists in the individual's past performances of the behaviour in question, 
and particularly those which were part of the initial training. 
Is the exercise of a learned reaction automatic in the sense that it is marked by 
the absence of deliberation? We saw above that on McDowell's reading the whole 
point of Wittgenstein' s solution to the rule following problem is that it is an 
alternative to a picture according to which "inner" items are supposed to "guide" the 
rule follower. This generated McDowell's Scylla. So if we understand "deliberation" 
as the consultation and weighing up of "inner" representations which might speak for 
39 See also PI §206. 
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or against acting, Wittgenstein' s regress applies equally to this (PI §211). For 
Wittgenstein, following a rule cannot merely be an intellectual matter, rather it must 
be practical. That is not to say that an agent could not deliberate before following a 
rule on some particular occasion. It is rather to say that the question of whether or not 
deliberation takes place is independent from the question of whether or not she 
actually follows the rule. It is no coincidence that all five of the terms that 
Wittgenstein uses in his account of rule following are practical notions, i.e. they refer 
to things that are overtly done, not things that are merely thought. The idea of 
learning can be seen as a replacement for deliberation because it shows how the kind 
of reaction in question is not accidental, but a reaction which is constrained by, and 
naturally follows from, the learning process. 
Are agents personally responsible for their learned reactions? Wittgenstein 
was not directly concerned with this question, but there are a number of points in the 
text that suggest not only that Wittgenstein does not want to demote the notion of rule 
following to the status of a mere mechanical response (avoiding Charybdis), but also 
wants to say that the agent is implicated in exercises of rule following. For instance, 
Wittgenstein asks "what has the expression of a rule got to do with my actions?" (PI 
§198), to which he answers, "I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular 
way, and now I do so react to it". Wittgenstein's use of the term "action", as well as 
the personal pronouns "my" and "I" suggest that rule following behaviour can, for 
Wittgenstein, count as nothing less than an expression of agency. 
This is not conclusive. For all of the notions that Wittgenstein employs, we 
would be wise to express reservations about the individual agent's responsibility for 
exercising them. A technique can be picked up unintentionally, so the individual may 
be thought not to be wholly responsible for its exercise. And as we saw in §5, when a 
technique is acquired from others, as when a child copies her parents, we have strong 
intuitions that the child is not personally responsible when she later practises that 
technique. These issues are complex and will be taken up in Chapter 4. For now we 
can rely on the prima facie case for thinking that Wittgenstein' s notion of a learned 
response is something for which agents are personally responsible. We can conclude 
that Wittgenstein too cures intellectualism with the idea of a habit. 
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It is worth mentioning that the view that rule following is a sort of habitual 
behaviour is not entirely new. Philip Pettit (1993) has proposed a version of this idea 
in what he calls his "ethocentric" account of rule following (pp. 76-108), though to my 
mind Pettit's view of these things has other weaknesses.40 Others have explicitly 
rejected the suggestion. Peter Winch, for example, (1958, pp. 57-65) denies that rule 
following behaviour is habitual on the grounds that a pupil "has to learn not merely 
to do things in the same way as his teacher, but also what counts as the same way" (p. 
59). I think Winch makes two mistakes. First, I think his reading of Wittgenstein is 
questionable. And second, I think he, like Ryle, is working with an impoverished 
notion of habit.41 My suspicion is that insofar as people reject my view of rule 
following, they are likely to be making one or both of these mistakes. 
9. The Curative Power of Habits 
In this chapter I have argued that Aristotle, Ryle and Wittgenstein have all tried to 
offer remedies for distinctive strains of intellectualism. These are respectively the 
intellectualist interpretation of the Socratic thesis, the Cartesian picture of the mind, 
and the idea that rule following in general and meaning in particular is always an 
interpretation. Though each thinker proposes distinctive practical notions to effect 
their cure - respectively a virtue, a behavioural disposition, and a learned response -
these notions have much in common. All three represent kinds of behaviours which 
are repeated, in that they are all learned by repetition; automatic in the sense that they 
do not involve a process of deliberation; and they are all behaviours for which the 
agent is personally responsible. It is in virtue of sharing these features that we can 
term all of these three notions "habits", in a sense of that term which is familiar 
enough from its ordinary use. 
If we understand habits, then, as all and only those behaviours which are 
repeated, automatic and responsible in the senses described, we can see the idea of a 
40 In Chapter 3, §7 I take issue with the conception of habits Pettit uses in his account. 
41 Here I follow Brett (1981) in rejecting the presupposition embodied in Winch's claim, that we ca1mot 
know "what counts" as the same way when we exercise a habit. 
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habit as a notion which is both simpler than, and broader than, those employed by the 
three thinkers surveyed. Unlike Aristotelian virtues, habits need not be associated 
with specifically moral behaviour; unlike some Rylean dispositions, habits need not 
be thought of as particularly "intelligent" or "unintelligent"; and unlike some 
Wittgensteinian learned reactions, habits need not be thought of as essentially 
connected to a community. But Aristotelian virtues, behavioural dispositions and 
learned reactions are all kinds within the class of habits. The short history presented 
in this chapter can therefore be understood as the judicious deployment of kinds of 
habit in arguments against intellectualism. 
This interpretation of the history suggests two profitable lines of thought. 
First, and most straightforwardly, habits, or some varieties of them, might be 
employed to cure other intellectualisms. That may well be a fruitful exercise in a 
number of areas of philosophy, and I shall make some suggestions in that respect in 
Chapters 7 and 8. 
But there is a second implication specifically for the philosophy of action. For 
if we ask why habits have this power to combat intellectualism, a plausible 
explanations is this. For the historical anti-intellectualisms to have succeeded, habits 
must not themselves be vulnerable to intellectualist interpretations, but must rather 
represent a class of human behaviour which is not beset by intellectualist problems. 
Whilst Aristotle, Ryle and Wittgenstein all noticed the possibility of this kind of 
behaviour, habits, as I noted in Chapter 1, have no distinctive place in contemporary 
philosophy of action. Not only does this invite an appropriate correction to current 
accounts of action, but if the first suggestion made above is to be pursued, such a 
correction will also be important outside that field. For an argument which relies 
upon an unsubstantiated and controversial claim about actions is less likely to 
persuade than one that does not. The prior task, then, is to substantiate the claim that 
habits have a proper and distinctive place in the philosophy of action. That is the job 
of the next four chapters. 
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HABITUAL BEHAVIOUR 
1. Defining Habits 
In Chapter 2 we saw that Aristotle, Ryle and Wittgenstein all employed varieties of 
habit in order to combat intellectualist trends of their times. In that chapter we 
worked with a simple definition of a habit, that is, as a behaviour which is repeated, 
automatic and responsible. Whilst some progress was made in that chapter towards 
saying how these terms might be understood, the primary task there was exegetical. 
We can now turn our attention to the job of describing in detail what it means to say 
that a given piece of behaviour is "habitual", by explicating each of these three 
features. The result will be a more precise definition for use later in the thesis. Even 
though I shall make some stipulations in giving this definition, the hope is that it will 
still capture a large portion of the behaviours that we would naturally call "habitual" 
in our everyday discourse. 
In this chapter I shall deal with the first of the two features of habits -
repetition (§§2-4) and automatism (§§5-7). These two features alone give us an 
understanding of what it means to say that a habit is learned, which I shall also spell 
out (§8). This will yield a definition of a habitual behaviour, though not yet a definition 
of habitual action. In the next chapter we shall turn our attention to the question of 
how such behaviour can be regarded as responsible, and hence as action proper. 
It may seem that there are two jobs here - one of defining a habit and another 
of defining a particular piece of habitual behaviour - and we only need to do the 
second. But the two jobs are interdependent. We cannot understand what a habit is 
without understanding its manifestations; and we cannot understand what a habitual 
behaviour is without appreciating that it is just one manifestation of a habit. So whilst 
in this chapter the primary goal is to define particular habitual behaviours, largely 
because we shall later be engaging with debates about particular actions, we shall 
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implicitly be developing a corresponding notion of habit, of which those behaviours 
are exercises. 
A note on some of the terminology used in this chapter. First, when I use the 
term "agent" I shall mean the kind of being that it makes sense to hold personally 
responsible for what she does. Healthy, adult humans are agents in this sense. Very 
young children, people in comas, non-human animals, plants, corkscrews and stones 
are not. Second, I mean the term "behaviour" to refer to happenings which involve 
the agent's body (though may extend beyond it, as for example when we use 
equipment). In particular, I mean the term "behaviour" to be neutral between actions, 
roughly, things agents do, and what we might call "mere behaviour", things that 
happen to agents. Because I shall not argue that habitual behaviours are actions until 
the next chapter, I shall not in this chapter refer to them as actions. Lastly, although I 
shall not be proposing a definition of the term "habit" until the end of the next 
chapter, I shall use the term frequently in the meantime. When I do so I mean to pick 
out an agent's temporally extended pattern of behaviours which conform to our 
working definition of a habitual action, by being repeated, automatic and responsible. 
I should also comment on the fact that I do not draw on the writings of others 
very much in this chapter. There is a good explanation for this. Whilst writers such 
as Peters (1963), Hamm (1975) and Brett (1981) have noticed the importance of habits, 
and specified them as having roughly the three features I have identified, they have 
not gone into the details of what each of these features amounts to. I seek here a 
detailed account, which may have implications for their claims. 
2. Repetition 
Habitual behaviours are repeated. We have seen that for Aristotle, Ryle and 
Wittgenstein, repetition is important because it is the means by which doing a given 
sort of thing becomes automatic. However, repetition of a behaviour is not merely a 
means to acquiring a habit (whatever that may mean); it is part of what it is to have a 
habit. If somebody said of a given piece of behaviour that it is habitual, not knowing 
whether the agent had done nothing like it before, their competence in using the term 
would be called into question. Repetition, then, is built in to the concept of a habit. In 
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this and the next two sections I want to clarify this idea of repetition, its limits, and 
how particular repetitions might be specified. I shall return to the question of what it 
means to say that a habit has been "acquired" by repetition in §7. 
To say, as I almost did above, that for a piece of behaviour to be habitual, 
something like it must have been done before, and is in that sense repeated, is both 
too vague and too liberal. It is too vague because it is quite unclear what "something 
like it" determines; and too liberal, because unless this is specified, it does not seem to 
rule out many behaviours at all. If we look more closely, we find that we can be more 
specific about the sort of repetition involved in habitual behaviour. 
The following are all examples of what I want to call repeated behaviours 
(though they may not also be habitual): 
a) Tom goes to the pub this evening, and has been to the pub on previous 
evenings this week. 
b) Pamela is cleaning the floor, as she often does when she's nervous. 
c) My blinking. 
d) Paul goes sculling on Wednesday, as he does most Wednesdays. 
e) My biting my nails when I'm thinking. 
f) My regular attendance at a Durham night club on Mondays. 
The first thing to notice about the repetition in these behaviours is that they 
have been repeated by the individual agents themselves. We saw in Chapter 2 (§3) 
that there is a possible case for saying that a piece of behaviour could be regarded as 
repeated on the sole grounds that people other than the agent had done this sort of 
thing before, and indeed that fact might explain why the agent does it herself. (In 
particular we saw how this might be a tempting move if we wanted to count the very 
first execution of an apparently virtuous behaviour as virtuous). But whilst we might 
be able to make some sense of the idea of a habit whose repetitions are spread across 
individuals in this way, I think that would not be our usual way of understanding the 
notion. Intuitively, if we know that an individual has never performed a given sort of 
behaviour before, we will not say that it is her habit, whatever the explanation for her 
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doing this now might be. It is habits as they pertain to individuals, and their 
particular histories, in which we are interested. 
The number of repetitions required for an individual to be said to have a 
particular habit can vary enormously. There is no upper limit to the number of 
repetitions required for habitual behaviour. The more times a behaviour has 
occurred, the more confident we get that it is repeated, and that in turn reinforces our 
sense that the individual has the habit. We say that the habit becomes "entrenched". 
There is, however, a lower limit on the number of repetitions. 
For a behaviour to be repeated at all we can say for sure that they must have 
done something like it at least once before. Without at least two behaviours to 
consider, the present one and at least one previous one, the idea of repetition has no 
application. But two occasions may not be enough. We can see this by looking at how 
our everyday talk about repetition tends to go. For we would seldom say of a kind of 
behaviour that it happened "repeatedly" unless it occurred considerably more than 
twice. I may have gone to a particular night-club in Durham twice, but it would be 
misleading for me to say that I had gone "repeatedly", which suggests rather more 
past attendances. Of course, the second occurrence might rightly be termed a 
"repetition" of the first, but it doesn't follow from this that the term "repeatedly" 
applies to this kind of behaviour without strain. Similarly with "habitually". These 
latter terms would be more at home had I been to the night-club on, say, a dozen 
occasions, and perhaps with a certain regularity (of which more shortly). We could of 
course resolve these uncertainties by stipulating a lower limit on repetition, say at 
two, or some other small number. But in view of what is to follow, there is no need. 
For when we come to consider the automatic feature of habits in §5, we have there a 
criterion for what counts as sufficient repetitions for habit attribution. At this stage, 
we can just say that for a behaviour to be repeated it must have occurred at least once 
before. 
3. Specifying Repetition 
To say of a behaviour that it is repeated is to say that it has something- perhaps many 
things - in common with previous behaviours, of which, we have established, there is 
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at least one. But that will not suffice to specify a repeated behaviour. For how we 
describe the behaviour is crucial to making any commonality across behaviours 
visible. How does this work? 
Consider one of the examples from the previous section. When we describe 
what Paul is doing as "going sculling on Wednesday", we are in a position to say that 
he has engaged in behaviour which fits that same description, before. If we had 
described what he is doing in other ways, the repetition could be obscured. So we 
might describe what Paul is doing as "going sculling in the afternoon", but as a matter 
of fact, Paul has never actually sculled in the afternoon before, so he is not repeating 
anything under that description. 
Because repetitions can be described in many different ways the links between 
particular repetitions may otherwise be quite tenuous. So if I say that Paul won at 
rowing on Saturday, and won a game of chess on Sunday, one could say that Paul is 
doing a similar thing, namely, winning repeatedly. Had these activities been 
described in any other way it is unlikely that any kind of similarity could have been 
discerned, and hence there would be no grounds for saying that he was repeatedly 
doing anything. So if we say of any behaviour that is repeated, we imply that there is 
some description which would connect it to past behaviours. 
This means that in describing a behaviour as repeated, we don't merely draw 
attention to common features. We also specify which aspects of the agent's past are to 
count as the behaviour's ancestors. So in saying that Paul's sculling on Wednesday is 
something he does on most Wednesdays, a whole tract of Paul's earlier career 
becomes salient. If I say that Paul sculled very well, as he usually does, another aspect 
of Paul's past comes into view. 
The importance of description in defining repetition does not imply that the 
agent herself has any grasp whatsoever of what that description might be. Identifying 
similarities between behaviours can be done from a purely third-personal perspective. 
And I think the same goes for habit attribution. One need not have any idea that one 
has a given habit, for it to be true that one does. For that reason I do not think we can 
specify any limit on the kinds of similarities that should be permitted in specifying 
repetition. 
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Even given a specification of a repetition, however, the notion can tolerate 
exceptions within various limits. So for example, if I go to the Durham night-club 
every Monday night for five weeks, and then miss a Monday, before resuming my 
routine once more, we would probably want to say that I had repeated this behaviour 
sufficiently often for "going to the night-club on Mondays" to be regarded as a habit 
of mine. If the number of exceptions became too great, however, we would no longer 
say that I repeated this enough for it to count as habitual. So if I went clubbing for 
less than half the available Mondays, it would seem wrong to say that I had this 
particular habit. Given this different history, for us to be able to say that I have a habit 
of clubbing at all, it would have to be described in a different way. 
In our natural understanding of habit, there seem also to be more nuanced 
requirements, not just concerning the proportion of times that I do it, but also 
concerning when the particular historical repetitions take place. There seems, for 
instance, to be a requirement for a certain sort of regularity in the behaviour, which 
rules out what we might call" sporadic" histories. For example, had I gone to the club 
more than half of the available Mondays, but in fits and starts, that would be sporadic. 
My going on four consecutive Mondays, then not at all for four more, then three 
Mondays in succession, would be such a sporadic history. In such cases I take it we 
would be less inclined to call this a habit than we would had I gone on exactly the 
same number of occasions, but with no gaps of more than a week. 
In addition to this, there seems to be a further requirement concerning the 
most recent behaviour of the agent. If I had been to the club every Monday night for 
five weeks, and then did not go at all for another five, it would seem right to say that I 
had not repeated the behaviour sufficiently recently to say that I have the habit. 
Though we may have been willing to say that I once had the habit on grounds of 
repetition alone, we will probably not wish to say that I have the habit now. We 
might indeed want to say that I have "lost the habit" or" got out of the habit".1 
The tolerance for exceptions, then, is quite a complicated business, and 
specifying some behaviour as a repetition will not generally be to specify precisely 
1 I shall offer my own understanding of these terms in §7. 
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how much play will be allowed in these matters. Nevertheless I think we can be more 
prescriptive about the way in which we specify repetitions, in a way that allows us to 
define which past behaviours should count as "exceptions", and which ones should 
not. 
4. A Suggested Schema 
I want to propose that in saying of a behaviour that it is repeated, we don't just 
convey a sense of what occurs, but we also imply an understanding of when it occurs. 
When it comes to specifying the behaviour, that is, in saying what it is to be the 
particular repetition that it is, we can distinguish between a description of the kind of 
behaviour on the one hand, and the description of what I call the normal circumstances 
on the other, that is, the circumstances or context in which that behaviour usually 
(statistically) takes place. So for instance, "my going to a Durham night-club" 
describes my behaviour, and "on Mondays" describes, at least partially, some of the 
circumstances in which that usually takes place. To take the earlier example, "Paul 
going sculling" specifies the behaviour, and "its being a Wednesday" captures the 
circumstances in which he usually does it. Table 1 (overleaf) summarises how, using 
this schema, we might capture this information for the six examples of repeated 
behaviours given earlier. 
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Particular Kind of Behaviour Particular Normal 
Behaviour~ Circumstances C Circumstances 
a) Tom going to the Tom going to the It's being an Evenings this 
pub this evening pub evening of this week 
week 
b) Pamela cleaning Pamela cleaning Pamela is nervous Pamela's being 
the floor now the floor now nervous 
c) My blinking now My blinking 3 seconds elapsed Short time elapsed 
since last blink since last blink, 
dust in the eye, 
strong wind 
d) Paul's sculling Paul going It's being Wednesdays 
outing this sculling Wednesday 
Wednesday 
e) My biting my nails My biting my nails My thinking at My thinking 
at timet timet 
f) My going to a My going to a It's being Monday Mondays 
Durham night- Durham night-
club this Monday club 
Table 1 
Adopting the above schema does not only force us to make explicit some 
features of the repetition which might otherwise be implicit in our descriptions. It 
also allows us to make explicit the tolerance of exceptions described in §3 above. 
In the earlier example of clubbing on Mondays, given a certain history, it was 
easy to distinguish those parts of the history which were genuine ancestors to this 
repetition, from those parts which were exceptions. The reason for this is that in the 
description of the repetition in question the kind of behaviour (going clubbing) was 
clearly distinguished from the normal circumstances (Mondays). But it is possible to 
specify a repetition without making such things explicit, as in example (c), which was 
originally specified as 11 my blinking". Given only this description, although we can 
identify which parts of my history are past occurrences, we cannot locate any 
II exceptions", because we cannot make good sense of the idea of an "exception". This 
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is because we have no specification of when blinking should take place. Exceptions, 
in other words, presuppose an expectation of something happening, which doesn't, 
and without distinguishing the kind of behaviour from normal circumstances, we 
cannot specify when an absence is significant. 
In allowing us to make sense of exceptions in every case, then, the schema also 
facilitates our making sense of what can count as sporadic and recent repetitions. For 
determining both sporadic and recent repetition depends upon our having some 
grasp on when our given behaviour normally takes place. 
Given, then, that the distinction between kinds of behaviour and normal 
circumstances allows us to make sense of some of the aberrations from repeated 
behaviour, we could, if we wished, now answer our previous questions about where 
to draw various lines. We could, for instance stipulate that a behaviour is repetitious 
only if, in less than 10% of occurrences of normal circumstances, it did not occur. Or 
we could say that it is repeated only if, on the last three occurrences of normal 
circumstances, the normal behaviour occurred. Whilst such stipulations are possible, I 
think that they only open up possible discrepancies between ordinary usage and a 
technical notion of habit, and tiresome debates concerning counter-examples. So that 
we can instead focus on the more important aspects of habits, then, I am going to 
leave these matters vague, and the lines blurred. 
One last point I want to make about specifying repetition concerns how we 
understand a specification of normal circumstances. This matter will become 
significant both later in this chapter (§7), and in later ones, since some arguments will 
turn on how exactly we understand the idea of normal circumstances. The problem is 
that in many cases, normal circumstances are very difficult, if not impossible, to 
capture linguistically. One reason for this is that there many be no particular point in 
repeating a behaviour. Repeating things is something we cannot help but do, simply 
because we encounter similar circumstances in our everyday lives, and our responses 
tend to be similar. Another reason is limitations in our descriptive powers. Capturing 
what is similar about a number of sets of circumstances is not something we should 
expect to be able to do very precisely, since there is only a finite stock of terms with 
which to describe such similarities, and even the terms we have may not be well 
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suited for the job. Of course sometimes agents repeat things on purpose, and in such 
cases asking the agent may be the best way to establish what sorts of circumstances 
she is intending to do such things in ("I'm hitting this drum 80 times a minute"). But 
even when we can ask such questions, it is still possible for the agent's actual 
behaviour to depart from what she intends, or will admit to, and it is her actual 
behaviour in which we are interested. 
There may in fact be an argument for thinking that specifying normal 
circumstances will always be impossible. I adapt this from Dancy's (1993, Ch. 6) 
argument against the assumption that there are "general moral truths". The proposal 
is this. Given any finite specification of the normal circumstances, we shall always be 
able to think of some circumstances which do not fall under that description in which 
the behaviour does occur, and it would still naturally be counted as a relevant 
repetition. Perhaps more contentiously, we may also be able to think of some 
circumstances which fall under that description in which the relevant behaviour in 
such circumstances would not naturally be thought of as a repetition. 
To illustrate this consider behaviour (a) from Table 1, for which the normal 
circumstances for Tom's pub visit are described as "evenings this week". First, 
suppose Tom's only pub visit on Tuesday was between 4 and Spm. We might 
intuitively not want to count this as an evening this week, since it is too early to be 
evening, yet we intuitively would want to say that this repetition was significant in 
Tom's history, since it seems to support our saying of him that his pub-going is in this 
way repetitious. Intuitions may of course pull in other directions here, but the 
examples can be modified so that they don't. 
Second, suppose that on Wednesday evening Tom was captured by a 
desperate criminal and forced at gun-point to go into the pub to be held hostage. 
Here he is intuitively going to the pub on an evening this week, but equally 
intuitively, he is hardly well described as doing anything "repeated". He has not 
been into the pub in anything like that way before, or since. Again, if intuitions slide, 
modify the example. 
The thought is that any attempt to anticipate such exceptions by specifying 
them in a revised definition of normal circumstances will be doomed, because there 
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will always be other exceptions which we had not anticipated. I cannot see how to 
avoid this conclusion. This is not to say that the characterisation of normal 
circumstances is of no use, however, for a good characterisation will capture most 
repetitions, and that is how I intend the table to be read. But it is to say that we must 
read the specifications of normal circumstances as having an implicit ceteris paribus 
qualifications. In other words, a description of the behaviour plus the normal 
circumstances are together to be read as conveying a rough sense of what would be 
normat and implicitly what would be abnormat behaviour for that agent in those 
sorts of circumstances, which may leave some cases indeterminate. It for some 
reason, we must classify such cases, it will require judgement and a decision. 
We now have the materials for a definition of repeated behaviour. 
(R) An agent A's behaviour~ in circumstances Cis repeated if and only if A has on 
numerous prior occasions encountered circumstances similar to C ("normal 
circumstances"), and when in such circumstances, A usually, and on most of 
the recent occasions, behaved in a similar way to ~. 2 
The terms "numerous prior occasions", "usually", and "most of the recent" are here 
left deliberately vague for the reasons given above. This then will suffice for our 
definition of what the repetition involved in habitual behaviour amounts to. 
5. Automatic Behaviour 
There seems to be a consensus in the writing on habits that habitual behaviour cannot 
be characterised only in terms of repetition. R. S. Peters (1963) writes that '"Habit' 
also carries with it the suggestion not only of repetition but also of the ability to carry 
out the action in question 'automatically"' (p. 60). C. M. Hamm (1975) writes that 
"automatism is an essential ingredient of 'habit"' (p. 418). Neither writer tells us how 
this idea is to be understood. Nathan Brett (1981) gives us only slightly more, writing 
that "Habitual behaviour must in some respect be 'automatic"', which he glosses as 
"not the product of conscious decision" (p. 357). Brett's suggestion is at least 
2 This is the first of a number of definitions, a summary of which can be found in the Appendix. 
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consistent with what I suggested in Chapter 2, that is, that for Aristotle, Ryle and 
Wittgenstein, the automation in a particular exercise of a habit (virtue, behavioural 
disposition, learned response) could be understood in terms of a lack of deliberation 
about that particular exercise. In this chapter I want to clarify just what such 
automatism consists in. 
Defining automatism requires us to avoid two extremes. On the one hand we 
do not want to underplay the phenomenology of habitual behaviours, that is, the lack 
of mental involvement on the part of the agent in performing them. So our definition 
of automatism would do well to explicitly exclude not just conscious decision, as Brett 
suggests, but all conscious thought processes, such as the contemplation of whether to 
do it, the weighing up of pros and cons, as well as decisions. 3 
On the other hand, we do not want to overplay the lack of mental 
involvement. For if, in trying to capture the lack of mental involvement, our 
definition of automatism pictures the agent as completely external to the behaviour in 
question, that could make capturing the intuition that agents are responsible for their 
habitual behaviours (the task of Chapter 4) impossible. Habitual behaviours are, as 
we have noted earlier, "second nature" for that agent, so she cannot be thought of as 
completely alienated from them. What I propose then is to give a definition of 
automatism which I hope avoids these two extremes. 
The obvious place to start is with the thought that that we can simply define 
automatic behaviours as those over which we do not deliberate. This seems to capture 
an important aspect of our ordinary experience of habits. As we shall see I don't think 
a lack of deliberation is all there is to automatism, but it gives us part of a definition. 
The term "deliberation" could cover a multitude of sins, so we need to say what 
exactly falls under it. 
3 This would not rule out the possibility that such behaviours are done "for reasons", since, as we shall 
see in Chapter 5, nobody thinks that reasons need be consciously entertained. 
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6. Deliberation 
Deliberation, as I shall understand it, is the familiar process of considering, or 
reflecting upon, the considerations relevant to performing some piece of behaviour, 
some of which might count in favour of doing it, or doing it in a certain way, others 
counting against, weighing these factors against one another, and then finally coming 
to a decision regarding whether to perform that behaviour. Such a process is 
inevitably incomplete. Temporal and epistemological constraints dictate that we will 
seldom, if ever, be in a position to deliberate upon every relevant factor. But that does 
not prevent us from making decisions about what to do, knowing that we might get 
things wrong. Nevertheless, if some such process, however partial or unsatisfactory, 
has been undertaken by an agent, either alone or with assistance from others, with the 
question of whether the ensuing piece of behaviour should be performed as its subject 
matter, I shall say that the agent has deliberated on that behaviour. 
This characterisation leaves us with contentious cases, in particular when no 
other agent is involved in the supposed deliberation. I want to tighten our definition 
so that it is as clear as possible when we should say that deliberation has not taken 
place, so that we can know when a given behaviour is rightly classed as automatic. 
To this end I want to settle, again largely by stipulation, four controversies. 
An initial controversy is over just how little of the process described above an 
agent needs to have performed in order for it to still count as deliberation. 
Specifically, as it can merely involve reflection, without any processes of weighing or 
deciding, what can count as "reflection"? Here I want to say that insofar as we can 
say that the agent has done something distinct from the behaviour, which might have 
resulted in her not behaving at all, she has reflected. So, to have deliberated, the agent 
must have done at least two things - reflecting and behaving - and not one - just 
behaving. If the only grounds for saying that the agent reflected is that she behaved 
in such and such a way ("in ~-ing she saw that she should~"), this is not sufficient to 
say that she has done two things. There must be independent grounds for saying that 
the agent was involved in a process that might not have resulted in the behaviour. 
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Usually the agent herself will be authoritative on this matter if questioned in a 
suitably non-coercive way.4 
A second source of controversy concerns just how conscious the agent needs to 
be of a deliberative process in order for it to count as deliberation. Paradigmatically, 
deliberation is conscious. The agent is aware of the content of that deliberation at the 
time. Indeed she might perform such deliberation out loud, or with the assistance of 
others. If asked, she will be able to say whether she is going to perform the piece of 
behaviour before she does it. And if asked afterwards why she did it, she is likely to 
be able to recall the contents of the deliberative process and cite what she then found 
to be decisive considerations as being amongst her reasons for doing what she did ("I 
did it because I thought such-and-such"). Needless to say, when deliberation is 
conscious in all these ways, any resulting behaviour is not automatic. 
However, we seem to be able to make some sense of the idea of non-conscious 
deliberation. Deliberation might be thought to be non-conscious in two senses. First, 
in the sense that the agent might seem to be able to report on an apparent process of 
deliberation, even if she was unaware of engaging in any such process at the time. I 
call this sub-conscious deliberation. I call it" sub-conscious" rather than "unconscious" 
because such a process could have been carried out consciously (perhaps given more 
time prior to the behaviour), and can be brought to consciousness given reflection. 
Here, the basis for saying that she deliberated is her readiness to make such a report, 
plus the assumption that such a report is a matter of the agent's remembering a prior 
process which is distinct from the behaviour itself. These are importantly different 
grounds from those upon which we construct a "post hoc rationalization" of a 
behaviour, after it has been performed. 
I shall say more about post hoc rationalization in Chapters 5 and 6, but we need 
to be clear on a number of features of it now in order to distinguish it from sub-
4 Not always. Deliberation can be done overtly, perhaps out loud, which the agent could not plausibly 
deny, and presumably would not. At other times, the agent having paused before acting, possibly with a 
"wondering" expression, furrowed brow, and so forth, will be sufficient grounds for attributing 
deliberation regardless of what she might later assent to. 
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conscious deliberation. The idea is that we can imaginatively construct a justification 
for some behaviour that presents the context in which it took place as it might have 
struck the agent, as cohering with her overall conception of the world, her projects 
and so on. We can do a post hoc rationalization for virtually any behaviour, whether 
or not the agent was even capable of a deliberation with that content. Indeed we often 
perform post hoc rationalizations for baby and animal behaviour. So this kind of 
rationalization need not be performed by the agent herself. Anybody with a good 
understanding of the agent's perspective will be able to do the same. And of course it 
follows that rational agents will standardly be able to construct such rationalizations 
on their own behaviour. So we should not conclude from the fact that an agent has 
this capacity following a particular behaviour, that she must have deliberated. 
Given that such post hoc rationalization is possible, then, if we are faced with 
an apparent example of the agent "remembering" a hitherto unconscious deliberation, 
we need to be sure that it is not just a post hoc rationalization in disguise. Fortunately 
we do not need to settle here the question of what might constitute adequate grounds 
for thinking that remembering had taken place. All we need to say is that if there are 
cases of genuine recollection, that may be reason to say that the actions in question are 
not automatic.s Hence I want to allow that sub-conscious deliberation, if such sense 
can be made of it, is compatible with the idea of that behaviour being automatic. For 
as we shall see in Chapter 5, somebody might try to argue that reasons are present in 
habitual behaviour in this sub-conscious way. 
There is a second and more extreme sense of non-conscious deliberation that I 
do not want to include in the definition. For one might want to say that the agent had 
deliberated even if she was unaware of any such process at the time, and could not 
recall the content of any such process either. There may be theoretical motivations for 
saying this, such as the aspiration for a theory of action which unites thought-out and 
non-thought-out actions.6 But taken as a pre-theoretical view about what deliberation 
s This may allow us to include "Freudian" accounts the sub-conscious in this class, because for these, 
there is always the possibility of revealing the true content of a deliberation in psychoanalysis. 
6 See for example Smith (1998) 
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is like from the point of view of the experiencing subject, it lacks support. Indeed, 
theories that misrepresent the phenomenology of actions in this way contribute to the 
prevailing insensitivity to the distinctiveness of those behaviours - habitual 
behaviours being a paradigm- about which we do not apparently deliberate. The 
temptation is to model them on those which we do, but that may be an intellectualist 
mistake. At this stage then, I do not want to prejudice our account with such 
theoretically motivated notions of deliberation, so this is not a sense of deliberation 
that I shall recognise here. 
A third controversy is that of when a process of deliberation can be said to take 
place. When an agent deliberates about doing something, perhaps most commonly, 
she does this shortly before doing it, perhaps only a second or two before, or even 
less. But the time gap between deliberation and resultant behaviour can vary 
considerably. One might deliberate and come to a decision a long time in advance of 
the behaviour. For instance, I can deliberate about going round the world when I 
retire, which is a number of decades away. At the other extreme, deliberations might 
take place concurrently with the behaviour. For instance, somebody asks me to push 
their car for them to get it started, and its only when I have braced myself against the 
rear bumper that I wonder whether this is a good idea, in view of the size of the car, 
although I decide that it is, and keep pushing. Although the long-term deliberation 
might be thought not to specify a particular behaviour, but only a kind of action (and 
a rather vague one at that), and although the concurrent deliberation could at most 
interrupt the behaviour, because neither are characteristic features of habitual 
behaviour, I want to allow that all of these kinds can count as deliberations. 
The final two controversies concern the content of the deliberation. The first of 
these is whether we shall say that deliberation concerns a particular piece of 
behaviour, or about a kind of behaviour. This is particularly important if we are going 
to include habitual behaviours in the class of automatic behaviours, because we have 
acquired some of our habits on purpose, that is, following a conscious decision to do 
so. At some point in the past, then, an agent decides that she would like to perform a 
certain kind of behaviour with less effort than she has done up until now, and so she 
resolves to make it a habit, which she then acquires by practice. The whole point here 
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is that her prior decision was made in order to avoid the need for deliberation about 
particular behaviours of the kind that she wishes later to perform. What makes her 
prior deliberation (about forming the habit) not deliberation in the required sense, is 
that it is deliberation about a kind of behaviour. Deliberation for the purposes of our 
definition, then, is deliberation about whether to perform a particular piece of 
behaviour. 
The fifth and final controversy concerns whether automatic behaviour should 
exclude deliberation about how to perform the behaviour in question. So far the only 
deliberation I have specified is over the question of whether one should perform the 
behaviour. Clearly habitual behaviour does not involve that. However, it might be 
consistent with some uses of the term that an agent might still wonder how precisely 
to perform that particular behaviour, the particular style of performance, or taking 
into account novel features of the particular context. In Chapter 2, §3 we saw how this 
might affect our understanding of the automatism of virtuous actions. For when an 
agent acts virtuously, say in an exercise of courage, she may need to resolve questions 
about the details of how to be courageous in this particular case, although the 
question of whether to be courageous, quite properly, does not occur to her. So whilst 
we need not maintain that thinking about how to do something always occurs in 
habitual behaviour, it would seem to be an unnecessary restriction to rule such 
thinking out of our definition. Thus if our definition of automatic behaviour only 
rules out deliberation about whether to do it, other sorts of deliberation are left as 
possibilities. 
Given the above clarifications, I want to adopt a lack of conscious deliberation, 
concerning whether to perform a given particular piece of behaviour, as a necessary 
condition for that behaviour to be automatic. However, I don't think it is also 
sufficient. 
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7. Trying 
Anthony Kenny (1989) writes: "If one has a habit of doing X then it is harder not to do 
X than if one has not" (p. 85).7 I think this expresses rather well the idea of how a 
habitual behaviour can be said to be "second nature" to the agent. But I do not think 
that saying of automatism that it consists only in a lack of deliberation fully captures 
this thought. For deliberating may, to many of us, be no "harder" than not 
deliberating, and when that is so, simply saying that one did not deliberate about 
performing a given behaviour might not yet capture what is easy about it. I propose 
then to add another condition to the definition of automatism which more fully 
captures the lack of difficulty in habitual behaviour, and that is by saying that 
automatic behaviour does not require the agent to try. 
This is a more contentious thing to say than it may seem, however, since Brian 
O'Shaughnessy (1973) and Jennifer Hornsby (1980) have both claimed that all actions 
involve trying, and Philip Pettit (1993) has even said that exercising habits in 
particular involves trying. I think it is worth taking the time to see how these sorts of 
move can be resisted. I tackle the more specific, and thus potentially most damaging, 
objection first. 
I mentioned Pettit's (1993) "ethocentric" account of rule following in Chapter 
2, §8. Pettit thinks that rule following can be understood as the exercise of the kinds 
of habits he calls "extrapolative inclinations" (1993, pp. 86-97). In order for 
extrapolative inclinations to provide an account of following a rule, as opposed to 
merely acting in accord with one, Pettit thinks that the agent must "try" to exercise 
them. The idea of trying is in turn understood in terms of the agent's having certain 
beliefs and desires, thus they are squeezed into the mould of "intentional" actions. 
Trying, then, for Pettit, is nothing more than the possession of mental states. 
There are a number of objections to this move, not least of which is that Pettit 
offers a contentious account of what it is to try. More seriously, if what I said in 
7 The context is Kenny locating habits within the class of dispositions. Unfortunately he does not develop 
his suggestive remark. 
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Chapter 2 (§§6-8) about rule following is right, extrapolative inclinations understood 
in this way cannot provide an account of rule following; since there is a question of 
how to interpret the mental states, which in turn will require further mental states, 
and so on ad infinitum. In the terms of Chapter 2, §6, Pettit has chosen the position 
that McDowell calls Scylla. 
Even if Pettit's view fails as an account of rule following, he may still be right 
about habits always involving trying. But I do not think that this claim does justice to 
the evident phenomenology of habitual behaviour, which, given reasoning analogous 
to that made about deliberation above, gives us no grounds for saying of an agent that 
she not only behaves in a certain way, but that she tries to as well. But here we run 
into the more general objection, which states that on the contrary, all actions are in 
fact accompanied by trying. 
There are two writers who defend such a claim. O'Shaughnessy (1973) 
proposes that "trying is an essential constituent of intentional action as such" (p. 53). 
Similarly, Hornsby (1980) claims that "Every action is an event of trying or attempting 
to act" (p. 33). If either of these writers is right, it would undoubtedly mark 
significant progress towards a unified analysis of actions. But for our purposes, 
defining automatic actions as those which (amongst other things) the agent does not 
try to do, would result in the immediate exclusion of habitual behaviours from the 
class of actions. To avoid this outcome, which would present a significant problem 
for the argument of Chapter 4, I need either to distinguish my sense of trying from 
that used by O'Shaughnessy and Hornsby, or to find a way of responding to their 
arguments. I shall begin with the latter option. 
Both writers recognise that the prima facie evidence counts against them. 
O'Shaughnessy notes the "oddity" of saying "'He tried to walk across the road', of a 
normal able-bodied man in a setting of rural peace" (1973, p. 53), though he goes on to 
assert that such sentences "must be perfectly intelligible, and capable of truth and 
falsity, in humdrum circumstances of this kind." (1973, p. 53). 
Similarly Hornsby writes, 
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It seems that it is only appropriate for a speaker to say that an agent tried to ~' if, for 
some reason or other, the agent did not - or it was thought that he did not -
straightforwardly and easily~- (1980, p. 34) 
Nevertheless, she notices that trying seems only appropriate when various "doubt or 
denial" ("D-or-D") conditions are fulfilled, an idea she takes from Grice (1961). And 
following Grice, she admits that "if this condition is not fulfilled, the utterance of a 
statement [that says he tried] may well be extremely misleading in its implication" 
(1980, p. 34). The fact that such a statement would be "misleading" does not, 
according to Grice or Hornsby, entail that it is false. Indeed Hornsby, like 
O'Shaughnessy, thinks it is true. 
First of all I want to agree with both O'Shaughnessy and Hornsby, that it is 
"odd" or "misleading" to say that an agent "tries" in "humdrum" circumstances. 
And it seems to me that we can explain this oddity by appealing to phenomena such 
as habitual behaviours. When an agent behaves habitually, the circumstances are 
utterly familiar to her, and she naturally "finds herself" engaged in exercising the 
habit. There is no question of failure, either for us observers, or for the agent herself. 
As a result, we will not find it at all natural to describe such behaviours as requiring 
the agent to "try". That is why I think citing the absence of trying is a good way of 
capturing the automatism of habitual behaviours. 
Where I need to disagree with both O'Shaughnessy or Hornsby, however, is in 
thinking that in such cases, it is still true to say that the agent tries. The way that both 
writers try to persuade us that this is right is by means of thought experiments which 
place doubt about the success of an action in the mind of an observer, though the 
action in fact proceeds successfully.s Hornsby's example is of an onlooker who has 
been misinformed about the difficulty his friend will have in moving a boulder. As it 
s O'Shaughnessy writes: "though we speak of trying only when success is in doubt, that doubt could 
dwell in someone other than agent or speaker; so it seems that we misunderstand this linguistic rule if we 
suppose it unconditionally to forbid mention of trying when one is in no doubt. It follows that sentences 
attributing trying to an agent must be perfectly intelligible, and capable of truth and falsity, in humdrum 
circumstances of tl1is kind." (1973, p. 53). 
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turns out there is no difficulty and the onlooker says "I was right about one thing at 
least. I knew that my friend would try to move it" (1980, p. 35). 
Now I don't say that these examples should persuade us.9 But even if they are 
found persuasive for one-off behaviours, I don't think we should accept that they 
work when the behaviour is habitual. The reason is that insofar as there is doubt 
about the success of a behaviour, from whatever point of view, that would 
compromise the claim, from the same point of view, that the circumstances in 
question are normal, in the sense outlined in §4 above. This is a point about the logic 
of normal circumstances. Hence, by definition (R), the behaviour in question would 
be disqualified from being habitual on the sole grounds that it is not repeated, never 
mind how the rest of the definition of habitual behaviour turns out. In other words, 
one cannot consistently claim both that a behaviour is repeated according to (R), and 
that there is some doubt about whether it will happen. The doubt is always an 
indication that something abnormal is afoot. 
We can see this kind of move at work even more clearly if we consider 
Hornsby's own example of an allegedly habitual behaviour that she thinks involves 
trying. She asks us to, 
Consider Brown who has a daily routine of waking up, getting dressed ... , which he 
carries out habitually, without reflection or ado .... One day someone is provided with a 
reason to think that Brown ate something on the previous night that causes specific 
motor disturbances, and to think that as a result Brown will not be able to tie his knot 
this morning. (Hornsby 1980, p. 37) 
Brown, as it turns out, is unaffected, and as before, Hornsby concludes that the 
observer "always knew that he would try to knot his tie" (1980, p. 37). Again Hornsby 
clearly trades on abnormal circumstances - the suspect food- which, insofar as they 
9 Both writers rely on a questionable distinction between how (presumably competent) language users 
use the term "trying" on the one hand, and on the other, either the "linguistic rule" which governs its use 
(O'Shaughnessy, see n. 8 above) or the conditions which make sentences containing that term true 
(Hornsby, e.g. 1980, p. 38). This sort of distinction would be rejected by Wittgenstein for one (see Chapter 
2, §§6-8). 
71 
Habitual Behaviour 
obtain (or are thought to obtain), diminish the plausibility of the claim that the 
behaviour is habitual (or is thought to be habitual). The fact that an observer simply 
got things wrong, should not affect what it is right to say. What we need is an 
example of a habitual behaviour which, although the circumstances are normal in 
every way, and are acknowledged to be so by all parties, still involves trying. And I 
doubt we can find any such example.lo 
In fact, my disagreement with O'Shaughnessy and Hornsby may not be as 
great as it seems. For both writers later admit that when actions are "successful", the 
agent does not do two things - try and successfully act- but one. Thus they think that 
a successful act is identical with the agent's trying to do it.11 So what we have here 
may in fact be a disagreement about terminology after all, since they are prepared to 
call a successful act "trying" whilst I am not. My reply is that insofar as they insist on 
this appropriation of the ordinary use of the term "trying", applied to habitual 
behaviours this revision lacks justification, and for present purposes it would prevent 
us from making the distinction we want. If this means that we shall have to look 
elsewhere for a unified account of action, so be it. 
Thus I want to understand trying in what I think is a natural way, so that it 
does not "misleadingly" apply to all behaviours, but rather informs us about 
characteristics of particular sorts of behaviours. Trying, then, is whatever extra effort 
is required to perform a behaviour given that the agent has expectations about its 
possible failure. I want to say that insofar as habitual behaviours are automatic, they 
do not involve such trying. 
In sum, I want to define automatic behaviours as follows: 
to In Chapter 8 I shall suggest how this sort of response to Gricean moves might fruitfully be developed. 
n See O'Shaughnessy's "Postscript" (1973, pp. 73-4); Hornsby writes "if ever we try to~ and succeed in~­
ing, then our trying is our succeeding" (1980, p. 39). I am aware that Hornsby also thinks that "all actions 
occur inside the body" (1980, p. 14), which would definitely be harmful to the present thesis. However, 
the view is, I think convincingly, rejected by Jonathan Lowe. See the extended exchange between them in 
Lowe (1981, 1983, 1984) and Hornsby (1982, 1983). 
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(A) A behaviour ~ is automatic if and only if the agent performing ~ engages in no 
process of conscious deliberation about whether to ~' either before ~ is 
performed, or during its performance; and the agent does not try to~-
Whilst this definition characterises automatic behaviour in purely negative 
terms, I take it that it nevertheless captures something of the phenomenology of 
habitual behaviour: it is a natural and simple kind of activity. Importantly, because 
the characterisation of automatic behaviour is negative it does not outstrip the 
phenomenology. If other philosophers wish to analyse habitual behaviour into 
component parts, they will have to go beyond the phenomenology, and the onus of 
justifying such an analysis will be with them. 
The idea of automatism also captures an interesting feature of habitual 
behaviour: that we find ourselves engaged in it. Everybody has had that experience of 
being engaged in some familiar routine, say brushing one's teeth in the morning, or 
putting the kettle on (early morning routines seem replete with examples), and then. 
reflected on the fact that one never made any sort of decision or effort to do that thing. 
One just finds oneself doing it. This may seem alienating, like finding somebody else 
doing these things. One might think: "Here is a person (or 'body') going through 
some routine, upon which I am a little more than a spectator". But I would want to 
say that the experience of finding oneself engaged in a habitual behaviour is a proper 
part of healthy, non-alienated, agency. The routines are familiar to one, since one has 
oneself repeated them many times before. One has been at least vaguely conscious of 
what one is doing before "coming to", though the consciousness is inarticulate, and 
little more than a sense of being awake. And importantly, one becomes aware of the 
behaviour, as it were "from the inside", a perspective from which one cannot view 
others. Thus I think that any sense of alienation in finding oneself behaving 
habitually is either a sign of mental illness, or an illusion. The occurrence of the 
phenomenon is, I think, rather to be viewed as a good indicator that a repeated 
behaviour is automatic. 
It may also be worth noting that the requirement for automatism places limits 
on the sorts of repeated behaviours that could become habitual. For some behaviours 
will never become automatic, no matter how many times we repeat them. These 
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might include complex routines such as playing a game of football; or activities that 
are intellectually demanding, such as playing a game of chess or writing a philosophy 
paper. Whilst initiating such activities may become automatic, and various elements 
of them may also be like this, carrying them through from start to finish will never 
become automatic for creatures at our point in evolution, at least. Trying or 
deliberating will be an inevitable part of such activities. It is for that reason that 
habitual behaviours will tend to be relatively simple routines which can be mastered 
in the way suggested. 
8. Learning and Losing Habits 
We can now say what habitual behaviours are, namely, all and only behaviours which 
are both repeated according to (R) and automatic according to (A). This definition 
puts us in a position to say what it is for a habit to be learned, and what it is for a habit 
to be lost. This will not affect our definition of habitual behaviour, but that we can 
account for these things is one test for the adequacy of that definition. Let us consider 
learning first. 
Any kind of learning involves a transition of an agent, or knower, from one 
state to another. From a state of ignorance to a state of knowledge. This is no 
different for learning habits. For as long as there was a time when the agent could not 
perform this kind of behaviour automatically, and that there is now a time that she 
can do it automatically, we have identified a transition from one state of the agent to 
another. That it what it is to learn a habit. From simply being able to do something, 
to doing it naturally, as a characteristic part of who one is. This is the acquisition of 
practical knowledge. In Ryle' s terminology, one becomes disposed to behave in a new 
way. 
The transition marks a change in the significance of the normal circumstances. 
When we say of a behaviour that it is merely repeated, the normal circumstances are 
those in which the repetition, as far as we know, just happens to take place. The fact 
that the behaviour usually takes place when the normal circumstances arise may be 
purely accidental, and the only predictive inferences that can be drawn from one's 
occurrence to the other's would be based purely on statistics. But once the agent can 
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be said to be disposed to behave in this way, the connection between the normal 
circumstances and the behaviour is seen as non-accidental in a new way. Since the 
behaviour in question is only automatic in these sorts of circumstances, it can now be 
regarded as a response to those circumstances, which has more than a statistical 
significance. The occurrence of the circumstances plus the disposition of the agent, 
could now be said to explain, in a new sense, why the behaviour in question happened. 
The sort of explanation we have here would be comparable to explaining a leaf falling 
by saying that the tree it came from is deciduous and winter has arrived; or by 
explaining the eat's pouncing by saying that it likes playing with wool, and it's 
spotted a ball of the stuf£.12 The transition in question, then, is potentially of 
considerable importance. 
The transition from not being able to perform a behaviour automatically, to 
being able to, typically comes about in one of three ways, which I call intentional, 
unintentional, and non-intentional respectively. Intentional learning comes about when 
an agent deliberately chooses to acquire a particular habit. So I might decide that it 
would be a good idea if I got up early every day to get some work done before 
breakfast. I train myself to do so by setting my alarm for 7 a.m. and after a few weeks 
it starts to get rather easier. I get used to it, and it soon becomes harder not to do it 
even at weekends. I may even find myself getting up at that time even though my 
alarm has stopped working. Since I now do it automatically, we can say that I have 
got into the habit of getting up at that time. We can train ourselves to acquire many 
other useful habits in this way. 
Habits can also be acquired unintentionally. Simply repeating a kind of 
behaviour on numerous occasions can be enough for this to happen, though one does 
not intend it to. So acquiring the habit of watching television in the evenings is 
something I never intended to happen, but the repetition alone makes me do it 
automatically now (a fact that I find rather annoying in view of the poor quality of the 
programmes on many evenings). 
12 I will develop this idea a little in Chapter 6, §4, where I suggest that this sort of explanation is causal. 
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The third way that habits can be acquired is not merely unintentional, but is 
better described as non-intentional. These habits are acquired during upbringing, and 
can pre-date our linguistic and deliberative capacities altogether. So there is no 
question of the individual having made or failed to make any sort of decision. Rather, 
the natural reactions of the infant become gradually refined as she matures, through 
the natural mechanisms of imitation and repetition. This process is part of the 
acquisition of second nature that we saw McDowell describing in Chapter 1. 
This account of learning is consistent with the ideas proposed by Aristotle, 
Ryle and Wittgenstein discussed in Chapter 2. These writers all think that the 
repetition is part of the learning process. And whilst their respective accounts of the 
particular modes of learning might differ, that need not harm the claim that they are 
each talking about behaviours which are both repeated and have become automatic. 
This further justifies counting these three writers' notions as habits in our sense. 
An account of losing habits, in contrast, like the idea of not knowing 
something any more (or forgetting it), goes the other way around. If there was a time 
when I had some habit, that is, I used to repeat the behaviour and could do it 
automatically, but now I either have to deliberate or try in order to do it, if I can do it 
at all, this would count as my having lost the habit. Notoriously losing habits is much 
more difficult than gaining them, though there are more and less effective strategies. 
Simply being away from the normal circumstances for a given habit for a long period 
is one way of losing it. Performing alternative actions in those same circumstances 
may be more effective. Experience also shows that losing a habit need not be 
permanent. Indeed getting a habit back - relearning it - is likely to take far less in the 
way of practice than it did the first time. 
Is being learned a fourth feature of habits? One might thinks so since it would 
be a way of excluding repeated automatic behaviours that are not learned, such as the 
heartbeat, blinking and the digestion, from our definition of habit. But we shall see 
that such behaviours can be excluded anyway given our third criterion, responsibility, 
which is to be explicated in Chapter 4. I cannot see any other reason to include 
learning as an additional criterion. 
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9. Definition 
We can now state our definition of habitual behaviour as follows. 
(HB) A behaviour ~ is habitual if and only if it is repeated according to (R) and 
automatic according to (A). 
This definition captures the first two features of habits, and will form the basis of our 
definition of habitual action, the topic of the next chapter. 
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1. Actions or Compulsions? 
In Chapter 2 I argued that Aristotle, Ryle and Wittgenstein all opposed intellectualism 
by employing the idea of a behaviour which is repeated, automatic and responsible. 
In Chapter 3 I developed the idea of a habitual behaviour by describing in detail how 
we should understand the first two of these features. In this chapter I want to 
complete the definition of a habit by spelling out the sense in which we can be said to 
be personally responsible for some of our habitual behaviours. This will support my 
claim that we should call such behaviours habitual actions. 
According to definition (HB), habitual behaviours are not distinguished from 
other acquired behaviours which are also repeated and automatic. Addictions such as 
smoking, various kinds of neuroses, compulsive behaviours like binge eating, 
expressions of phobias such as vertigo, and nervous tics are all of this kind. Because 
these behaviours, which I group under the heading compulsions, are most obviously 
thought of as things that happen to agents - we are victims of them - rather than 
things that agents do, it seems reasonable to say that they should not be counted as 
actions. With only the two features so far discussed, then, we have no reason to think 
that habitual behaviours as such should count as actions, any more than compulsions 
do. 
But in this chapter I shall argue that there is a class of habitual behaviours 
which are not compulsions, and deserve to be thought of as genuine expressions of 
agency. That requires us to decide upon a suitable criterion of action-hood, which 
allows us to distinguish repeated automatic behaviours which are compulsions from 
those which are not. As we shall see, settling on such a criterion is not 
straightforward. 
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In §2 I explain why I shall not adopt a standard criterion for actions, according 
to which they are intentional under some description. In §3 I defend my proposed 
criterion for actions, which is that they are behaviours for which we are personally 
responsible. In §4 I propose an intuitive test for personal responsibility which derives 
from a suggestion by Strawson, which I call the reactive attitudes test. I apply this test 
to show that we seem to be responsible for some habitual behaviours, and not others. 
In §§5-8 I develop a notion of control that explains the results of this test, and thus 
how we can be said to have personal responsibility for many habitual behaviours. 
This will be the basis of my completed definition of habitual actions. 
2. Intentional Actions 
When philosophers enquire into what an action is they generally begin by noticing the 
intuitive distinction between things that agents do on the one hand - actions, and 
things that merely happen to agents- mere behaviours, on the other.1 Contemporary 
writers then tend to make a second move, which dates back at least as far as 
Anscombe's (1957) Intention, which is to characterise the agent's doings as being 
"intentional" under some description. The thought is that a piece of behaviour can be 
described in many ways, but only when it is described in certain ways does a 
description capture it as something the agent intended to do (or "meant" to do, or did 
"on purpose"). So, to use Anscombe's (1957, pp. 37-41) example, a man might be 
replenishing the water supply and poisoning the inhabitants, but it is only the first of 
these that says what he intends. As long as we can settle on at least one intentional 
description of a behaviour, we can say that it is an action. The task then is to offer an 
analysis of intentional actions thus construed. But I think that for our purposes this is 
a bad strategy, and I shall now explain why. 
Analyses of intentional action vary greatly, but can be roughly divided into 
those which emphasise the role of the agent's will, or some variant of it, and those that 
emphasise the role of rationality, understood as the agent's responsiveness to reasons. 
1 This characterisation pervades introductory texts on action. See for instance Dretske (1988, p. 1), Moya 
(1990, p. 2). 
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I take my cue here from a recent survey paper on intentional action by AI Mele 
(1992b), who organises his discussion around two "proto-analyses" of action: 
Al. S intentionally A-ed if and only if S A-ed in the way that S intended to A. 
A2. S intentionally A-ed if and only if S A-ed for a reason. (Mele 1992b, p. 200) 
Those that adopt Al and thereby emphasise the will, whose variants include 
"volition", "trying" and "intending", include Jonathan Lowe (1996), Carl Ginet (1990), 
Brian 0' Shaughnessy (1980) and Jennifer Hornsby (1980). Those that adopt A2, and 
thereby emphasise rationality, include Anscombe (1957), Donald Davidson (1980), 
Alvin Goldman (1970), AI Mele (1992a), Jonathan Dancy (1993, 2000) and Rowland 
Stout (1996). This classification is rough, and some writers offer analyses which might 
be said to fall into both groups (Hornsby is perhaps one of them). But that will not 
matter unduly. For whilst one or both of these ways of analysing action could 
potentially provide the grounds for distinguishing habitual actions from compulsions, 
I don't want to adopt either. 
The reason is that I think that both kinds of analysis embody prejudices 
against the very idea of a habitual action. This may be due to a tendency to assume, 
following influential writers like Ryle (1949) and Winch (1958), that habitual 
behaviours are mere mechanical responses to stimuli which shouldn't really count as 
actions anyway. In Chapter 2 we saw some reasons why this view is impoverished. 
Nevertheless, some writers appear reluctant to say that habitual behaviours 
are definitely not actions. Davidson (1963), for instance, seems to want to make room 
for the possibility of habitual actions, since he seems to allow that a habit can be (at 
least part of) a reason. 2 For considerations I shall give in Chapter 5, however, I think 
Davidson is wrong in this latter regard. Another approach is taken by Alvin 
Goldman (1970). Rather than trying to incorporate habitual behaviours into his 
analysis of intentional action, Goldman is candid about its inadequacy in this respect. 
He writes that "It must be conceded ... that the analysis of action I have given is not 
2 Davidson's characterisation of a "pro attitude", one component of a "primary reason", includes "social 
conventions" and "permanent character traits" (1963, p. 4). 
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ideally suited for dealing with habit, nor has it been designed with habitual behaviour 
in mind" (1970, p. 91). Goldman's own theory is reasons-based, but I think the same 
anti-habit prejudice infects will-based analyses too. 
This pervasive prejudice leads to intellectualist distortions in both kinds of 
analysis. Will-based analyses are vulnerable to two sorts of distortion. Such analyses 
may posit "internal" items which are vulnerable to the sorts of difficulties incurred by 
the Cartesian intellectualism that Ryle attacked (Chapter 2, §4). Or they may posit 
explanatory items for which there may be no phenomenological grounds. We saw 
how this worked in the case of "trying" in the previous chapter (§7). We are asked to 
accept that every intentional action is accompanied by some push from the will. 
Those analyses that emphasise rationality tend also to make intellectualist 
assumptions about what it means for an action to be rational, namely, that it is done 
for reasons, an idea which is understood in a particular way. This is a position which 
I shall criticise at length in Chapters 5 and 6. But, to anticipate, I think those that hold 
reasons-based analyses still conceive of intentional actions as things that agents, as 
Stout puts it, "make happen" (1996, p. 9). And again, we look for an injection from the 
intellect, this time in the form of reasons, to mark out intentional actions from other 
phenomena. 
Of course, any analyses that accommodate both will and rationality, are 
vulnerable to both sorts of intellectualism. 
It is because of these sorts of difficulty that I do not want to adopt either kind 
of analysis to settle the question of how habitual behaviours can be said to be actions. 
What I think lies at the heart of the problem is not the particular analyses of 
intentional action, but their starting point. The very idea of an intentional action is 
understood as a behaviour in which the agent has some quite direct intellectual 
involvement, which has a content sufficiently determinate and articulated for us to 
settle on some definite descriptions of the behaviour under which it is purported to be 
intentional. But in habitual behaviour, which is by definition automatic, we have no 
reason to think that any determinate or articulated characterisation of what the agent 
is doing must or will be available to her. Yet in their determination to find a unified 
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theory of action, many contemporary analytic philosophers of action are prepared to 
gloss over such details. 
Of course, there may be ways of understanding the idea of an intention which 
require less intellectual involvement from the agent. But my suspicion is that using 
the idea of intentional action to decide which habitual behaviours are actions will be a 
bad place to begin. For none of them are clearly intentional anyway. I want rather to 
make a fresh start by going back to the original intuition about actions. 
3. Other Characterisations of Actions 
Fred Dretske (1988) is one of the few philosophers of action who does not begin with 
the idea of intentional action. Instead he begins with a much more "general notion", 
for which he prefers the term "behaviour", and which applies to "animals, plants, and 
even machines in very much the same way as it applies to people" (p. 3). Significantly 
for the present project, Dretske' s notion "applies to people . .. when there are no 
purposes or intentions" (p. 3). Thus for Dretske, the following examples all qualify as 
"behaviour": 
People shiver when they get cold. That is something they do. They also perspire when 
they get hot, grind their teeth when they are asleep, cough, vomit, weep, salivate, blush, 
tremble, hiccup, inhale, exhale, choke, fumble, stammer, fall asleep, dream, wake up, and 
a great many other things that are in no way voluntary, deliberate, or intentional. (1988, 
pp. 3-4) 
Although there is no explicit mention of exercising habits in Dretske's list, I don't 
think they would be out of place. My reason for thinking this is that Dretske' s list 
seems sensitive to the way we standardly describe the behaviours on his list. We saw 
how this could work in the discussion of Wittgenstein in Chapter 2 §8. The 
suggestion there was that one way of determining whether a given happening is 
thought to be an action is to look at whether is it described by means of a subject ("I", 
"he", "Maureen", etc.). The behaviours on Dretske's list are all standardly attributed 
to a subject in this way, and exercising a habit is something that is described in the 
same way ("I exercise my habit of nail-biting"). If this is right, Dretske might have a 
way of capturing the sense in which habitual behaviours are things people do. 
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But there are at least two reasons why Dretske' s scheme will not work. First, 
many of the behaviours in his list are the sorts of things that I earlier called 
"compulsions", in the sense that we are victims of them. Usually, when we cough, 
weep or stammer, we are doing something which we cannot help, and indeed 
something we would rather not do if we had the choice. Notwithstanding the way we 
describe them, they are not expressions of agency. So it looks as though Dretske has 
drawn the line in the wrong place, at least for our purposes.3 This also marks the 
unreliability of the linguistic approach. 
The second reason I don't think we should go with Dretske is that the analysis 
he offers of the distinction between "behaviour" and other sorts of thing that can 
happen to creatures, is problematic. He cashes out that distinction in terms of 
whether the change is caused "internally" or "externally" (1988, p. 3). And for 
Dretske an "internal cause" is understood literally, as that which originates "inside or 
underneath the skin, fur, fins, feathers, or whatever" (p. 3, n. 3).4 Now whilst nobody 
would deny that something goes on underneath our skins whenever a behaviour in 
Dretske' s sense takes place (though we can expect it to be quite different for each sort 
of behaviour), it is highly contentious to claim that reference to such happenings 
could tell us anything about what it means for us to behave in such a way. After all, 
we can learn what actions are without learning anything about what goes on under 
the skin. The conceptual investigation into actions is the prior task, and what we are 
concerned with here. Dretske' s approach then, is not as much help as it first 
appeared. 
In the absence of other non-intentional characterisations of actions in the 
mainstream literature, we are pushed back onto our own resources. 
I want to return to the intuition that actions are what agents do, as opposed to 
what happens to them. I propose to fill out that intuition in the way we did with our 
3 Karlsson (2002, pp. 62-3) has recently made a similar objection to Dretske's approach, and advances an 
Aristotelian alternative, in a paper to which I would like in future to give a fuller treatment. 
4 I think there may be an alternative way of understanding the "internal" /"external" contrast which does 
allow habitual behaviour to have an "internal" source of change. See §8 below. 
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working definition of habits in Chapter 1, noting that, whatever else "things agents 
do" may be, they are behaviours for which agents are personally responsible. Putting 
things this way gives us an approach to actions which emphasises the contrast 
between actions and phenomena which are merely causal. This is not to say that 
actions are not causal phenomena, they are just not only causal. In Chapter 2 §3 I 
suggested one way in which we can understand this distinction, and that is by saying 
that whereas things for which we are personally responsible warrant attributions of 
praise or blame, things that bear only causal responsibility, do not. I want to develop 
this idea as a better criterion for actions. 
4. Reactive Attitudes 
Sir Peter Strawson (1962) connects the fact that agents are morally responsible for 
what they do with the fact that we hold various "reactive attitudes" such as gratitude, 
resentment and forgiveness, towards them.s Having such attitudes towards one 
another seems to be an inescapable part of being a human being with interpersonal 
relationships. Now unlike Strawson, our concern is not with the compatibility of free-
will with determinism, nor is it with specifically moral responsibility, but we can 
employ the same kind of conceptual connection that he uses. We can say that we 
know that an agent is personally responsible for a given piece of behaviour if, as a 
result of various bits of information which concern that behaviour, we could harbour, 
and perhaps express, reactive attitudes towards that agent. So if, given the right 
surroundings, I could resent an agent for her arm going up, perhaps because I knew 
she wanted to raise the bid, that shows that her arm going up is an action; her action. 
That I could not resent her, in any surroundings, for her arm moving - after all, 
somebody else nudged it- shows that it is amongst the mere behaviours. The same 
thing could, I take it, be said of the coughing, weeping and stammering. I call this test 
the reactive attitudes test. 
s According to Jay Wallace (1994, p. 8, n. 10), who discusses Strawson, the connection between 
responsibility and such attitudes goes back to Joseph Butler's (1726) sermon "Upon Resentment". 
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I am going to use the test not as the ultimate arbiter of what is a responsible 
behaviour and what is not, but merely as a way of bringing out our intuitions about 
whether some bits of behaviour seem responsible or not. That should be enough to 
motivate a further enquiry into what underlies these intuitions. 
Let us apply the reactive attitudes test to habitual behaviours. For instance, 
because I live in Britain I am in the habit of driving on the left. I do it repeatedly and 
automatically. Exercising this habit is something that I could be thanked for, given 
that it gets me and my passengers from A to B in safety. If driving on the left were 
something that merely happened to me, such an attitude would make no sense. 
Similarly when I indulge my long-standing habit of nail-biting I regularly attract the 
attitude of impatience from my partner. Unfortunately I can't pretend I am 
completely blameless for this minor self-mutilation. My suggestion, then, is that at 
least some habitual behaviours will pass the reactive attitudes test for personal 
responsibility, and this should raise our suspicions that they are actions. 
Compare our attitudes towards the behaviours I call compulsive. We might 
find somebody' s nervous tic annoying, and we might sympathise with him for having 
this disposition. But such behaviour would not tend to attract our resentment or 
admiration. Similarly, somebody who is often overcome with an urge to eat a whole 
trifle late at night deserves our help and compassion, but not our resentment 
(providing of course one didn't have an eye for it oneself). 
Other compulsions are more contentious. Consider smoking. We may loathe 
the practice, and resent anybody who does it. Similarly for compulsive tidying. Does 
this mean that compulsions should also be counted as responsible? I do not think so. 
However, at this point we need to dig deeper into these examples to see what 
supports these attitudes. This will allow us to make a stipulation which allows us to 
say that we should not have reactive attitudes to the victims of compulsions. 
Return to the smoking example. Consider how our reactive attitudes might 
change if we learn that a particular smoker has done all they can to give up, tried the 
patches, the gum, hypnosis, and so forth, and still cannot give it up. When informed 
of circumstances like this our reactive attitudes tend to subside. What this brings out 
is something important about what governs our reactive attitudes. If the agent 
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literally "can't do anything about" behaving in some way, we tend not to hold them 
responsible for it. 
The sorts of things that we can be said to "do about" our habitual behaviours 
can vary considerably. Something might be done at two levels: at the level of the 
particular behaviour, when the agent might decide to do otherwise, which may not be 
possible in cases of genuine compulsion; or at the level of the habit or compulsion 
itself, when the agent might adopt strategies to eradicate the tendency to indulge in 
such behaviour.6 But whilst the success of such strategies, which might include a 
change of scene, counselling or hypnosis, is unlikely to be solely in the hands of the 
agent, she is likely to be in a position to put such strategies in train (in modern 
Western society at least). To that very minimal extent she may be said to attract the 
reactive attitudes. In §8 I shall be in a position to explain these two levels of reactive 
attitudes for habits. 
Deciding on which attitudes make sense is a delicate matter, and requires close 
attention to the details of the particular case. But what we are looking for in each case 
seems reasonably clear. Insofar as we know that somebody can't do anything about a 
habitual behaviour, manifestations of that behaviour do not attract the reactive 
attitudes, and we can surmise that they are not personally responsible for these 
manifestations. The suggestion is that these are the compulsions. In contrast, insofar 
as the agent is in a position to do something about an instance of habitual behaviour, 
and does not, they do attract the reactive attitudes, and hence seem to be behaviours 
for which the agent is personally responsible. They are the candidates for being 
habitual actions. 
Thus the idea of being able to do something about a behaviour gives us a way 
of distinguishing compulsions from other habitual behaviours. We could say that if a 
habitual behaviour is such that the agent cannot do anything about its exercises, it 
should be classed as a compulsion. Otherwise we should class it as an action. This 
would give us a basis for our intuitive distinction between these things. 
6 We saw how losing a habit can be understood in Chapter 3, §8. 
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Even given such a distinction, there will be behaviours which are close to the 
borderline between compulsions and habitual actions. Sometimes we will not be able 
to tell if a kind of behaviour is a habitual action or a compulsion until on some 
occasion we try to stop doing it. Addictions commonly work like this. For other 
behaviours, we might find that we can resist on some occasions, whilst on others we 
cannot (my nail-biting might be such an example, though in some moods I won't 
admit it). There is no need to be any more stipulative here. For the principle is clear 
in particular cases. If the agent genuinely cannot do anything about the particular 
habitual behaviour, it is to be classed as a compulsion, and not an action. 
What the reactive attitudes test suggests is that the idea of "being able to do 
something about" a behaviour is at the heart of our intuitions about personal 
responsibility. In the next two sections I want to support the idea that we have 
personal responsibility for non-compulsive habitual behaviours by developing more 
precisely what "being able to do something about it" amounts to. To this end I shall 
develop a specific notion of control which captures this currently rough thought. 
5. Control of Habitual Behaviours 
I want to develop the idea of a kind of control that we can be said to have over non-
compulsive habitual behaviours which I call rational intervention control. I claim that 
this kind of control is sufficient for personal responsibility. It follows that if actions 
are those behaviours for which agents are personally responsible, non-compulsive 
habitual behaviours are actions. 
I begin with some suggestions about a kind of control that we might have over 
habitual behaviours which I find in Aristotle and Ryle. It has two aspects, involving 
both intervention and rationality. In this section and the next I develop the more 
generic idea of intervention control and tackle a possibly fatal objection to the claim 
that this kind of control grounds responsibility made by Fischer and Ravizza (1998). 
In §7 I explain the significance of saying that intervention control is "rational". 
In Chapter 2 I suggested that virtuous action should be thought of as both 
automatic and responsible. In §3 of that chapter I said that virtuous actions count as 
responsible ("virtue in the strict sense", as opposed to "natural virtue") because 
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Aristotle holds that virtue "is not merely the state in accordance with right reason, but 
the state that implies the presence of right reason" (NE 6.13, 1144b26-7). What is 
important here is that the "presence of right reason" allows us to say that a virtuous 
action is responsible without having to give up on the idea that it is automatic. For to 
say that the faculty of reason is "present" is not to say that it reasoning actually takes 
place. The suggestion then is that reason has some controlling function which 
accounts for virtuous actions being responsible, but that control need not be directly 
exercised. Reason controls whilst being, in some sense, "in the background". But it is 
not obvious how something that is merely "in the background" could be said to 
control anything. 
We get a clue from Ryle in his account of intelligent capacities (see Chapter 2, 
§5). Ryle's idea is that when an agent exercises an intelligent capacity she "minds" 
what she is doing, by exercising "care, vigilance, or criticism" (1949, p. 42). Now 
whilst this might be said to bear some resemblance to Aristotle's idea of the presence 
of right reason, reason being present in the form of the agent's care, vigilance and 
criticism, I think Ryle is adding two insights. First, Ryle notices something special 
about a variety of intelligent human behaviour. Namely, manifest in that behaviour is 
a kind of watchfulness over, or attentiveness to, it. This idea of watchfulness is the 
idea of something in the background, as it were, paying attention, albeit entirely 
passively, rather as a shepherd can watch over his sheep. 
But secondly, Ryle writes of the "exercise" of care, vigilance or criticism, and 
this implies that some kind of intervention would be made were the relevant 
circumstances to arise. In the same way, the shepherd would rescue a sheep were it to 
stray. There is an active aspect to these notions too. The exercise of an intelligent 
capacity, then, can be said to be controlled, because the rational faculty is not just in 
the background, but is attentive, and ready to intervene in the behaviour, as and when 
necessary. This, in outline, is what I call rational intervention control. And I argue in 
the next section that we have this kind of control over our non-compulsive habitual 
behaviours. 
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6. Intervention Control 
Harry Frankfurt (1978) notices the significance of intervention: 
A driver whose automobile is coasting downhill in virtue of gravitational forces alone 
may be entirely satisfied with its speed and direction, and so he may never intervene to 
adjust its movement in any way. This would not show that that the movement of the 
automobile did not occur under his guidance. What counts is that he was prepared to 
intervene if necessary, and that he was in a position to do so more or less effectively. 
Similarly, the causal mechanisms which stand ready to affect the course of a bodily 
movement may never have occasion to do so; for no negative feedback of the sort that 
would trigger their compensatory activity may occur. The behaviour is purposive not 
because it results from causes of a certain kind, but because it would be affected by 
certain causes if the accomplishment of its course were to be jeopardised. (Frankfurt 
1978, p. 75)7 
Frankfurt's passage nicely illustrates the intuition that the possibility of intervention, as 
opposed to actual intervention, is all that is needed for control, and hence 
responsibility, for a piece of behaviour. This is the case for the behaviour of the car as 
well as the bodily behaviour. According to Frankfurt, it can be correct to say that the 
driver drives the car down the hill "purposefully", and this entails that it is he that 
does it, even though he may not have initiated the coasting, and did not actually 
intervene in it. Similarly, it might also be correct to say that an agent's behaviour is 
"purposive", she does it, regardless of how her bodily movements might have been 
caused, and irrespective of the fact that she may not have actually intervened in those 
movements. 
Now in the light of the considerations canvassed earlier, we might baulk at 
Frankfurt's suggestion that the behaviour in question is "purposive". For this may 
carry with it the suggestion that what we have here is a kind of intentional action, and 
one might then argue, as Mele (1997, pp. 8-11) does, that it can be incorporated under 
standard analyses. But we need not read so much into the term as this. One thing I 
7 We can remain agnostic about Frankfurt's overtly causal interpretation of what it means to intervene in 
a process. 
89 
Actions, Responsibility and Control 
think Frankfurt is getting at by saying that the behaviour is "purposive" is that an 
agent can be behind a behaviour without intervening in it at all, and that is all we 
need. 
The idea of control in play here seems to fit in rather well with the idea of a 
habitual behaviour. Because habitual behaviour is always automatic, there is no 
question that it has been initiated by an act of thinking (deliberation or trying). 
However, if something unexpected happens, or if the agent so chooses, she will 
become more aware of what she is doing, and at this point may or may not intervene. 
If she intervenes her behaviour is no longer automatic, and so ceases to be properly 
habitual. However, when none of these contingencies arise, i.e. the circumstances are 
normal, and she does not intervene, the behaviour remains habitual. The control over 
her behaviour consists in her being able to intervene should it be necessary. And if 
my understanding of Frankfurt's intuition is right, this is enough for her to be 
personally responsible for it. 
But there is dissent. In their recent book Responsibility and Control (1998), John 
Fischer and Mark Ravizza agree that some kind of control is necessary for 
responsibility.8 They write: 
It seems to be a basic presupposition embedded in the way we think about these matters 
that an agent must in some sense control his behaviour in order to be morally responsible 
[for it]. (pp. 13-14)9 
However, Fischer and Ravizza argue that the kind of control in question could not be 
the intervention control Frankfurt describes in the passage above. If they are right, 
this may be a threat to the idea that intervention control is sufficient for personal 
responsibility. If we look at their argument, we see that there is such a threat. 
s In the remainder of this section page numbers will be to this work unless otherwise stated. 
9 Not much turns on Fischer and Ravizza's use of the term "morally". They employ it primarily to 
contrast this kind of responsibility with causal responsibility (pp. 1-2, and n. 1). For our purposes, then, 
we can take their notion of "moral" responsibility to be equivalent to our idea of personal responsibility. 
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Fischer and Ravizza are impressed by counter examples to what is called "the 
principle of alternate possibilities", which states that an agent is only morally 
responsible for a piece of behaviour if she could have done otherwise. The principle 
originates from an earlier paper by Frankfurt (1969). In that paper he famously argues 
against the principle on the grounds that there may be no alternative (for Frankfurt, 
"alternate") possibilities "genuinely open" to an agent, yet she can still be held 
morally responsible for what she does.1° Frankfurt invents a number of (increasingly 
bizarre) scenarios in which various outside agencies would have intervened had the 
agent tried to do otherwise, and made things turn out in the same way anyway. 
These scenarios involve coercion, brain manipulation, mad scientists, and the like. In 
such cases, argues Frankfurt, no alternatives are genuinely open to the agent. 
However, Frankfurt's intuitions are that the agent is nevertheless responsible for what 
she does. If this is right, the principle of alternate possibilities is shown to be false, 
and we must look somewhere other than to counterfactual scenarios to ground 
responsibility .11 
It is this that motivates Fischer and Ravizza to introduce a distinction between 
guidance control and regulative control by means of the following example: 
Let us suppose that Sally is driving her car. It is functioning well, and Sally wishes to 
make a right turn. As a result of her intention to turn right, she signals, turns the steering 
wheel, and carefully guides the car to the right. ... She controls the car, and also has a 
certain sort of control over the car's movements. Insofar as Sally actually guides the car 
in a certain way, we shall say that she has "guidance control". Further, insofar as Sally 
also has the power to guide the car in a different way, we shall say that she has 
"regulative control." (pp. 30-1) 
1o "Genuinely open" is Fischer and Ravizza's phrase (1998, p. 30). 
11 There may be a serious tension between this result and the claim of Frankfurt's later (1978) paper 
referred to above, since in that paper he seems to be relying on alternate possibilities (the possibility of 
the driver intervening in the movement of the coasting car) in his account of "purposive" action. The 
coherence of his overall position may thus rely on some sort of distinction between two sorts of control, 
like that made by Fischer and Ravizza, discussed and criticised below. 
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Let us suppose for the sake of argument, that regulative control is equivalent to our 
intervention control. 
Fischer and Ravizza claim that the two kinds of control "can at least in 
principle pull apart" (p. 32). They show this by extending the example so that Sally's 
car has dual controls, and an instructor at the other controls, "who is quite happy to 
allow Sally to steer the car to the right, but that if Sally had shown any inclination to 
cause the car to go in some other direction, the instructor would have intervened and 
caused the car to go to the right Gust as it actually goes)" (p. 32). This is structurally 
equivalent to one of Frankfurt's cases. Thus, as Sally has guidance control over the 
car, but not regulative control- the instructor has that- and since, following Frankfurt, 
Sally seems still to be responsible for the car's movements, they reason that "the sort 
of control necessarily associated with moral responsibility for action is guidance 
control" (p. 33).12 They conclude that "Guidance control, and not regulative control, is 
the control that is associated with moral responsibility" (p. 34), and they thereby 
avoid any reliance on the principle of alternate possibilities. If this argument is sound 
it amounts to a refutation of my claim that intervention control can be sufficient for 
responsibility. 
But there are a number of ways in which we can resist this conclusion. First 
consider the instructor case, which is Fischer and Ravizza' s only example of the two 
kinds of control coming apart. We could refuse to accept the analogy between the 
instructor case and cases of habitual behaviour. In the instructor case there are two 
agents; in habitual behaviour there is only one. And it is not clear that a single agent 
could ever have guidance control without also having regulative control. What is 
telling is how Fischer and Ravizza characterise guidance control, that is, in terms of 
Sally "carefully" (p. 30) guiding the car to the right. A natural understanding of this is 
that Sally is attentive to feedback (both visual and through the steering wheel), and 
would in the light of such feedback, make corrections if necessary. In other words 
guidance control entails some regulative control, so alternate possibilities are still in 
the picture. 
12 On the use of" moral" see n. 9 above. 
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This objection may of course reveal that I have misunderstood what Fischer 
and Ravizza mean by guidance control - unfortunately they define the idea solely by 
means of the single example. But it does not look as if there will be an easy fix to this 
criticism. For if guidance control involves no regulative control at all, the claim that 
guidance control alone underwrites responsibility looks far less plausible.13 
But even if we accept the analogy with a two agent scenario, in the light of 
intuitions like Frankfurt's, we can deny Fischer and Ravizza' s intuition that Sally, and 
not the instructor, is responsible for the car's going to the right. True, it is not exactly 
obvious what we would say in such an unusual situation, but it would certainly be 
odd - or symptomatic of being in the grip of a theory- to deny flatly that the instructor 
has any responsibility for what happens to the car. The instructor will, after all, earn 
some of our reactive attitudes for the car's movements going so smoothly. It is these 
same kinds of attitudes that will become transferred to Sally herself once she learns to 
drive, and these attitudes that explain why we are more impressed with her cornering 
when she does it on her own. 
Perhaps there are replies to these objections. If there are, there is a nettle still 
to be grasped. For if we are going to rely on the idea of regulative control, or some 
other notion of control which requires the idea of alternate possibilities, to explain our 
responsibility for non-compulsive habitual behaviours as I suggest, we shall need to 
show that this notion of control is not subject to Frankfurt-type counter examples. 
How is this to be done? 
I have two answers. First, we can maintain that none of the Frankfurt-type 
cases represent the kind of intervention that we need to invoke to secure responsibility 
for habitual behaviour.14 The kind of intervention that I think is necessary is the 
intervention of the agent. So, for instance, the possibility that I could make a decision not 
to bite my nails now, not to go the usual way to work today, and so forth, is all that is 
needed for intervention control. These are the counterfactual scenarios that do the 
13 This objection could also be made to Frankfurt's overall position, seen. 11 above. 
14 This argument has similarities with Davidson's (1973, pp. 74-5) reply to Frankfurt, though it does not 
rely on Davidson's idea of "attitudinal conditions". 
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work in grounding responsibility. In contrast, the kind of intervention that I do not 
think is necessary to ground responsibility is the intervention of outside agencies, 
mad scientists, aliens, omnipotent gods and driving instructors, which fill the 
literature on alternate possibilities. It seems to me that if any of these are genuine 
possibilities, then it would be futile to try to say that they are what ground the agent's 
responsibility. For it would seem far more natural to say that it is precisely because 
these are possibilities of alien intervention that the agent has less control over her 
behaviour than she might have thought she had. It is the aliens that have the control; 
not her. 
The second answer is structurally similar to the argument against the presence 
of "trying" in Chapter 3, §7. The idea is that none of the behaviours in Frankfurt-type 
scenarios could count as habitual behaviours, since in every case, the circumstances in 
which the behaviours are supposed to take place are abnormal. This is what the 
definition of habitual behaviour (HB) implies, and the move also enjoys intuitive 
plausibility. With outside agencies wired up to an agent, poised and ready to 
intervene, severe pressure is put on the supposition that she is involved in anything 
repeated, never mind habitual. In contrast, it would be quite usual for the agent 
herself to be in a position to intervene should that be appropriate or desirable. Thus 
Frankfurt-type cases are not counter examples to the idea that we have intervention 
control over habitual behaviours, for they presuppose that the behaviours in question 
are non-habitual. Our willingness to be impressed by thought experiments of this 
kind may reveal how deep our habit blindness goes.15 
In sum, I do not think that Fischer and Ravizza have shown that the only kind 
of control relevant to responsibility is guidance control. And I do not think that we 
should be as impressed as they are with the Frankfurt-type cases that motivate their 
claim, both in general, and in the particular context of habitual behaviours. Since we 
have seen no good counter argument, it still seems entirely plausible that intervention 
control is sufficient for personal responsibility. In the next section I shall develop the 
1s Questions are raised here about the use of thought experiments in the philosophy of mind and action, 
suggesting a further avenue for future research. 
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notion of intervention control by spelling out the sense in which intervention is 
rational. 
7. The Rationality of Intervention Control 
I want to say that we can understand the particular kind of intervention relevant to 
the control of non-coercive habitual behaviours by saying that it must be rational 
intervention. Though I shall not be addressing the topic of the rationality of habitual 
behaviour properly until Chapters 5 and 6, it is necessary to broach the topic of 
rationality here in order to argue that intervention control is sufficient for personal 
responsibility. For the purposes of the current argument we can understand rational 
intervention as intervention "for reasons", an idea of rational action which is well 
embedded in the literature.16 We can for now understand that phrase simply as 
indicating actions that are sensible things to do from the point of view of the agent. 
As we saw in the previous section there are lots of ways of intervening in the 
progress of a piece of behaviour, and not just any kind of intervention will show 
personal responsibility. Possible interventions include being restrained or pushed by 
things in one's environment, being restrained or coerced by somebody else, being 
overcome by tiredness, being anaesthetised, having one's brain manipulated, and so 
on. None of these are rational interventions, however, because they are not done for 
reasons. This relation to an agent's reasons gives us a clear sense in which an 
intervention may or may not be authored by the agent. When an agent intervenes by 
acting for reasons she is the author of that intervention. When she does not, as in the 
above interventions, she is not. The idea is that insofar as a piece of behaviour can be 
intervened upon by an agent in this way, that agent is author of the behaviour, 
whether or not she actually intervenes. I take this to be consistent with Frankfurt's 
intuitions about the coasting of the car. 
16 As we shall see in Chapter 5, actions for reasons are thought by many to exhaust the class of rational 
actions. This is something I challenge in Chapter 6. I argue there that rational action need not be 
understood as actions for reasons, for many habitual actions are rational in another sense. This leaves 
open the possibility that rational intervention may consist in exercising other habits. I take this up in 
Chapter 8. 
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We can now give a definition of rational intervention control. 
(RIC) An agent has rational intervention control over a behaviour if and only if she has 
both a capacity to notice when an intervention on that behaviour is rationally 
appropriate, and a capacity to intervene appropriately on such occasions. 
I want to spell out the idea of rational intervention in a little more detail by 
distinguishing between two sorts of intervention that may take place when exercising 
a habit. I call them minor interventions and major interventions. Minor interventions are 
adjustments of the behaviour, whilst continuing to exercise that habit. Major 
interventions involve abandoning that habitual behaviour altogether, so it is no longer 
an exercise of that habit. 
Consider my habitual behaviour of walking to work along a certain route 
every day. Reasons for minor interventions include the fact that it is raining, which 
should prompt me to take an umbrella; a crowd of people standing in my usual path, 
which means I should walk around them; and there being large volumes of traffic at a 
road crossing, which just means I have to wait for longer than usual. Some of these 
sorts of interventions may be done quite subconsciously, by the body alone. Others 
could be described as rational, in the sense that I could be said to have such reasons to 
intervene. However such interventions are understood, they do not compromise the 
status of my behaviour as an exercise of this particular habit. For the circumstances 
within which these interventions are made fall within the characterisation of normal 
circumstances specified in Chapter 3, §4. Any deliberation involving such reasons 
would not typically be deliberation about whether to exercise the habit or not, but how 
to adjust things appropriately in this particular case. Hence it is in virtue of the 
possibility of minor interventions that habitual behaviours can be said to be 
monitored, and corrected by, our deliberative faculty, without that faculty necessarily 
being directly involved. 
Examples of reasons for major interventions include the fact that due to floods 
all work is cancelled; my breaking my leg; some life-threatening situation at home; 
that I wanted a change; and that I wanted to lose the habit. If I came to have any of 
these reasons, acting on them would be to intervene in such a way that I would not 
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exercise my habit at all today.17 The sorts of circumstances in play here are relevant to 
the habitual behaviour in prospect, since they would all be reasons for me not to 
perform it. So an attempt to persist in performing the behaviour, perhaps as a result 
of not having noticed the strangeness of the circumstances, or having noticed this but 
not really thought properly about the implications, I would be doing something 
irrational, since I would be failing to respond appropriately to reasons. Thus we can 
see that intervention control works at a second level, that is, in monitoring significant 
abnormalities in the circumstances, and opting out in appropriate ways. A failure to 
do so would render our otherwise automatic attempts to behave habitually 
irra tional.1S 
Thus we can see that the two capacities involved in rational intervention 
control can both be present at two levels corresponding to minor and major 
interventions. Minor interventions occur when the agent adjusts what she is doing to 
the particular, though normal, circumstances, and continues to carry out her habitual 
behaviour; and major interventions, when the circumstances are abnormal, and the 
agent opts out of the habitual behaviour altogether. Thus we can see that failures in 
either capacity, that is, to fail to notice when an intervention is required, or to fail to 
intervene appropriately, in a piece of habitual behaviour, is a failure in rationality. 
Were I to go out without my umbrella when it's raining, "blindly" walk into the 
crowd of people, try to cross the line of moving traffic, ignore the radio, or even my 
own wishes, at best I could be accused of being absent minded; at worst stupid or 
rude. These kinds of failures would be culpable irrationality - I would be responsible 
for these mistakes. It would be no justification for me to say that "after all, it was a 
habit of mine!", but an excuse, and a rather feeble one at that. I would be guilty of 
failing to pay proper care and attention to what I am doing. We call this kind of 
failure negligence.l9 
17 All are ways in which I might end up losing the habit, as the last reason makes explicit. 
1s I shall say more about the rationality of major interventions in Chapter 6, §6. 
19 Note that if I genuinely was not able to stop myself from ignoring these reasons, I would still arguably 
be manifesting irrationality, though in a different way. As we saw in §4, the inability would indicate that 
97 
Actions, Responsibility and Control 
I think that rational intervention control is sufficient for personal responsibility 
because it is the agent herself who needs to be attentive enough to spot any reasons 
not to do it; and it is the agent herself who would have to act otherwise on pain of the 
charge of negligence.2o 
I think we can find support for this claim in some literature on intentional 
actions. For some accounts of intentional actions draw on the idea of interventions to 
solve problems about where exactly, in spatia-temporal terms, an action begins and 
where it ends.21 For instance, Stout (1996, pp. 31-2) takes up Adam Morton's (1975, p. 
14) suggestion that "Intentional action is action that is guided by information to which 
it is responsive". The idea is that only whilst the guidance continues can the 
behaviour be deemed an action. 
However, both writers propose views according to which actions also aim at 
some outcome, and are thereby intentional. And I don't think we can in general say 
that sort of thing about habitual behaviours. When we behave habitually we just do 
what is usual for us in this context. What is more, we seem to be able to detect what is 
unusual in our surroundings, and correct for it, without having any conception of 
what we were doing in the first place. We revert to what we were doing, whatever 
that was. In this way we can still, as Stout puts it, "make a good shot at it" (1996, p. 
31). Thus we can have the idea of being guided by information, in the form of rational 
intervention control, without thereby conceding that habitual behaviours are 
intentional. Adopting Morton's scheme with this modification, there need be no 
problem with determining when an agent is acting: it will be for the duration of the 
agent's having rational intervention control over her behaviour. 
This characterisation of control has an interesting, and perhaps surprising, 
upshot, which will become significant later. For nowhere in the above definition have 
we are dealing with a case of compulsion, not habit. We can see compulsion as a particularly unfortunate 
kind of irrationality, which would not be culpable (or at least not in the same way). 
2o I shall say more about the irrationality of inattentiveness in Chapter 6, §5. 
21 There is a helpful discussion of this issue in Dretske (1988, pp. 11-22). Stout (1996, pp. 29-32) offers a 
brief, but helpful synopsis of the positions. 
98 
Actions, Responsibility and Control 
we needed to specify what kind of behaviour is actually being controlled, or "under 
control". This means that agents could be said to have rational intervention control 
over occurrences whether or not they involve the agent's own body. Frankfurt's 
coasting car example is not merely an analogy for the kind of control in question, but 
a genuine case of it. The driver has rational intervention control over the movement 
of his car down the hill, even though he may have his hands off the steering wheel, 
and his feet off the pedals. Similarly, a footballer can be said to have rational 
intervention control over the movement of a ball which he "guards" as he runs with 
it, though he need not make contact with it. And a child-minder has rational 
intervention control over his children even though he might be sitting in the same 
room reading a book, or even just listening in another room on a baby alarm. As long 
as the agent is attentive and can intervene if necessary (which may require 
technological support) they can be said to be in control of any given occurrence. 
This is not to deny that behaviours which involve the agent's own body could 
be said to enjoy a special status. Indeed, in view of our characterisation of behaviour 
(Chapter 3, §1), habitual behaviours always do involve the agent's body. The point is 
that the involvement of the agent's own body in the behaviour is not essential to her 
being personally responsible for it. What follows is that an agent can have rational 
intervention control over a piece of behaviour whether or not that behaviour is itself 
rational in the sense that it is done for her reasons. This will become important in the 
next two chapters. 
8. Control of Habits 
In §4 I suggested that the reactive attitudes, when applied to habitual behaviours, are 
appropriate at "two levels": at the level of the particular exercise of the habit; and at 
the level of the habit itself. Given that we have rational intervention control over 
particular habitual behaviours, we can now add something about the sort of control -
and hence responsibility - we have over habits themselves. For we can now be said to 
control our habits in two ways: we have control over which new ones we learn, and, 
to some extent, over which ones we lose. 
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In Chapter 3, §8, I described how we can acquire habits intentionally, that is, 
by deciding to practise the kind of behaviour we would like to become automatic in 
contexts of the appropriate sort. But whilst the prospect of automatism may motivate 
us to intentionally acquire habits, "programming" ourselves in this way has its 
dangers. For although we have rational intervention control over our non-compulsive 
habitual behaviours, so one is never completely at the mercy of the "program" 
(providing of course that the habit does not become a compulsion), this requires 
continued vigilance. Better then to acquire good habits than bad. But gaining habits, 
good or bad, is nevertheless one way in which we can intentionally adjust our own 
future behaviour, and hence such behaviour is something for which we are doubly 
responsible. 
Because we have rational intervention control over non-compulsive habitual 
behaviours, we can also, to some extent, control which habits we lose. Providing an 
agent knows that habits can be lost through retraining, and has reason to lose a 
particular habit, it is the fact that she has rational intervention control over her habit's 
exercises that makes a certain sort of habit loss possible, that is, when an agent has no 
choice but to be presented with the normal circumstances. Such an agent could 
always decide to intervene in a particular habitual behaviour, and do something else, 
or nothing at all. Doing this repeatedly in normal circumstances for that habit will 
help. But actually losing a habit - for it to cease to be automatic - will often take 
considerable perseverance, and, depending on our age (apparently due to the reduced 
"plasticity" of the brain), it may never happen. 
Thus it is because we enjoy rational intervention control over particular 
habitual behaviours that we have a certain amount of control over which habits we 
have. One implication is that in the mature and self-reflective agent, there ought to be 
a good deal of harmony between the habits one has, and the habits it would, on 
reflection, be good to have. It ought to be no surprise that for such agents, many 
exercises of habits turn out to meet precisely the same standards of correctness as 
those actions which flow from careful deliberation. There is a kind of harmony 
between habit and reason. But as we shall see in Chapter 5, to blur the distinction is a 
mistake. 
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For the purposes of this chapter, we now have not one, but two, justifications 
for saying that non-compulsive habitual behaviours are the agent's behaviours, and are 
thus marked out from compulsions. First, we can say that non-compulsive habitual 
behaviours are the agent's because it is the agent herself who has rational intervention 
control over them in particular cases. Second, we can say that non-compulsive 
habitual behaviours are the agent's because it is the individual agent herself who has 
cultivated (in the case of intentionally acquired habits), or refrained from losing (in 
the case of unintentionally or non-intentionally acquired habits), the habits of which 
they are exercises. 
There are at least the following two implications. First, both justifications 
draw on a conception of an agent as a being extended in time, with a rich history and 
a repertoire of capacities, which are not all manifest at any one moment. Accounts of 
personal identity may be affected. Second, this more complex picture of personal 
responsibility can help to explain some of the limits that exist in our willingness to 
hold, and revise, our reactive attitudes to one another, as we negotiate the fine line 
between compulsion and action. 
9. Habitual Actions 
In this chapter I have developed the idea of a kind of control, rational intervention 
control, which we have over particular habitual behaviours. I have defended the 
claim that an agent's having this kind of control over a behaviour is sufficient for 
them to be personally responsible for it. Not only that, but we also have some degree 
of control, and hence responsibility for, which habits we have. I conclude that we are 
now justified in calling habitual behaviours habitual actions. 
The complete definition of the notion of a habitual action can now be stated: 
(HA) A behaviour ~ is a habitual action if and only if it is repeated according to (R), 
automatic according to (A), and the agent has rational intervention control 
over~-
The corresponding definition of a habit is as follows: 
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(H) An agent has a habit of ¢-ing in C if and only if the agent performed habitual 
action ~ on most of her recent encounters with C. 
I anticipate (but will not show) that these two definitions capture a considerable 
portion of those human behaviours, and kinds of behaviour, that we commonly call 
"habitual actions" or "habits". 
My starting point was to try to capture something generic in the anti-
intellectualist ideas put forward by Aristotle, Ryle and Wittgenstein. Whether or not I 
have completely succeeded in that endeavour I am not sure. It would require further 
exegesis and argument in each case, armed with our new definitions. But regardless 
of whether I have precisely captured a common conceptual core, the true test for the 
notion of a habitual action will be whether it can be employed to cure contemporary 
intellectualisms. But before we can go into that issue, we need to make good a crucial 
claim about such actions. Namely, that habitual actions themselves, and not their 
interventions, represent a distinctive class of rational actions. That is the job of the 
next two chapters. 
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1. Rational Actions 
In the previous chapter we arrived at the definition of habitual actions by abandoning 
standard analyses of action, which, I suggested, may have been prejudiced against 
habits. But abandoning the standard analyses comes at a cost. For those analyses 
tend to license us to say that actions for which we are personally responsible are also 
rational. Indeed many analyses simply assume that action-hood and rationality come 
and go together. If we are going to admit habitual actions, or any subset of them, into 
the category of rational actions, then, we have more work to do in showing they 
belong there. 
One might at this point want to say that we have already come across a sense 
in which habitual actions can be said to be rational. This sense arises from the kind of 
control that we have over them, described in the previous chapter (§7). One might say 
that because we have rational intervention control over habitual actions, that in itself 
provides a sense in which they are rational. But in fact, all that follows from our 
having this kind of control over our habitual actions is that the counterfactual 
scenarios are rational, that is, when the agent intervenes for reasons. It does not 
follow that the actual scenarios of habitual action, in which no such intervention 
occurs, are rational. What we still need to do then, is to identify a sense, or senses, in 
which actual habitual actions are rational. 
The obvious approach is to adopt a widely held assumption about what it 
means for an action to be rational, namely, that all rational actions are actions for 
reasons. We met the idea of actions for reasons in the last chapter (§7), albeit briefly. I 
said there that actions for reasons can be thought of as sensible things to do from the 
point of view of the agent. As we shall see there are different ways in which such a 
locution can be cashed out, but the central idea is uncontroversial. This assumption 
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about rational actions can be traced at least as far back as Anscombe's (1957) 
Intention.l And perhaps because the view has such a pedigree, contemporary 
philosophers of action, with few exceptions, consider it a platitude. 
Nevertheless I consider the above assumption to be a substantive claim, and a 
contentious one at that. Hence I give it a name. I shall call the view that all rational 
actions are actions for reasons the reasons theory of rational action (or just the reasons 
theory). In this chapter, however, I shall assume, with the majority, that the reasons 
theory is correct. Hence for the moment the question of whether habitual actions are 
rational just is the question of whether habitual actions are actions for reasons. A 
major factor in my thinking that the reasons theory is contentious is that, as I shall 
show, the answer to this question comes out negative. 
In answering this question we must keep in mind the importance of the 
descriptions of actions in determining their status, whether it be rational or habitual. 
We noted in Chapter 4, §2 that actions are only intentional under certain descriptions. 
The same thing goes for an action's being rationaP Under the description "brushing 
my teeth", my action may be done for my reasons, whereas under the description 
"wearing the brush out", it probably will not. Similarly for habituality. We saw in 
Chapter 3, §3 that behaviours are only repeated under certain descriptions, but not 
others. And because habitual actions are a kind of repeated behaviour, the same thing 
applies to them. Described as "brushing my teeth", my action may be habitual. But 
described as "occupying my mouth", it is doubtful that it is, since there are no 
characteristic circumstances in which I do this. 
1 Anscombe writes: "What distinguishes actions which are intentional from actions which are not? The 
answer I shall suggest is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given 
application; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting" (1957, p. 
9). Whilst Anscombe has certainly been influential in bringing about the orthodoxy, it is notable that she 
does not say that intentional action must be actions for reasons. Unlike many who are influenced by her, 
she leaves room for other analyses. 
2 Indeed, for some, e.g. Davidson (1980, p. 61) an action's being rational and it's being intentional comes 
to the same thing. 
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Of course the question of whether such alternative descriptions genuinely pick 
out one and the same action, is highly contentious. To say that they do may require 
some underlying ontology a la Davidson. For reasons given in Chapter 1, this is 
something I thipk we should avoid. If we instead assume that no identity can be 
established, the question to be addressed must be whether habitual actions, under their 
description as habitual, are rational, under their description as actions for reasons. This then 
is how I shall proceed. 
But still matters are hardly simple. For when we come to look at the literature 
on actions for reasons, we find there is little in the way of agreement about what this 
idea amounts to. The lack of consensus is not just a problem for the question at hand. 
It also means that the counterfactual scenarios upon which the idea of intervention 
control relies may require further clarification. Nevertheless, as for any disagreement, 
there does seem to be common ground, and I shall begin in §2 by canvassing popular 
views on the topic, and giving a characterisation neutral enough to be acceptable to all 
holders of the reasons theory. I shall then divide going accounts of actions for reasons 
into two groups, according to what kind of thing they take a "reason" to be. I call 
these views respectively reasons internalism and reasons externalism. In each case I 
consider whether habitual actions could be actions for reasons on this construal of a 
reason. In §§3-5 I describe reasons internalism and say why I think that holders of 
that view have difficulty in accommodating habitual actions. In §6 I describe two 
well-known problems with reasons internalism. This not only motivates the opposing 
position, reasons externalism, but also explains why I reject reasons internalism as an 
account of the counterfactual scenarios. But whilst reasons externalism might avoid 
internalist difficulties, it remains, I argue in §§7-9, difficult to accommodate habitual 
actions as done for reasons in this sense. I shall conclude, in §10, that whilst reasons 
externalism may represent a preferable account of reasons, neither view of reasons 
can accommodate habitual actions as actions for reasons. 
2. The Reasons Theory 
The idea of "a reason for which an agent acts" is technically defined. Such reasons 
must, as Davidson first said, rationalize the action: 
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A reason rationalizes an action only if it leads us to see something the agent saw, or 
thought he saw, in his action - some feature, consequence, or aspect of the action the 
agent wanted, desired, prized, held dear, thought dutiful, beneficial, obligatory, or 
agreeable. (Davidson 1963, p. 3) 
The term rationalization has been adopted in the literature ever since to express the 
relation between reason and action.3 The notion of a reason expressed here is well 
embedded in the literature, and we don't need to agree with very much of what 
Davidson says to accept its intuitive appeal. Specifically, and with due respect to 
other reasons theorists, we need not accept that reasons can always be restated in 
terms of a pro attitude plus a means-end belief, nor that this pair is causally related to 
the action. For current purposes we can be neutral on such matters. 
Slightly different locutions have been employed, which I take to be equivalent. 
Here, for instance is McDowell: 
A full specification of a reason must make clear how the reason was capable of 
motivation; it must contain enough to reveal the favourable light in which the agent saw 
his projected action. (McDowell1978, p. 79) 
Here we have the idea that the reason is capable of "motivation", in virtue of its 
revealing "the favourable light" in which the agent saw his action. Both these terms 
enjoy currency today. Here, for instance, is Dancy in a recent book: 
normally there will be, for each action, the reasons in the light of which the agent did that 
action, which we can think of as what persuaded him to do it. When we think in terms 
of reasons in this way, we think of them as motivating. (Dancy 2000, p. 1)4 
3 Robert Audi (1985) has suggested that in our everyday methods of making sense of actions, the 
rationalization of an action is often contrasted with its proper explanation. I shall follow philosophical 
convention in making nothing of such a contrast (if it exists), and regard rationalization as a species of 
explanation. 
4 The context here is Dancy introducing the distinction between "motivating reasons" and "normative 
reasons", a distinction that Michael Smith (1994) in particular has made popular in recent years. There 
are a number of factors which lead me to think that the distinction is unhelpful, not least of which is 
Dancy's own denial that we are here talking about two sorts of reason, "There are not. There are just two 
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Reasons, then, can be thought of as items which not only explain an action, but show 
it to be justified from the agent's point of view. We can gather from the above 
characterisations that the idea of justification is meant to be weak, which is why it is 
sometimes glossed as "sensible". It certainly falls short of moral justification. But the 
agent nevertheless has a sense of why she should do it. 
This characterisation marks reasons out from at least two other sorts of things 
that we might naturally call "reasons". There might, for instance, be a number of 
considerations which could justify an action, but as it happens, the agent is not aware 
of them. So the fact that I would meet an old friend was a good reason for my going 
for a walk, though this fact played no part in my decision to do so. We can follow 
Dancy (2000, p. 1) in calling these "good reasons". There may be many good reasons 
which are not the reasons for which an agent acts, the latter being within the agent's 
purview when she acts. 
A second sort of item which we would ordinarily call a "reason", but which 
does not rationalize in the sense required, are those factors which explain an action, 
but do not justify it. So we might say that the reason that I fell asleep was that I had 
taken a sleeping pill. Such reasons do not justify what I do, though they may help us 
to understand it. Again following Dancy (2000, pp. 5-6) we can distinguish these non-
justifying reasons from those for which agents act by calling them "reasons why". 
The reasons theory of rational action would hardly be compelling at all, 
however, if we did not accept one important qualification concerning the 
phenomenology of actions, whether or not they are habitual. More often than not, just 
why we should perform some action hardly ever goes through our minds either 
shortly before, or during, its performance. And this need not be because it is 
something we have done repeatedly. So, for instance, we might at some earlier time, 
have made a plan about what to do, and the present action may be a part of 
implementing that plan. Any number of considerations could have been before our 
questions that we use the single notion of a reason to answer" (2000, p. 2). Dancy also seems to 
undermine the case for this taxonomy in his (1995b) paper in which he argues that "there is really no 
such thing as the theory of motivation". See also Norman (2001) for a rejection of the distinction. 
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minds at the planning stage, but we are unlikely to be rethinking these thoughts when 
we come to execute the plan. 
We have of course come across unthinking actions before, in Chapter 3, §§6-7, 
when we defined the sense in which habitual actions are automatic. It would be 
convenient if we could say that non-habitual unthought actions were automatic in the 
same sense. But I don't think we can. There is a much stronger case for saying that 
the agent tries when she acts non-habitually. Certainly, my argument against the 
presence of "trying" does not go through if the action in question is not repeated, 
since the idea of normal circumstances used there does not apply. And as we shall 
see, I suspect that there may be a sense in which reasons theorists would like to say 
that some sort of deliberation does in fact accompany non-habitual actions, albeit of a 
sub-conscious variety. So I think it would be a mistake to assume that non-habitual 
actions are automatic. But in terms of understanding the reasons theory, we need to 
bear in mind that for many actions, whether habitual or not, there are no 
phenomenological grounds for ascribing reasons to the agent. 
This is not to say that we are never aware of what justifies a non-habitual 
action when we perform it. Typically this will happen when we are not sure about 
whether to do something, or where the consequences of an action are particularly 
significant or important to us, or both. In such cases, providing there is time, we will 
quite properly deliberate. But even given that deliberation may only be partial, 
actions preceded by such a process are relatively few and far between. Thus a fair 
reading of reasons theorists is that they do not deem it necessary for reasons to be 
within the agent's consciousness at the time of acting. If this were a requirement it 
would turn out that hardly any of our actions were rational, never mind the habitual 
ones. As an account of rational agency, this would be something of a paradox.5 
The reasons theorist will nevertheless want us to believe that for all rational 
actions, the reasons are in some sense "present" to the agent when she acts. They 
cannot be completely external to the agent's subjectivity, or the reasons theorist would 
be unable to say that this action was intentional under a description at all, and this in 
s I return to this paradox in Chapter 6. 
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turn would compromise its status as an action. But neither need they be present to the 
agent in the way that they are when we deliberate about what to do. Nevertheless, 
according to the reasons theory, in rational actions, they are always there. One might 
speculate that their attribution will be somehow linked to the agent's willingness to 
self-ascribe these reasons if pressed on the matter after acting. But even if this were 
maintained, their ontological status is left wide open. 
I am going to assume that all of the reasons theorists I am going to discuss 
would agree on the above characterisation of reasons, and the rationalizing relation. 
Given this characterisation, the reasons theory has a number of things going for it. 
The reasons theory gives an account of the normativity of rational actions, that is, the 
sense in which we should do them, since the actions are not just explained but justified 
by the reasons. The reasons theory gives an account of the sense in which rational 
actions are authored by the agent, since reasons must be within the agent's point of 
view. And whilst the issue of the causes of actions is hotly debated, the reasons 
theory at least has the potential to deliver an account of the etiology of rational actions. 
For the reasons could plausibly form a part of a story of what brought the actions 
about. I take it that these factors go some way to explaining the theory's popularity. 
The implication is that if habitual actions fail to be rational according to this theory, as 
I think they do, any alternative may find it hard to live up to these standards. I shall 
follow up this challenge in Chapter 6. 
At the risk of oversimplifying, I shall now divide philosophers into two groups 
according to their views about reasons: reasons internalists and reasons externalists 
(abbreviated as internalists and externalists). Very roughly, reasons internalists believe 
that reasons are psychological states of the agent. Reasons externalists deny this and 
claim that reasons are states, or possible states, of the world, which are in the purview 
of the agent. I want now to canvass each view and ask in each case whether habitual 
actions can be said to be done for reasons so conceived. 
3. Reasons Internalism 
The view that reasons are psychological states of the agent can be traced back to 
Hume. Recall that in his Treatise, Hume divides human psychology into "reason" and 
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"passion", and claims that reason is "the slave of the passions" (Hume 1740, p. 415). 
Since reason in some sense "guides" our actions, every action requires a contribution 
from both sides: a "desire" for something, and a "belief" that the action in question 
will satisfy that desire. This, at least, is the received view. 
More recently, since Davidson's (1963) seminal paper, internalism has been 
thought attractive because it opens the way for the idea that reasons might be related 
to the actions which they explain causally. For a thesis such as this to be plausible, 
reasons internalism will seem mandatory, because only a state which is realised in 
some physical way in the agent's body, could be said to cause a movement of that 
same body.6 Such a thesis places a constraint on how we understand the notion of a 
"psychological state", that is, as a state that supervenes on the physical state of the 
agent's body. But whilst reasons internalism might support a causal analysis of 
action, it does not entail it? 
Alongside Davidson, present day reasons internalists include Alvin Goldman 
(1970), Al Mele (1992a), Michael Smith (1994) and Simon Blackburn (1998). Whilst 
their accounts differ in their details, all believe that the reasons which rationalize an 
action consist of the characteristic pair of psychological states: a desire plus a means-
end belief. Whilst other kinds and configurations of psychological states are 
theoretically possible, this is by far the most popular version of the view, and it is 
accordingly how I shall understand internalism.s 
The terms "desire" and "belief" are broadly construed by internalists. 
"Desire" covers a range of attitudes, including wants and emotions, and is for that 
6 At least, that is, given popular assumptions about causal explanation. In contrast, Stout (1996) argues 
that there is an account of causation which allows a causal explanation of action to be compatible with the 
rejection of the internal conception of reasons. 
7 Smith reserves this possibility by arguing that reason explanation could be understood "teleologically" 
(1994, pp. 101-4), though he admits (p. 114) that as a matter of fact, he also holds a causal thesis. (See also 
Smith 1998, p. 18). 
s Other possible views could say that just beliefs or just desires rationalize. "Intentions" might also figure 
in the internalist's picture. I anticipate that all such variations will be subject to the forthcoming 
arguments. 
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reason sometimes glossed, following Davidson, as "pro attitude". The following 
passage shows the diversity included under this latter notion: 
desires, wantings, urges, promptings, and a great variety of moral views, aesthetic 
principles, economic prejudices, social conventions, and public and private goals and 
values in so far as these can be interpreted as attitudes of an agent directed toward 
actions of a certain kind. The word "attitude" does yeoman service here, for it must 
cover not only permanent character traits that show themselves in a lifetime of 
behaviour, like love of children or a taste for loud company, but also the most passing 
fancy that prompts a unique action, like a sudden desire to touch a woman's elbow. 
(1963, p. 4) 
Now I think there is a genuine question about whether some of these items deserve to 
be termed "psychological", but that is something I shall be discussing shortly. 
"Beliefs" may also include genuine states of knowledge, as well as states which fall 
short of it. 
Reasons internalism is not the implausible view that our folk rationalizations 
always mention a belief and a desire. As the example of the explanation of my going 
for a walk "for health", illustrates, we do not need to mention such states to be 
understood. However, no matter what we might say in such explanations, according 
to internalists, until we have mentioned such states, we have not displayed the real 
reasons for which the agent did what she did. To display them, our everyday 
formulations can, and should, be recast in terms of the internalist' s preferred 
psychological states. In the above example, we might for instance say that I went for a 
walk because I wanted to be healthy and I believed that by going for this walk I would 
help to bring that about. Here we have the standard pairing of belief and desire 
which internalists think must be the reason for every rational action. 
There seem to be two possible ways in which a habitual action could count as 
an action for a reason in the internalist' s sense. First, the habit itself might count as a 
psychological state of the agent. Second, the habit is not itself considered to be a 
psychological state, but it generates, and thus explains the existence of psychological 
states, which in turn rationalize the action. I shall consider these possibilities in turn. 
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4. Are Habits Psychological States? 
An answer to this question will turn on how we understand the idea of a 
psychological state. Unfortunately, deciding on a correct conception of such things is 
not something we can hope to do here, so we shall have to settle for some fairly rough 
and ready characterisations of some possible views. I want to consider three 
conceptions of psychological states upon which an internalist might draw in order to 
argue that habits are states of that kind. These conceptions are respectively that 
psychological states are attitudes with propositional content; that they are 
dispositions; and that they exhibit a first/third personal epistemic asymmetry. I shall 
argue that in all three cases, either the conception of a psychological state is 
impoverished for the internalist' s purposes, or there are problems in subsuming 
habits under that class of state. Thus habits are not psychological states. 
I turn first to the conception of psychological states as attitudes with 
propositional content. If the reasons internalist believes that only propositions can 
provide proper justifications, she will say that psychological states are required to 
have propositional contents of some sort. The obvious thing is to say that the 
psychological states in question are the sorts of states which are commonly called 
"propositional attitudes". Beliefs and desires can both be of this form since one can 
believe that such and such is the case, or desire that so and so be the case. 
But even if we accept that reasons are psychological states of this kind, there is 
a difficulty in thinking of habits in this way, since habits do not seem to have a 
propositional form at all. One has a habit of ~-ing in C, which is not the habit that 
anything. Habits just don't seem to be the sorts of things that can be captured 
propositionally. 
Somebody might object by suggesting that there are ways for the internalist to 
capture the idea of a habit propositionally, and indeed this can be done either in terms 
of a belief or a desire. The suggestion might run as follows: my habit of ~-ing in C can 
be expressed either as my belief that when inC I should~; or as my desire that when 
inC I~-
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Now these attributions seem on the face of it to be little more than theoretical 
posits, and artificial ones at that. They seem to be ascribable only as a consequence of 
knowing an agent has a habit, and hardly the sorts of states which the agent will self-
ascribe. But even if we accept the legitimacy of such posits, there is a more serious 
problem with the suggestion that these states capture the idea of a habit. For it would 
be compatible with an agent having a habit of ~-ing in C that they have the opposing 
beliefs and desires. So I might actually believe that when in C I should not ~; my 
problem is that my habit points me in the opposite direction. Similarly, I might desire 
that when inC I should refrain from ~-ing, it's just that my attempts at losing the habit 
have yet to succeed. So, assuming that the suggested beliefs and desires are not 
supposed to be completely independent of the agent's other beliefs and desires, 
somebody who wanted to lose a habit would be guilty of a kind of incoherence. It 
seems then that if we understand them as genuine beliefs and desires, they do not 
capture the idea of a habit. Habits can operate independently of the agent's 
propositional attitudes. And this is even true of those attitudes which concern the 
very behaviours involved in a habit. So unless the posited attitudes are conceived as 
entirely independent of the agent's actual beliefs and desires, which would thereby 
fail to capture anything of the agent's point of view, they must be rejected as an 
account of reasons. Habits then are not propositional attitudes. 
Denying propositional content to habits may seem to be a radical step. Indeed 
those gripped by the reasons theory may resist this move simply on the grounds that 
if habits do not have propositional contents, they certainly could have no role in 
rationalizing an action. Others may resist this move because of the implications for 
the individuation of habits. After all, according to the current suggestion, 
psychological states can be individuated by means of their propositional contents. 
Denying that habits are of this kind will render this method unavailable. But I think 
we can admit that there may be such challenges, without conceding that giving an 
explanation in terms of a habit is just to deny an action's rationality. 
The above considerations lead to a second way in which the internalist might 
try to say that habits are psychological states, namely, to say that psychological states 
are a kind of disposition to act in certain ways. If I have a desire to go rowing, you will 
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expect me to take the opportunity to do so when it arises, or else you will suspect that 
I didn't really have that desire after all. Similar things can be said of beliefs. If I 
believe that Caracas is the capital of Venezuela, you will rightly expect me to say 
certain things when I describe South American countries, and to give certain answers 
to questions on that topic. The idea that psychological states are dispositions and 
nothing more, is often, and to my mind unfairly, attributed to Ryle.9 Nevertheless, 
adopting this view of psychology would provide a rationale for thinking of some of 
the more dubious items in Davidson's set of "pro attitudes" as psychological. Here I 
am thinking of what he refers to as "social conventions" and "permanent character 
traits" (1963, p. 4). And more to the point, this account of psychology would also be 
conducive to the internalist counting habits as reasons. For since habits can be 
regarded as a sort of disposition, it follows that they, on this account, are 
psychological states. 
But whilst the dispositional view might give the internalist a quick victory, I 
think the internalist requires more of a psychological state than this view can offer. In 
particular, the internalist needs to capture the sense in which reasons are from the 
agent's point of view. And dispositions do not seem to capture that thought at all. I 
am disposed to blink when something passes close to my eyes, but my disposition 
does not make this sort of behaviour seem attractive to me. The disposition might be 
an explanation of what I did, but it is not a reason in the required sense. 
That is not to say that dispositions are an unimportant aspect of psychological 
states. But having a disposition cannot be all there is to being in a psychological state 
of the relevant sort. Something more is needed which captures the sense in which a 
psychological state expresses the agent's perspective on things. 
9 This attribution is usually accompanied by the charge, meant in a derogatory way, that Ryle is a 
"behaviourist", see e.g. Fodor (1987, p. 292). Compare Ryle: "I am not, for example, denying that there 
occur mental processes. Doing long division is a mental process and so is making a joke" (1949, p. 23). 
So don't think Ry le would endorse the "and nothing more". 
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One way of understanding this idea is in terms of an asymmetry between the 
way I ascribe such states to myself, and the way I ascribe them to others.1o This 
asymmetry may be understood in a number of ways. It may for instance, be due to 
the states in question having certain first-personal "feel" which is not available to 
anybody else. This would be particularly evident for some desires like hunger, or 
longings, though less so for others, such as the desire to watch television, and 
arguably absent for beliefs. Perhaps more plausibly, the asymmetry may consist in 
the fact that unlike others, only I can know my own psychological states non-
inferentially, that is, without making any inferences from my verbal and non-verbal 
behaviour. Or the asymmetry may be understood in terms of a certain sort of 
authority I have over which states I am in, that nobody else has. Any of these 
construals of asymmetry can be said to capture the agent's point of view. A purely 
dispositional account of psychological states simply misses that aspect out. 
It is on these grounds that I would dispute Davidson's inclusion of 
"permanent character traits" and "social conventions" amongst his pro attitudes. For 
even if an agent were to have one of these "attitudes", that does not entail that he 
"saw, or thought he saw" (1963, p. 3) anything attractive about manifesting one of 
these dispositions. The reason is that one can have these "attitudes" without having 
any sort of distinctive perspective on them. This is something which is also true of 
habits. Indeed, on a plausible interpretation of Davidson, the two "attitudes" in 
question are kinds of habit. One can have a habit (or character trait, or social 
convention) without any idea that one has it, or of what, if anything, can be said in 
favour of having it. In such cases, the "attitudes" in question fail to rationalize the 
action on Davidson's own terms. So I think we have to reject their inclusion in the 
legitimate set of pro attitudes. 
The above problem with the dispositional account naturally suggests a second 
way in which the internalist could understand psychological states, which picks up on 
the asymmetry of such states. Dispositions can still constitute part of the account, but 
it will have to be supplemented with some criterion of asymmetry. The question is, is 
1o See for instance Lowe (2000, p. 68). 
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there any understanding of asymmetry, which both allows standard beliefs and 
desires to be psychological, and does not rule out habits? I do not think so. 
In support of this view I shall canvass the three interpretations of asymmetry 
sketched above. First, using phenomenological feel is unpromising. Since such feels 
are missing from all of the beliefs and many of the desires typically involved in reason 
attribution, it will not do as a criterion of the psychological for the internalist. It may 
be a sufficient condition for a state to be psychological, but it is not necessary. 
Second, can asymmetry be understood in terms of whether an inference is 
required? The idea here is that I only know other people's psychological states by 
making inferences from their verbal and non-verbal behaviour, whereas I can self-
ascribe such states to myself immediately, that is, without any such inference. Now 
there may be some habits, including those which we have had from infancy, which 
we can self-ascribe in this way. I don't, for instance, need to infer that I eat three 
meals a day, and that I speak English. But an inference is likely to be required in the 
self-ascription of other habits. In particular, this will be the case if I have not 
previously reflected upon whether I have a particular habit, and nobody has brought 
it to my attention. 
There is also a question of how satisfactory an asymmetry in kinds of inference 
is as a criterion of the psychological. I seem, for instance, to know certain intuitively 
non-psychological facts about myself non-inferentially, whereas others may not, such 
as what my name is and how tall I am. Like my self-ascriptions of well-known habits, 
I can check these things empirically, but I still seem to know them non-inferentially. 
So it looks doubtful that this way of spelling out asymmetry will provide a necessary 
condition of the psychological. 
The third possibility is whether an agent's having a certain sort of authority 
over her states is a plausible criterion of their being psychological. The idea, which is 
known as first-person authority, is that I cannot be mistaken about my own 
psychological states in the way in which I can be mistaken about the states of others.l1 
11 See for instance Glock & Preston (1995), who attribute this view to Wittgenstein. 
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Now I don't want to take issue with this way of spelling out asymmetry as a plausible 
criterion of the psychological, and indeed one that could be adopted by the internalist. 
The problem is, I don't think we enjoy this sort of authority over our habits. 
Here we have to be a bit careful. For because of the way things are defined, it 
might be suggested that there is a sense in which we have a kind of first-person 
authority over our habits. Specifically, I have authority over whether any particular 
candidate habitual action is automatic. Nobody else is authoritative over whether I 
tried or deliberated over a particular action, or range of actions - that may be just a 
matter for me. Even if I visibly paused beforehand, I might have been deliberating 
about something other than the action itself. However, whilst I would admit that I 
have authority over whether or not I tried or deliberated, I do not think that this 
amounts to authority over whether I have a particular habit or not. This latter fact 
will depend upon there being similarities across a range of my own behaviours, and 
whether there are such similarities is something over which I am definitely not 
authoritative. 
Indeed, I would venture that if anybody has authority over whether my 
behaviour is repeated, it will lie with people who know me well, rather than with me. 
This can in some cases be because I do not have a very good view of some of my 
behaviours, in particular facial expressions, and bodily postures. But most obviously, 
I do not have authority because certain other people, in particular those who know me 
very well, and with whom I cohabit, are confronted with my ways continually. There 
is a sense in which such people need to know my habits, so that they can get used to 
the tolerable ones, and bring the unbearable ones to my attention! So whilst I cannot 
be intelligibly informed about whether I did something automatically, I can be 
informed about whether doing that thing is a habit of mine; and that is why learning 
of such things can come as a surprise to me. This is not to say that I may not, as a 
matter of fact, know at least some of my habits better than anybody else. But that is 
simply a contingent matter of my having observed the behaviour more often than 
anybody else, and not a logical feature of habit attribution. 
I have not come across an account of this sort of authority in the literature, but 
I call it second-person authority, and I shall say that habits enjoy second-person 
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authority. The upshot is that if we characterise psychological states in terms of an 
asymmetry of authority in favour of the first-person, habits are not psychological 
states. If we seek an authority about such states, it would be better to ask somebody 
else.12 
So we have not found a way of spelling out asymmetry in a way that will be 
both conducive to the reasons internalist, and allow her to count habits as reasons. 
And neither of the other two interpretations of psychological states allowed this 
either. There may be other ways of understanding the internalist' s idea of a 
psychological state which I have missed, and which are not subject to the sorts of 
difficulties described above. I do not know what they are. In the absence of such an 
understanding, we must conclude that habits are not psychological states, and so are 
not reasons in the internalist's sense. 
5. Do Habits Explain Psychological States? 
The other possibility for the internalist is not to say that habits themselves are 
amongst the reasons for a given habitual action, but rather that habits explain the 
reasons, themselves understood as standard psychological states, which in turn 
rationalize that action. Goldman seems to have something of this kind in mind in the 
following passage: 
I frequently call a certain number in Yonkers, 914 YO 5-3438. Each time I do this, I begin 
with an occurrent want to dial the whole number. As I proceed, a smaller want is 
formed to dial each successive digit. On one occasion, however, I want to call a different 
number in Yonkers, 914 YO 8-7183. Having dialled 9-1-4-Y-0, habit results in my 
forming an occurrent want to dial 5 instead of 8. (Goldman 1970, p. 90) 
The suggestion seems to be that habit operates at one remove from the real reasons 
associated with habitual actions, which include "occurrent wants". These wants are, 
in turn, be conceived as components of reasons according to Goldman's internalist 
picture of these things, so the dialling of each digit is done for reason, even though the 
12 Presumably a similar thing could be said about Davidson's "character traits" and "social conventions". 
And this further strengthens the case against their inclusion as internalist reasons. 
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dialling of the entire wrong number is not, since the agent in question at no point 
wanted that. So here it looks as though the habit is operating to generate reasons, 
although the habit itself does not confer rationality on the resulting actions. 
The question is, could habitual actions in general be incorporated into the 
internalist' s scheme in this way? I don't think so. 
For a start I think there is room to deny that any of the posited occurrent wants 
exist at all. Of course, the context of Goldman positing these things is defending his 
own internalist, and causal, picture of intentional actions, and he would like that 
picture to apply to as many actions as possible. But I think that he is being over-
ambitious in this case, since the occurrent wants enjoy no pre-theoretical support 
whatever. Indeed, if the agent in Goldman's example did not want to dial the entire 
number, then surely it follows that he did not want to dial each digit of that number 
either, notwithstanding his habit. I suggest Goldman's positing of such items says 
more about his commitment to a particular theory of action, than it does about the 
way habits work, which, as we saw in the previous section, can be contrary to our 
beliefs and desires. 
What I think gets to the heart of the matter, however, is this. On the scheme 
suggested, it is the belief and desire which are rationalizing the actions on their own 
merits, and regardless of how the agent acquired them. So the actions in question are 
not actually being assessed as rational under their description as habitual. In 
describing the justifying states as "occurrent wants", the idea of their having been 
generated by a habit drops out of the picture. The actions in question are instead 
being assessed under a description which is independent of the habit. So the scheme 
cannot show how specifically habitual actions are rational, which is what we wanted. 
It seems we must conclude that the reasons internalist cannot show how habitual 
actions are actions for reasons in this way either. And I do not know how else they 
could go about it. 
If we combine the fact that habitual actions cannot be accommodated by 
reasons internalism, with the popularity of that view, we get part of an explanation of 
why habitual actions are thought of as, at best, only marginal cases of rational actions. 
And this may in turn go some way to explaining why so little philosophical attention 
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has been paid to this class of actions. But there are difficulties with reasons 
internalism, and if we can show it must be rejected, this may give habitual actions a 
second chance at being actions for reasons. 
6. Problems with Internalism 
Reasons internalism has been criticised in recent years. Critics include McDowell 
(1978, 1995b), Quinn (1993), Stout (1996), Collins (1997), Stoutland (1998) and Dancy 
(2000). Here I want to sketch what I take to be two of the most important criticisms of 
internalism, without going into details or considering objections, which I leave to 
others. My purpose is just to illustrate the kinds of problems that internalism faces, 
regardless of its success or failure at accommodating habitual actions. Not only will 
that give us reason to consider habitual actions in the light of the externalist 
alternative, the job of §§7-9, but it will also support my view that internalism cannot 
provide an adequate account of the counterfactual scenarios necessary for the control 
of habitual actions. 
I shall look at two ways in which reasons internalism is criticised, both of 
which, I take it, would be endorsed by the externalists named above. Internalism is 
criticised first, on the grounds that desires cannot rationalize, and second, on the 
grounds that beliefs cannot rationalize. I describe the criticisms in that order. 
The need for desires (or pro attitudes- I shall speak indifferently of desires for 
now) in rationalizations has been criticised perhaps most persuasively by Warren 
Quinn (1993, pp. 228-55). The idea under attack is that desires are "non-cognitive" 
states of the agent. The argument can be put quite simply. Agents can have desires 
for all sorts of things, some of them quite bizarre. Examples in the literature include 
Anscombe's man who has a desire to drink a saucer of mud (1957), and Davidson's 
"yen ... to drink a can of paint" (1963, p. 4). Quinn gives the example of somebody 
who just loves to switch radios on, though he doesn't do it to listen to the music, for 
information, or for any other end (1993, p. 236). Quinn's central point is that an 
agent's simply having a desire for something does not tell us what is good about it. 
And if it does not say that, it cannot do the rationalizing job. Thus internalism does 
not do proper justice to what I called in §2 the normativity of rational actions. True, if 
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we know that somebody likes performing some kind of action, we would normally 
expect there to be something good about it. But just being informed that they like it 
does not yet tell us that there is anything good about it, or what that something is. 
Of course, if desires were thought to be cognitive items, that is, states that 
somehow latched onto things that were in themselves good, that is, desirable, as 
opposed to merely desired, such difficulties might be lessened. But since internalists 
tend to follow Hume in the strict division between reason and passion, and since 
denying this would seem to entail that the world is populated by values as well as 
facts, the metaphysical price may seem too high. Non-cognitive states face Quinn's 
difficulty, and there does not seem to be an easy way out. 
This difficulty does not just affect desires, but it affects habits such as 
Davidson's character traits and social conventions, too, and bolsters the earlier 
argument against accepting such things as being reasons. Explaining what I do by 
saying that it is my habit does nothing to say what is good about it. It might be a 
terrible habit (nail-biting), just as a character trait might be sinister (avarice), and a 
social convention could be extremely harmful (slave-ownership). To be fair, Davidson 
himself might be able to evade this problem because of the way he characterises 
rationalization- which must reveal something that "the agent wanted, desired, prized, 
[or] held dear" (1963, p. 3), all of which are arguably non-cognitive attitudes- but if 
Quinn's criticism is right, this does not make proper sense of the action from 
anybody's point of view, never mind the agent's. This is why, I would suggest, 
Davidson should not allow that a yen to drink a can of paint could ever rationalize it. 
I shall say more about the significance of the distinction between good and bad 
habits in the next chapter. For now we can conclude that the fact that an agent has a 
particular desire, conceived as non-cognitive state of the agent, cannot rationalize 
what she does. Of course, if desires are not conceived as non-cognitive, things may 
look more hopeful for the internalist. I shall say more about such states below. 
What about the rationalizing role of beliefs? Arthur Collins (1997) gives an 
example of a rationalization which is attributed to Joe, who usually drives across the 
bridge to work. Today, however, the bridge is closed, and Joe decides to take the 
ferry. Thus, the explanation is as follows: 
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(0) Joe is taking the ferry because the bridge is closed. (Collins 1997, p. 109) 
This explanation is stated in terms of the objective circumstances, namely, that the 
bridge is closed. According to internalism (what Collins terms "the standard 
outlook"), this requires a "psychological restatement" as: 
(P) Joe is taking the ferry because he believes the bridge is closed_l3 
Collins, however, argues that" Appeals to objective circumstances need not be deleted 
in favour of psychological realities. As a matter of fact ... claims about objective 
circumstances cannot be deleted without dropping the explanation altogether" (p. 
109). Collins suggests that the mistake of the standard outlook is to think of beliefs as 
"stored representations" upon which we "report" when we self-ascribe beliefs. He 
states the problem with this view as follows: 
the explanation proffered by 'I am doing it because I believe that p' absolutely depends 
on the fact that these words do express the speaker's commitment to the truth of p. The 
explanation makes the claim about the objective circumstance and cannot delete that 
claim. (Collins 1997, p. 118) 
So we cannot coherently say of an agent that she believes that p and at the same time 
hold that she is indifferent about whether p is the case. Expressing a belief, then 
cannot simply be the agent's making a reference to her own internal resources. This 
does not of course mean that psychological restatements like (P) are in error, but it 
does mean that we cannot think of the fact that it is expressed in terms of belief as 
crucial to (P)'s rationalizing Joe's action. To have the requisite normative import, 
then, rationalization requires the right kind of content, and that content cannot be 
understood independently from the agent's commitment to the way the world, 
containing bridges and such like, is arranged. It is not the fact that an agent believes 
that p which rationalizes what she does, but simply the fact that p. The internalist's 
13 I change Collins' exact phrasing (1997, p. 109) to the third person, I take it without loss. 
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insistence on the restatement in terms of belief, then, has things the wrong way 
round.14 
My presentation of these moves is doubtless too schematic to persuade the 
internalist.15 Indeed in Chapter 7 I return to some internalist defences made by Smith 
and Blackburn, that have been put forward in the context of a debate in moral 
philosophy, though I shall argue there that ultimately these defences fail. But the 
above difficulties should be enough to show why, from here on, I shall take it that it is 
reasons internalism which requires defence. 
In the light of the two anti-internalist arguments described above, the position 
I call reasons externalism would seem to follow quite naturally. Here I go beyond 
what can strictly be attributed to Quinn or Collins. If, in response to Quinn's 
criticism, we drop the claim that desires are non-cognitive, it seems that a "cognitive" 
conception of these states might be able to do the rationalizing job. On such a 
conception desires, like beliefs, depict the agent's perspective on some feature, or 
possible feature, of the world. Here we need the idea of a possible feature of the world 
because desires are typically for states of affairs which do not yet obtain, and require 
action to bring them about. But this need not lead us to reject the label" cognitive". 
It may be thought that such a state should not be termed "cognitive" because 
states concerning merely possible states of affairs are not items of knowledge. 
However, calling desires "cognitive" captures two things about them. First, many 
desires (those that are not mere fantasy) depend a good deal on what is actually the 
case, and what the agent could realistically attain, so in this sense it is very misleading 
to brand them non-cognitive. Second, if desires are conceived non-cognitively, there 
is only one way in which such a state could "make sense" of an action, namely, that 
the action satisfies it (where "making sense" falls short of rationalization). Calling 
14 See also Dancy (2000, Chs. 5 and 6), who draws on Collins, and advances a similar line. See also Stout 
(1996, Ch. 1). 
1s For instance, Michael Smith (1998) has recently claimed that "while an explanation in terms of a fact 
presupposes the availability of a Humean belief/ desire explanation, the reverse is not true" (p. 20). 
Smith does not however seem to be aware of the arguments presented here. 
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desires "cognitive" brings out the sense in which they are for something more than 
their own satisfaction: they are for something in the world, and not "in" the agent. 
This blurring of the distinction between belief and desire on grounds of their 
cognitive features alone, then, places in doubt the standard internalist picture which 
requires both kinds of state. Properly understood, one or other of them could be 
sufficient. But if we then also accept Collins' criticism of internalism about beliefs, 
and generalise it for the cognitive conception of desire, we see that the idea that 
psychological states are the motivating reasons can be dropped altogether. If Collins 
is right, it is the agent's acting in the light of the way the world is, or (granted the 
above extension) might be, that justifies, and so rationalizes, her action, and not her 
thoughts to that effect.16 This is the position I call reasons externalism. 
For now, then, I shall assume that externalism provides the best going account 
of actions for reasons, and hence the best account of the counterfactual scenarios 
which are necessary for rational intervention control. Having rational intervention 
control over a habitual action, then, cannot be adequately conceived as merely 
attending and responding to one's psychological states, as the internalist could have 
it. Rather, it is better thought of as the agent's attending and responding to the way 
the world is, or might be, irrespective of her own beliefs and desiresY 
7. External Reasons 
Before turning to habitual actions specifically, I need first to further clarify how 
reasons are conceived by reasons externalists, external reasons, as I shall call them. 
Like all reasons theorists, externalists need to distinguish between those reasons for 
16 The idea of "the way the world is" is expressed in various ways by different writers. These include 
"external situations" (Stoutland 1998, p. 43) and "external fact" (Stout 1996, p. 35). I take these to be 
compatible with Collins' suggestion. I also think tilat tile ratiler technical construal of an "external 
reason" whose coherence is denied by Williams (1981) and defended by McDowell (1995b) is compatible. 
Williams' uses of "internal" and "external" reasons should not be confused witil mine. 
17 I shall suggest in Chapter 8 tilat tilis externalist conception of tile counterfactual scenarios may itself be 
nuanced in tile light of a conception of rational action corrected to accommodate habitual actions. 
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which the agent acts, and those for which she could have acted, but in fact didn't. 
They still need to make sense of the idea that the reasons which rationalize are "from 
the agent's point of view". Stout explains the requirement thus: 
If the agent did not have some immediate mental access to the reasons for their 
behaviour, then the involvement of their agency in this behaviour would be brought into 
question. The immediate reasons for an agent's action must be their reasons. (Stout 1996, 
p. 38) 
This requirement for the agent to be aware of her reasons is appreciated by other 
externalists. We saw in §2 that McDowell speaks of a "favourable light being shed" 
by the reasons on the action (1978, p. 79). Presumably the light shed is one from 
which the agent can benefit. He writes of the reasons being "something of which, on 
each of the relevant occasions, [the agent] is aware" (1979, p. 51). We have already 
seen Dancy writing of reasons "persuading" the agent to act (2000, p. 1). Presumably 
such persuasion cannot be done without the agent having some awareness of the 
items in question. And here is Dancy again in a revealing passage: 
[The explanation in question] specifies the features in the light of which the agent acted. It 
is required for this sort of explanation that those features be present to the agent's 
consciousness - indeed, that they be somehow conceived as favouring the action; so there 
must always be a way of making room for this fact, in some relation to the explanation 
that runs from features as reasons to action as response. (2000, p. 129) 
The way externalists distinguish the agent's reasons from other worldly facts, 
then, is by saying that the agent must be "aware" of those reasons. This claim can be 
separated into two aspects, one conceptual, the other temporal. The conceptual aspect 
is what Dancy expresses above as that the features "be somehow conceived as 
favouring the action". That is to say, the agent must know what the relevant facts are, 
not just under any description, but under a description which justifies that action. 
Note also that such justifications need not be justifications for everybody, but must be 
justifications for that agent. So the fact that there is a stamp fair in town is not a 
justification for me to go there, since I have no interest in stamps, though it will be for 
a philatelist. 
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The temporal aspect is that the agent must be aware of the justifications in this 
way at the time that she acts. Now since actions have a duration, this is not very 
specific. But if externalists are going to make sense of aborted actions, that for reasons 
outside the agent's control fail to be completed, the awareness will be required at least 
at the moment that the action begins, if not for its entire duration. Certainly, the 
awareness is not something that may or may not occur after the action is complete, as 
might be the case were the agent questioned about her reasons afterwards, and only at 
that point constructed a justification (what I called in Chapter 3, §6 a "post hoc 
rationalization"). Rather, for externalists, the agent's awareness of the reasons is 
supposed to be an essential part of the action itself as it takes place, and hence 
ineliminable from its proper rationalizing explanation. 
The need for both of these aspects of externalist rationalization is particularly 
vivid in Stout's (1996) teleological theory of action. He proposes that reasons 
externalism is compatible with a causal interpretation of rationalization, in which the 
reasons specify the goal and direction of a causal process. He writes: 
My claim is that actions are the immediate results of causal processes which are sensitive 
to actual (external) means-end considerations [i.e. reasons]. (Stout 1996, p. 3) 
It seems clear that such causal processes could not operate if the reasons which govern 
them, in a form apt for justification, were not present to the agent for their duration. 
Given this clarification, we can now turn to the question of whether habitual 
actions are actions for external reasons. There are two ways in which this might be 
claimed. The first is to claim that habits themselves are external reasons. The second 
is to claim that the circumstances to which a habitual action is a response constitute 
external reasons. I consider these in turn. 
8. Are Habits External Reasons? 
The idea here is that an agent's habit is part of the world in the sense required by the 
externalist, and hence the habit is her external reason for its exercise. The basic idea 
may seem obvious enough: the habitually acting agent acts in the light of her past 
behaviour. 
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I think this is what Philip Pettit (1993) has in mind for his notion of an 
"extrapolative inclination", which is central to his account of rule following (pp. 76-
106). Pettit thinks that for a rule to be something the agent can try to follow (a 
requirement I would question), it must be "independently identifiable". He suggests 
that "examples of [the rule's] application" (p. 86) are identifiable in this way. 
"Looking at the instances, [the rule following agent] will be able to have the rule as a 
salient object of belief; [the agent] will be able to target or address the rule" (p. 87).18 
From Pettit's analogy with a chimp who learns the "triangularity" rule, we can gather 
that for him, these instances are historical: "The chimp forms a disposition in response 
to the actual examples presented" (p. 89). But I don't think habits can be external 
reasons in this historical sense. 
There are at least the following two problems. The first is that I do not think 
that there are any general grounds for attributing a conception of the habit to the 
habitually acting agent at the time that she acts. The second is that facts about the 
agent's past behaviour do not by themselves justify continuing to behave in that way. 
I consider these problems in turn, before suggesting what might be a deeper difficulty 
with the proposal. 
First, I want to consider two sorts of grounds for attributing a conception of 
the habit to the agent. We know from our definition of habitual actions that we 
cannot seek the grounds for attributing to the agent a conception of a habit by 
appealing to the agent's phenomenology. Should the agent be consciously aware at 
the time of acting of any facts about her past behaviour, that would just indicate that 
the action was not in fact habitual. So the habit cannot be present to the agent in the 
sense the externalist requires. 
This is not to rule out the possibility that one can conceive of oneself as having 
a particular habit, and act in the light of that fact. I may, for instance, find myself 
being unsure about what to do in some familiar situation, but then decide that on 
balance it would be better to do what I've always done in this kind of position, or do 
1s Pettit's use of "belief" here belies his commitment to internalism, but his claim about what kind of 
content is relevant can be read externally. 
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what comes most naturally. However, if the foregoing accurately describes my action, 
it is not a genuinely habitual action by our definition, for such pausing and thinking 
disqualifies the action from being automatic. If we let the habit do its usual work, this 
will be an intellectualised misdescription of the phenomenology. 
A second source of grounds would be in what the agent says about her reasons 
after acting habitually. Were she asked why she acted as she did, the replies "that's 
what I've done before" or "that's what I always do", or even "that's my habit", might 
be thought grounds for saying that the habit is her external reason. But even if this 
were the only justification that the agent were prepared to give, we still lack sufficient 
grounds to conclude that the fact cited was present to the agent when she acted. 
Here we should recall the distinction from Chapter 3, §6, between post hoc 
rationalization and genuine recollection of hitherto "subconscious reasons". What 
sorts of grounds may be given for thinking we have a case of the latter? If the agent is 
questioned after the action, the two may not be easy for the agent, or anybody else, to 
distinguish. Grounds for the recollection might be the agent's protesting that she 
"remembers" what she thought at the time; or that she is extremely reluctant to 
endorse all but one rationalization of what she did. But here we run into difficulties 
about how much store we should put on what agents are inclined to say in such 
situations. We shall need to take into account such things as their sincerity, their 
motivations (are we offering them incentives, or punishments, for saying one thing 
rather than another?), and how theory-laden their claims may be. We may in fact 
need to bear in mind the possibility that our agent has done some philosophy of 
action. So I can't see that any of these grounds are going to settle beyond doubt the 
question of whether we have a genuine case of recollection of hitherto sub-conscious 
deliberation. 
What is more, there is reason to think that in the case of many habits, the 
chances of an agent offering either of the above sorts of self-justification will be zero. 
For if we reflect on the fact that many habits are naturally acquired either 
unintentionally or non-intentionally, and that, as I described in §4 above, habits enjoy 
second-person authority, then supposing that the agent to always have the requisite 
self-knowledge for such justifications will appear hopelessly optimistic. Without a 
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conception of her own habit, no particular stretch of her past behaviour will be salient 
to her. Indeed we could rather expect that there will be occasions when a demand for 
self-justification is met by no response at all from the agent. That is not to say that the 
habitual actions in question are not perfectly sensible things to do. But it is to say that 
if the availability of an after-the-action self-justification is the sole ground for 
ascribing a conception of the habit to the agent at the time of her action, it will be in 
general unavailable. And even when it is not, it looks to be inadequate. 
I confess that I don't know what other pre-theoretical grounds we might use 
for ascribing the requisite conception of the habit to the habitually acting agent. 
The second problem for the proposal that the habit's history is her external 
reason, is that even supposing that content could be correctly ascribed to the agent at 
the time of acting, we should not assume that it will be a justification. This is a 
problem is one we came across above (§6) in Quinn's argument against the idea that 
desires can rationalize. For habits the problem is that it does not follow from the fact 
that I have done something before that I should keep doing it. That I have bitten my 
nails for years is no justification for me to continue doing so. Sometimes indeed the 
fact that I have done something repeatedly gives a justification not to do it. The fact 
that I am unduly critical when I mark student essays is a justification for not doing it 
again. The fact that I keep doing it, as opposed to having done it just once or never 
before, makes my getting it right next time all the more urgent. So a behaviour's past 
history does not justify its continued performance. 
Somebody may suggest a remedy whereby we distinguish between good 
habits and bad habits. If we have such a distinction we might say that the good habits 
are the ones whose history does provide a reason to continue with them, whereas the 
bad ones, like nail-biting, and being over-critical in one's marking, do not. I think this 
may be an important distinction, and one which I shall discuss further in Chapter 6. 
But it is no solution to the current problem, because the evaluation of a particular tract 
of one's history as good or bad is carried out independent of its habituality. It 
amounts to the concession that habituality by itself provides no justification. It is an 
explanation only, not a justification. 
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I think the above two problems are sufficient for us to reject the idea that an 
agent's past history could constitute her external reasons. 
Before moving on I want to raise a further, and perhaps deeper, difficulty with 
the idea of habits being external reasons, which requires a slightly different 
understanding of that idea than the one with which we have been working so far. Up 
until now we have been assuming that for a habit to be an external reason just means 
that the agent's past history of exercising that habit is the reason. But that doesn't get 
things quite right. For it seems that unlike other external reasons, habits cannot really 
be separated from the actions they are supposed to explain, for the present action 
itself is an exercise of the habit too. 
Compare habits with other external reasons. Paradigm external reasons, such 
as bridges being closed, other than being reasons for an agent, are otherwise 
independent from the action. But habits are not independent from the actions they 
are purported to rationalize. This is because every habitual action is part of the habit 
which is supposed to rationalize it. So the action itself is part of the putative reason. 
The relation between habitual action and habit is one of part to whole. And whatever 
the supposed relation between reasons and actions has been thought to be by 
philosophers engaged in these debates, it has never, as far as I know, been conceived 
of in this way. So a habit is not something an agent acts "in the light of", but 
something she acts with.19 It is the wrong sort of thing to be a reason. This leads me to 
think that the externalist suggestion at hand may be more confused than either of the 
first two criticisms acknowledge. 
9. Are the Circumstances External Reasons? 
The other possibility for the external reasons theorist is to suggest that the reasons for 
a habitual action are the circumstances within which that action takes place. This may 
look more promising since the circumstances are not part of the agent, but part of the 
world, and since the circumstances are what the agent is in some sense, responding to, 
19 I am open to suggestions about better ways of expressing this idea. 
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the agent cannot be wholly ignorant of them. The question is, can these circumstances 
be external reasons? 
There are two difficulties. First, there is the difficulty of whether the 
habitually acting agent can be said to conceive of the circumstances when she acts, in 
any particular way at all. For instance, in habitually brushing her teeth, an agent may 
said to be responding to the fact that it is early in the morning, that she has just 
walked into the bathroom, or that she craves the taste of peppermint in the mornings. 
Even if we stay within the range of what the agent might plausibly assent to, there 
seems no upper limit on the number of possible descriptions of circumstances to 
which she could be said to be responding. 
However, as we have seen, the external reasons theorist requires that the agent 
is aware of the circumstances under some determinate description at the time of 
acting. Without such a description, the circumstances cannot provide justifications, 
for "these circumstances" alone does not justify anything. But just as we saw in the 
previous section when considering how a conception of the agent's history might 
provide reasons, without phenomenological grounds, such a description is hard to 
find. Analogous difficulties will also arise if we seek grounds for attributing a 
description in what the agent later says, since the interpretation of a self-ascription 
will be indeterminate between recollection and post hoc rationalization. So it is unclear 
how the externalist could go about settling on a description of the circumstances that 
is unequivocally available to the agent at the time she acts habitually. 
This difficulty should not be overstated. For we don't want to deny that there 
may be some, perhaps "low-level", awareness, on pain of admitting that the action 
was not really a response to the circumstances at all, and perhaps even just an 
accident. But how are we to understand this sort of "awareness"? 
One suggestion is by comparison with the sort of awareness we can be said to 
have when we are waking up after being asleep, that is, a sort of absent-minded daze. 
In such a state, we are not characteristically aware of anything in particular, for we are 
not typically focusing our attention on anything specific. However, it would also 
seem wrong to describe such a state as one of being unaware of the world around us. 
Whilst it is undoubtedly possible for us to bring the content of this awareness under 
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various descriptions given a sort of "coming to" - it is not in principle out of reach of 
our concepts- it would be a mistake to think of this content as coming to us with any 
determinate conceptual shape. I think our awareness of the world in habitual actions 
could plausibly be of this sort, not only because we can exercise some habits when 
actually half-asleep, but also, and more often, because we exercise habits when 
thinking about something else entirely. In these latter cases, we are not "awake" to 
our automatic exercises of habits. 
If this is indeed the sort of worldly awareness that we have in habitual action, 
what counts decisively against the external reasons theorist is that the content of this 
awareness is not of the required shape to provide justifications at all. There is nothing 
good or bad about the world as such which could make our acting seem worth doing. 
And this is the second problem for the external reasons theorist. 
So now the dilemma for the external reasons theorist is this. Either they 
attribute to the agent awareness of the circumstances with content determinate 
enough to justify. But we lack pre-theoretic grounds for fixing on such a content. Or 
they admit that there is no specific content to the awareness of the circumstances. But 
they now have difficulty saying how such content justifies. Either way, the prospects 
for saying that the circumstances are external reasons do not look good. 
This is not to say that there are no good reasons for acting habitually, and nor 
is it to deny that these reasons may be quite correctly said to be aspects of the 
circumstances in which such actions are performed. We may be able to locate in those 
aspects of the world our goals, and ways to reach those goals, which could justify 
what we do. On the other hand, we may not be able to locate such justifications. It 
would seem very optimistic to suppose we always could, for we seem able to acquire 
the most pointless habits. Examples would be hair-twiddling and mannerisms, of 
which even to say they are done "for the sake of it" seems strained. But when we do 
locate such justificatory aspects in the circumstances in which an agent habitually acts, 
whilst they are the agent's justifications in the sense that they justify what that agent 
does, they do not seem to be reasons for which she acts, in the externalist's sense of that 
term. Indeed, it seems likely that there are no such reasons. 
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What we have uncovered here then is a residual intellectualism, perhaps a 
hangover from internalism, in the externalist' s picture of things. For the externalist 
too requires the agent to have an intellectual involvement in reasons when she acts. 
We look for something that "persuades" the agent to act (Dancy), or something which 
gives a "means-end justification" of what she is doing (Stout), or something "in the 
light of which" she acts (McDowell). But in habitual actions nothing of the sort seems 
to take place. We don't need persuading to act habitually; we do it naturally. We 
don't need to have a justification at hand when we do what we habitually do, though 
we may be able to put one together afterwards. And if there are reasons which speak 
in favour of a habitual action, we act in the dark of them. I think that this 
intellectualised understanding of an external reason explains why the externalist is 
unable to say that habitual actions are actions for reasons. 
If this is right, it should be possible to try to solve the problem by offering a 
more radically externalist characterisation of actions for reasons, one which requires 
no intellectual involvement whatever from the agent at the time of acting. This is an 
avenue that I shall explore in Chapter 6. For now, if only for the sake of keeping our 
terminology consistent with what real externalists say, I think we should accept the 
conclusion of this section, which is that a reasons externalist should deny that habitual 
actions are actions for reasons. The best explanation for a habitual action on their 
account may then be that the agent acts out of habit. That such an explanation falls 
short of a rationalization for the externalist as well as for the internalist, need not be 
thought to create undue difficulties. Reasons theorists of both kinds should concede 
that I have identified a class of actions to which their theories do not apply; there are 
still plenty of non-habitual actions left over to which they do. 
10. Habitual Actions are not Actions for Reasons 
If we construe rational actions in the standard way, as actions for reasons, it seems 
that habitual actions are not rational. Whilst externalism is more promising than 
internalism, neither accommodates habitual actions. On the assumption that these 
two accounts exhaust the available accounts of actions for reasons, it follows from the 
reasons theory that habitual actions are not actions for reasons. 
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I do not think that this conclusion is controversial. Of the small number of 
writers who have considered the question of whether habitual behaviours are actions 
for reasons, most have argued that they are not. We have already seen Ryle's view of 
habits, thinking them as "mere" and "dispensing" with intelligence (1949, p. 42), the 
manifestations of which being contrasted with "motivated" behaviour (pp. 106-9). 
Along similar lines, N. S. Sutherland (1959) writes that "if someone did something 
purely from force of habit, it excludes the possibility of a motive explanation so that 
actions performed purely from force of habit must be excluded from the class of 
actions for which there is a motive explanation" (p. 146). And R. S. Peters (1958) 
points out that "to ask for a person's motive rules out the suggestion that he might be 
acting out of habit" (p. 152). The implication is the same as that supported by the 
argument of this chapter, namely, that habitual actions should, on account of their 
lack of rational motivation, be lumped together with other non-rational behaviours 
upon which the idea of a reason fails to get a grip. Of course it would be wrong to 
assume that the above writers were working with the same idea of habit as the one I 
have developed (indeed we saw in Chapter 2 that Ryle is not). But we may conclude 
with them that habitual actions are not rational actions at all. 
This would be a mistake. For whilst we can accept the premise that habitual 
actions are not actions for reasons, we need not share the conclusion. For this chapter 
has revealed not that habitual actions are not rational actions, but that they are not 
members of one class of rational actions that we call actions for reasons. We have been 
assuming the truth of the reasons theory all along. And we may be able to maintain 
that habitual actions are rational actions if we reject it. 
The reasons theory rests on an intellectualist bias in the philosophy of action 
itself. That bias is to think of all rational actions on the model of deliberated actions. 
We may flatter ourselves by thinking that most of our actions, if they are not actually 
deliberated, at least appear to be deliberated, and this is what makes them rational. 
As if we always get a (subconscious?) glimpse of the favourable light in which the 
world presents itself to us, and act in that light. Hence the fixation with actions for 
reasons. But now it should seem unsurprising that habitual actions which, since they 
are by definition automatic, are unlikely to fit into this deliberative mould. When we 
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act habitually we do not do two things - see the light, then act - but just one: we act. 
No matter how well thought out some habitual actions appear to be, we should not 
confuse appearance with reality. The insistence on classing all rational actions as 
actions for reasons is confused. It is just a modem form of intellectualism. 
In Chapter 6 I shall show how we can hold that habitual actions are rational 
whilst avoiding the error of intellectualism. 
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1. Problems with the Reasons Theory 
In the previous chapter we saw that the reasons theory of rational action creates a 
number of difficulties with thinking of habitual actions as rational. In the face of these 
difficulties it may seem best to conclude that habitual actions and rational actions are 
mutually exclusive categories. On this view, the idea of a rational habitual action is an 
oxymoron. In this chapter I want to argue that this is a mistake. 
Considerable support for the idea that habitual actions are rational comes from 
the anti-intellectualist projects in the history of philosophy, described in Chapter 2. If 
these interpretations of Aristotle, Ryle and Wittgenstein are right, their credibility 
would be weakened if it turned out that the common solution to intellectualism was a 
kind of behaviour which could be exhibited by non-rational animals. The exercise of 
virtue would then be not the expression of a rational human nature, but something 
closer to a blind response to stimulus. Ryle's dispositions would be similarly 
compromised in their proposed role as constituents of the mental - presumably the 
very seat of rationality - if manifestations of them turned out to be non-rational. And 
if following a rule was a non-rational activity, we would steer into what McDowell 
dubs Charybdis: "the picture of a basic level at which there are no norms" (1984, p. 
242). Many philosophers think these projects are successful, yet they all strongly 
suggest that habitual actions must be in some sense rational. 
There is a second and more general problem with denying that habitual 
actions are rational. In the previous chapter (§2) we noted that if the reasons theory is 
to be credible as an account of rational actions, it had better not turn out that most of 
the time we do not act rationally. But given the available interpretations of a reason 
which we have now canvassed, we might now seem pressed to draw that unpalatable 
conclusion. For it seems reasonable to say that most of the time, that is, at least when 
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we are awake, and reasonably healthy, we rational agents act habitually. Most of us 
do not in fact deliberate about what we will do very much of the time. Thus most of 
the time we conform, without trying, to stable patterns of action characteristic of 
habits. But if this is right, and if habitual actions are not rational, it follows that most 
of the time, rational agents do not act rationally. This paradoxical conclusion violates 
our intuitive understanding of what a rational agent is. Though a minority of the 
time, rational agents may not act rationally, an individual could not do this most of 
the time and still claim to be a rational agent. That most of the time we act rationally, 
then, provides a constraint on acceptable theories of rational action, which I shall call 
the conceptual constraint. If habitual actions are as prevalent as they seem to be, and 
our theory of rational actions forces us to deny that they are rational, we should to 
that extent be suspicious about that theory. And that implicates the reasons theory. 
There are two options: modify the reasons theory, or reject it. Whilst 
modification may seem less radical, and therefore initially preferable, there are a 
number of disadvantages with it. 
First, nothing I have said in criticism of the reasons theory prevents us from 
maintaining that actions for reasons, as they are currently defined, represent an 
important category of rational actions. Indeed we have seen how useful the idea has 
been for unseating reasons internalism. Keeping the idea of actions for reasons in 
play allows us to show that externalism at least purports to be doing the same sort of 
job as internalism. And there may be other debates that I haven't touched upon, 
which rely on the idea of actions for reasons. All this may suggest that to mark off 
actions for which the agent has an awareness of their justification at the time of action, 
is to identify a natural boundary in the class of human behaviours. Modifying the 
reasons theory would compromise this possibility. 
There is a second disadvantage of modification which concerns the motivation 
for such a move. Insofar as modification is part of a quest for a unified theory of 
rational actions, which specifies the essential nature of such actions, it may be poorly 
motivated. I shall say more about this difficulty later in the chapter. But for these 
reasons I think we should resist modifying. 
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Of course, the reasons theory is so entrenched in philosophical thinking that 
abandoning it seems a radical step, perhaps too radical if our aim is to accommodate 
the apparently rather marginal category of habitual actions. But I think that the step is 
worth taking, not just because it allows us to avoid the above difficulties, but also 
because abandoning the reasons theory casts doubt on the very assumption that 
habitual actions are only marginal members of the class of rational actions. The idea 
that habits are marginal may depend rather too much on the assumption that the 
reasons theory is true. If we reject it, we might discover that habitual actions are not 
marginal at all, but are candidates for the role of paradigms of rational action. 
I begin in §2 by identifying a hidden assumption of the reasons theory, the 
rejection of which points us towards possible alternative accounts of rational action. 
In §3 I introduce a promising alternative account, which I shall call the permissive 
conception of rational action. In §4 and §5 I fill out some of the details of that 
conception. In §6 and §7 I describe how the permissive conception accommodates 
both habitual actions and actions for reasons respectively. This puts me in a position 
to argue in §8, that the permissive conception allows us to meet the conceptual 
constraint. 
In §9 I consider another sense in which it might be said that actions in general, 
and habitual actions in particular, are rational, and that is in the sense that they are 
reasonable things to do. I suggest that this sense of rationality can be given an 
externalist interpretation without intellectualism. 
In §10 I summarise my findings. I will by then have explicated two senses in 
which an action's being habitual is compatible with its rationality. The idea of 
rational habitual action will thus be defended. 
2. An Assumption of the Reasons Theory 
In his book Morality: Its Nature and Justification Bernard Gert (1998) is critical of 
accounts of rational action which understand them to be "based on reasons" (p. 60). 
Gert does not go into the ways in which the expression "based on reasons" could be 
understood, so I cannot say whether he would agree with my arguments in Chapter 5. 
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Nevertheless, the explanation Gert gives for the failure of such accounts is relevant 
here. He writes: 
All attempts to provide a positive definition of rational action are inadequate because 
rational actions share no positive feature or even any significant similarity other than 
simply not being irrational. Defining a rational action simply as an action that is not 
irrational does not impose a fictitious and misleading uniformity on all rational actions. 
(1998, p. 61) 
Unfortunately Gert does not say very much in defence of this interesting and fertile 
claim. In this section I want to describe what I find in Gert's complaint about 
"positive definitions" of rational action. In the next section I shall take up his positive 
suggestion. First, then, to Gert's complaint that attempts to provide "a positive 
definition of rational action are inadequate". 
Gert attacks an assumption about rational actions that is contentious. The 
assumption is that every rational action is rational in virtue of sharing some "positive 
feature" with all other rational actions. Two clarifications are in order. First, I take it 
that the idea of a common "positive feature" refers to properties that all instances of a 
kind have, and that excludes properties that they lack. So, for instance, hardness is a 
positive feature common to all stones, but whilst all stones lack the property of being 
animate, a lack of animation is not a positive feature of all stones in the sense 
intended. Bearing in mind this qualification I shall hereon abbreviate the expression 
to "feature". This will become significant shortly. 
Second, I take it that this supposed common feature of rational actions cannot 
merely be that they are just that: rational actions. For that, it seems reasonable to 
think, would yield no informative theory at all. Rather, the sought common feature is 
thought to be something else, something which makes all of those actions rational. 
Something which, in some sense, underlies all rational actions and licenses our calling 
them this. In other words, something essential to rational actions. Call this common 
feature the rationality-maker. Once we have assumed that there are such things, the 
philosopher's task is to locate such a rationality-maker. 
In the case of the reasons theory, the posited rationality-maker is one or more 
of the agent's reasons. And this may seem as promising a candidate as any, if we are 
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optimistic about spelling out the idea of "the agent's reasons". But as we saw in the 
previous chapter, according to existing accounts of reasons, habitual actions do not 
seem to have a rationality-maker in this sense. As I read Gert, he suggests that we 
should put pressure on the assumption that makes this quest seem mandatory. 
Wittgenstein (1953, §§66-77) pointed out that there are many kind concepts 
which work perfectly well despite the fact that the items to which such a concept 
applies may share nothing save being of that kind.1 To use the hackneyed example, if 
we want to characterise the idea of a "game", a search for a feature shared by all 
games, and essential to them, will be in vain. Here we find the importance of the idea 
that a "feature" excludes lacks, since we might be able to think of something that all 
games lack, for instance, a spouse. But the lack of a spouse is not a feature of games in 
the required sense. There is no game-maker. This absence does not, however, inhibit 
our having a perfectly good sense of which things are games and which things are 
not. There will of course be marginal cases whose game-hood could go either way, 
and over which we could debate. But the existence of such cases does nothing to 
undermine the fact that there is large agreement on many clear cases of games and 
non-games alike. Monopoly is a game; the number 2 is not a game. When asked what 
licenses our calling some candidate "a game", we are not obliged to give the same 
answer every time. Rather we can point to a number of features which the candidate 
might be said to share with other items whose game-hood is undisputed, at least for 
the purposes of this exercise. In so doing we are pointing to what Wittgenstein 
famously calls "family resemblances" (§67). 
If this is right for games, it cannot be assumed that for some given kind 
concept C, there is a C-maker which items normally classed as C share. It will have to 
be argued not only that there is some common element which accurately tracks our 
normal use of the term "C", but what is more, that the presence of this element alone 
licenses such uses. 
Now terms with well established definitions may permit such arguments to go 
through. These might include technical terms such as the scientist's notion of water. 
1 For an account of Wittgenstein's suggestion see Bambrough (1961), to which I am indebted. 
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For the scientist, having the molecular constitution H20 is the water-maker, though it 
may not be for the rest of us. There are other non-technical examples, such as 
unmarried man-ness being the bachelor-maker. In both sorts of case it is obvious how 
to continue the s~ntence "to be a [or some] Cis to be ... ". But when definitions are 
vague or contentious, as they tend to be in philosophy, completing such sentences will 
be impossible. 
Prior to a theory of rational action, the notion has only a vague and 
contentious definition. Indeed, unless the definition were contentious, there would 
seem little point in seeking a theory in the first place! That is to say, before we have a 
theory in mind it is not obvious how we might continue the sentence "to be a rational 
action is to be ... ". Because the definition is contentious, it is also contentious to 
assume that there is a rationality-maker. For all we know, "rational action" might be 
another "game". So it need not be a lack of ingenuity that has prevented us from 
reaching consensus on the definition of a reason. Rather, a presupposition of the 
quest, that there must be a rationality-maker, ensures that it will be in vain. This is a 
deeper reason for resisting a modification of the reasons theory. 
The reasons theorist cannot deny that the definition of rational action is 
contentious by claiming that it is being employed technically. Employing a technical 
notion of rational action depends on deciding to do so, and supplying a rationality-
maker. If this is not to be question-begging, the decision requires justification which 
shows how the technical notion refines our pre-theoretical idea of rational action. 
And the requirement to supply an independent argument for the essentialist 
assumption that there is a rationality-maker remains. 
Even without such an argument, however, failing to make the essentialist 
assumption will seem to generate a serious problem. For giving up on the idea of a 
rationality-maker would seem to be tantamount to abandoning the theoretical 
enterprise of accounting for rational action. After all, how else can we give a unified. 
account of the phenomenon of rational action, than by seeking a feature that all 
rational actions share? 
The answer is not to abandon the idea of a single, unifying theory, for all else 
being equal, unity would be preferable to plurality. Rather, the answer is to weaken 
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our conception of what it means for a theory to be "unified". If we do this, we shall 
see that to abandon rationality-makers is not to abandon a single theory altogether. 
For there are at least two ways of offering an informative account of rational action, 
which can be said to unify in senses weaker than sharing a common feature. I shall 
describe the first of these in the remainder of this section, and argue that it is 
unsatisfactory because the sense of unification is in fact too weak. In the next section I 
shall describe the second, more satisfactory, way, proposed by Gert, which unifies in a 
stronger sense, without returning to essentialism. 
The first way of keeping the possibility of a the·ory of rational action alive is to 
take a disjunctive approach. That is, to say that all and only rational actions are either 
such-and-such or so-and-so (or ... ). The disjunction can be as long as we need it to be. 
This allows us to drop the assumption that there is a single rationality-maker, and 
instead suppose that there are many of them. In the present case we might say that all 
and only rational actions are either actions for reasons or habitual actions of a certain 
sort. Call this the disjunctive theory of rational action. But whilst this approach meets 
the conceptual constraint mentioned in §1, it does so only by unifying the 
phenomenon in a very weak sense, a sense which threatens the claim that habitual 
actions are genuinely rational. 
In the disjunctive theory what we have is not an account which captures the 
way in which the multiplicity of things that we call rational actions are all the same 
kinds of thing. But they are only the same kinds of thing by dint of the disjunctive 
theory itself. This is tantamount to admitting that we do not have two ways in which 
an action can be rational, but a straightforward ambiguity in the term "rational". 
Compare a disjunctive theory of the concept "bank": all and only banks are either at 
the edges of rivers or are financial institutions which retain and lend money. The 
sense of unification is very weak since the disjuncts merely reflect two different 
meanings of the same word, which are otherwise completely independent. The 
theory does not capture any deep connection between riversides and financial 
institutions because there is none to be captured. 
And a disjunctive theory of rational action does not articulate any genuine 
unity between actions for reasons and habitual actions, but is silent on the matter. It is 
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then open to an opponent of the view that habitual actions are rational to say that the 
disjunctive theory merely trades on an ambiguity in the notion of rationality, and 
reveals no more unity between actions for reasons and habitual actions than exists 
between financial institutions and riversides. The objector can deny that the 
"rationality" which is being claimed for habitual actions is rationality proper, but is at 
best of a second-class kind, and one which the serious philosopher of rational action 
can justifiably regard as marginal, if not a complete change of topic. 
I think that this is enough to for us to put disjunctive theories to one side. And 
of course further motivation for us to do so comes from the availability of an 
alternative approach, which I think can be regarded as unifying in a stronger sense, 
without requiring rationality-makers at all. It is to such an approach that we now 
turn. 
3. The Pennissive Conception of Rational Action 
I want to develop Gert' s suggestion about how we should define the idea of a rational 
action. The result will be what I call the permissive conception of rational action. Like the 
disjunctive theory considered above, the permissive conception does not require a 
single rationality-maker, but unlike the disjunctive theory, it unifies the phenomenon 
in a sufficiently strong sense. This conception will put me in a position to argue, in 
later sections, that some habitual actions are rational, along with actions for reasons, 
and thereby to meet the conceptual constraint. 
In the previous section we saw that Gert is, like me, suspicious of the idea that 
a rational action is one that is, as he puts it, "based on reasons". In Gert' s opinion this 
is "misleading" because, 
on any plausible account of "based on reasons," these definitions exclude from the 
category of rational actions all those rationally allowed actions that are done without a 
reason, or simply because one feels like acting in that way. Although all rationally 
required actions can be described as based on reasons, rationally allowed actions are also 
rational, and many of them cannot be correctly described as based on reasons. (1998, p. 
60). 
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Here we have a suggestion about why the idea of a rationality-maker might be 
a bad way to characterise rational actions, namely that this assumes that all rational 
actions are rationally required. If we make this assumption it will be tempting to think 
that there must be something which underwrites that requirement for every rational 
action. This is the role played by reasons (whether internal or external) in the reasons 
theory. But according to Gert the assumption is questionable. For, he suggests, some 
actions may merely be rationally allowed, and it is clear from the above passage that 
Gert thinks that they too can be thought of as rational. If he is right about this, we 
shall be less inclined to look for something that underwrites the rationality of all 
rational actions because if an action is merely allowed, we will not be tempted to posit 
something which "makes it" allowed. Rather what we will check for the absence of 
criteria for the action's being disallowed. So Gert suggests that we define a rational 
action "simply as an action that is not irrational" (1998, p. 61). This is what I call the 
permissive conception of rational action. Formally, 
(PC) An action is rational if and only if it is not irrational. 
Rather than supposing that rational actions are those actions which possess a certain 
feature, we instead suppose that rational actions are those actions which lack some 
feature, or set of features, which, were they present, would disqualify the actions from 
being rational. Instead of a rationality-maker we have one or more rationality-
disqualifiers, specifically, ways in which an action can be said to be irrational. 
I think (PC) unifies in a sufficiently strong sense since on the one hand it 
specifies something shared by all rational actions, namely that they are not irrational, 
so unlike the disjunctive account, it captures a genuine commonality. But on the other 
hand, the permissive account does not fall foul of the Wittgensteinian critique since 
what is shared is not a "feature" in the sense defined, but rather a lack of a particular 
sort of feature. 
The permissive conception requires two ideas which standard accounts of 
rational actions do not require. First, we need to make sense of the idea of an action 
independently of whether it is rational. Accounts of action which tie rationality and 
144 
Rational Habitual Actions 
action-hood closely together will have difficulty making sense of this idea.2 Second, 
we need to know what it means for an action to be irrational. After all, to use J. L. 
Austin's somewhat outdated though still useful phrase, according to the permissive 
conception of rational action, irrational actions "wear the trousers". I shall say more 
about these two ideas in the next two sections. Taking them both for granted for a 
moment, however, there is more to say in general terms about the permissive 
conception. 
The permissive proposal may seem idiosyncratic, but it is not without 
pedigree. Bas Van Fraassen (1989) has made a similar proposal about rationality in 
the context of theory change in the philosophy of science. He thinks that if we 
subscribe to the idea of rationality Bertrand Russell assumes to be right, it is 
impossible to show how it can be rational to believe a theory which goes beyond any 
available evidence, and lacks support from previous opinions. Van Fraassen thinks 
we should instead reject that idea of rationality and adopt another. He contrasts these 
two conceptions of rationality by analogy: 
The difference is analogous to that between (or so Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote) 
the Prussian and the English concept of law. In the former, everything is forbidden 
which is not explicitly permitted, and in the latter, everything permitted that is not 
explicitly forbidden. When Russell is still preoccupied with reasons and justification, he 
heeds the call of what we might analogously call the Prussian concept of rationality: 
what is rational to believe is exactly what one is rationally compelled to believe. I would 
opt instead for the dual: what it is rational to believe includes anything that one is not 
rationally compelled to disbelieve .... Rationalihj is only bridled irrationality. (1989, pp. 171-
2) 
It is by using the "English" concept of rationality (which he later parenthetically calls 
the "the permissive concept of rationality", which is where I get the name) that Van 
Fraassen can show how, when we invent new theories which lack support, "we are 
not only prone but rational to embrace them" (1989, p. 172). He thinks that it is too 
demanding to ask for "reasons and justification" for our beliefs to count as rational, 
2 Examples would include the reasons-based accounts of intentional action referred to in Chapter 4, §2. 
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since the quintessentially rational enterprise of scientific theory belief would thereby 
be disqualified. Thinking of rationality instead as a permissive notion, which only 
disqualifies irrational beliefs, captures this thought and hence better reflects our 
ordinary understanding of the idea of rational belief. This is a view which Van 
Fraassen still defends today.3 If it is right as a view about what it is rational to believe, 
why should the same not follow about what it is rational to do? 
Van Fraassen's remarks also lend support to the thesis at hand since they 
suggest that rationality is not the only permissive concept. This should reduce any 
suspicion that the introduction of such a concept is the result of gerrymandering. For 
Van Fraassen is surely right to say that the ordinary English concept of legality is 
permissive in the way he describes. We can define English legality by saying that an 
action is legal if and only if it is not illegal, where what is illegal is explicitly stated in 
the statute books. So for example, if I am not sure whether building model aeroplanes 
is legal, the lack of mention of that activity in the statute books ought to satisfy me 
that it is. There is no other criterion of legality, and in particular, there is no positive 
characterisation of it. Legality then, appears to be a permissive concept with which 
we are all familiar, and there are others. Candidates that have occurred to me include 
"healthy" (not ill); "normal" (not abnormal); and "adequate" (not inadequate). I think 
permissive concepts are commonplace, and that just adds to the plausibility of the 
view that rational action might be one of them. 
The permissive conception of rational action will be controversial at least in 
philosophical circles, since it gets rid of the standardly used three way distinction 
between rational actions, non-rational actions and irrational actions. With the 
permissive conception there is no distinction between non-rational and irrational 
actions, so we only have a two way distinction on the rational-irrational axis. The 
category of actions which were, on the standard scheme, both non-rational and not 
irrational, are now admitted into the class of the rational (and the hope is that these 
will include some habitual actions). 
3 He employs the idea in a recent (unpublished) lecture. 
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Someone might object that a move which denies us a potentially important 
distinction, should be avoided. In response I would say two things. First, the 
standard scheme is not obviously the best way to divide things up. For according to 
that scheme the term "non-rational" is used not only to pick out those actions which 
are neither rational nor irrational, but also to pick out behaviours which are simply 
not assessable as rational or irrational in the first place, since they are not actions at 
all. All that the permissive conception does away with is the first of these categories, 
and leaves the second intact. This is a distinction which the standard scheme 
obscured, so the permissive suggestion does no worse in terms of the number of 
distinctions we are allowed. 4 
Second, I doubt the three way distinction is important. For philosophers seem 
to have had little use for the category of actions which are both non-rational and not 
irrational. Perhaps indeed its main purpose is to provide the conceptual space for 
awkward cases.5 But if that is right, the fact that such cases exist should raise our 
suspicions about the adequacy of the theories which generate them, particularly if 
they include behaviours as widespread as habitual actions. 
The permissive conception is a radical proposal for a number of other reasons. 
We might previously have thought that we could give an account of rational actions 
without delving into the nature of irrationality, but this now looks unlikely. 
Philosophical accounts of irrationality, whatever form or forms it may take, are 
essential to our understanding of rational action. Other debates are demoted. 
Specifically, if the permissive conception is right, the current debates about actions for 
reasons must be repositioned. The debates between those who understand the 
relation between reason and action to be causal and those who deny it, and between 
reasons externalists and reasons internalists, can no longer be seen as debates about 
4 We could, following Hursthouse (1991) introduce the terminology of "arational actions" to stand for 
actions which are neither rational nor irrational, but this would be to depart from Hursthouse's particular 
use of the term for actions performed "in the grip of an emotion" (p. 59). 
sIn a similar vein, Lowe (1978, 1980) identifies that according to standard analyses of intentional actions, 
there is a category of actions which is neither intentional nor unintentional, which he terms "non-
intentional". 
147 
Rational Habitual Actions 
the nature of rational actions. Rather they are at best debates about one way of 
avoiding irrationality. And it remains to be shown that acting for reasons is the only, 
or indeed the most important, way. 
There are significant challenges for the permissive conception. In Chapter 5, 
§2, we saw some of the benefits of the reasons theory, which a competing theory of 
rational action would do well to match. These were that the reasons theory accounted 
for the normativity, authorship, and etiology of rational actions. The permissive 
conception may not seem to measure up very well in these respects. The normativity 
of rational actions is captured only in the rather weak sense that one should do what 
is not irrational. Nevertheless I see no reason not to accept that this is a viable sense of 
normativity (though I shall suggest how we might bolster it in §9). 
The authorship of rational actions is not captured at all by the theory of 
rationality, since there is no requirement that there be reasons belonging to the agent 
involved in acting rationally. However, this is not a problem since authorship is 
guaranteed by the account of actions simpliciter I shall shortly give. 
Etiology may present more of a difficulty. Since the most popular candidate 
for causes, that is, reasons, may not be present at all in rational actions, we shall have 
to look elsewhere for an account of what causes them. I have one suggestion in this 
respect, which may work for habitual actions, since it connects with some remarks I 
made in Chapter 3, §8, about the explanation of habitual behaviours. I give the merest 
sketch here. For it seems plausible that in saying that an action is habitual we have 
thereby specified what causes the action, namely, her having the habit plus her 
encounter with the normal circumstances. We can borrow some terminology from 
Fred Dretske (1988, pp. 42-4) at this point, and speak of the habit as a "structuring 
cause", and the encounter with normal circumstances a "triggering cause". As 
Dretske points out, there is no need to privilege one or the other as "the" cause. They 
both have a contribution to make, as might many other factors. So the habit plus the 
encounter are amongst the causal antecedents of habitual actions. Clearly this 
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suggestion requires development.6 But it shows that the permissive conception of 
rational actions is at least compatible with an account of the causation of those actions, 
even when reasons are absent. 
I now turn to the two notions upon which the permissive conception relies: 
actions simpliciter and irrational actions. 
4. Actions Simpliciter 
The permissive conception of rational action (PC) requires the idea of an action which 
is not defined in terms of its rational status. We saw accounts which are defined in 
that way in Chapter 4, §2, as the reasons-based accounts of intentional actions of 
Anscombe and her followers. We now have another reason to reject those accounts, 
since they tie rationality and action-hood too closely together to facilitate the 
proposed account of rational actions. For if an action just is a behaviour that is done 
for reasons, it would seem that according to any sensible account of irrationality, it 
cannot also be irrational, so (PC) would be an empty theory. Fortunately, however, 
the account of actions developed later in Chapter 4, albeit specifically for the purposes 
of making sense of habitual actions, does not make the tie too close. 
The proposal of Chapter 4 was that habitual behaviours are actions when we 
are personally responsible for them. And I argued that rational intervention control 
(RIC) is sufficient for responsibility, and that we have such control over some of our 
habitual behaviours. A natural extension of this idea is that personal responsibility 
can be used as a general criterion of action. It need not be restricted to those 
behaviours which are repeated and automatic, but applies equally to one-off 
behaviours, and those over which we deliberate. 
This does not entail that all personal responsibility is underpinned by rational 
intervention control. For there may be other sorts of control which are also sufficient 
for responsibility, such as the control required to initiate a behaviour. But we saw in 
6 One thought is that if we conceive of a habit as part of the agent, the account sketched here may be 
compatible with some idea of "agent causation" 1 along the lines of that developed by e.g. Chisholm 
(1976) 1 Taylor (1966) and Danto (1973). 
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Chapter 4 that this latter sort of control does not seem necessary for responsibility. On 
the contrary, we found that insofar as an agent is in a position to intervene 
appropriately in a piece of behaviour, she is to that extent responsible for it, no matter 
how it is initiated. Indeed the process which got the behaviour going may be a sound 
deliberation, it may be an unsound one, or it may be a purely causal process of some 
sort. Thus, if rational intervention control is sufficient for responsibility, this gives us 
at least a sense in which a behaviour can be said to be an action without thereby 
conceding that it is done for reasons. This I think provides enough independence 
between reasons and action-hood for the purposes of the permissive conception of 
rational action. 
The idea of rational intervention control is not of course completely 
independent of the idea of acting for reasons. For only agents who are capable of 
doing what is rationally appropriate, which for current purposes can be understood as 
acting for reasons, can be said to have this sort of control over their behaviour. So, for 
instance, non-rational animals will not be capable of actions. Reasons then are still in 
the picture, but they are in the background. For reasons are only involved 
counterfactually, at the level of the agent's capacities. 
Of course the above remarks hardly constitute an adequate defence of rational 
intervention control as a sufficient condition for actions in general. But as long as we 
don't think it is utterly implausible, it's success in making permissive rationality 
viable might motivate the pursuit of such a defence. The current test is whether this 
notion of an action can capture the idea of an irrational action, and to answer that, we 
need a better understanding of what the irrationality in question amounts to. 
5. Irrational Actions 
Irrationality is what Davidson picturesquely calls "a failure in the house of reason" 
(1982, p. 449). Irrational actions are a particular class of such failures. I want to begin 
with two general points about the sorts of things failures are before going into details 
about specific sorts of irrational actions which are relevant to habits. 
First, it may seem that the permissive conception is violating a very general 
truth. Namely, that if we are going to decide what counts as a "failure" we must 
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begin with a conception of what successful cases are like. In other words, our notion 
of failure is parasitic on our notion of success. This is obviously true in some cases, as 
for instance, when one has built something with a specific purpose in mind, and it 
fails to fulfil that purpose. We know it fails only because we know what success 
would have been. But as a general rule, this is false. For we can often say when 
things have failed without having any clear conception of what "succeeding" would 
be. I can know, for instance, that a persistent alcoholic has failed in some sense as a 
person, without having any clear conception of what it would mean for a person to be 
"successful". The most I know for sure about such a person is that they are not a 
persistent alcoholic, and that is not to say a great deal about them. Here my idea of 
success is being constructed from, and is hence parasitic on, my ideas about failure. 
There is good reason for the priorities being this way round. For failures tend to 
disrupt our lives, and when they do, we notice them, and put them right if we can. 
Failures are thus the standard fare of classification and explanation. Successes, on the 
other hand, we can just rely on without comment or intervention, and they thus stay 
in the background, unnoticed. 
This tells us two things about irrational actions when they are conceived as 
failures in the house of reason. First, we need not expect to begin with an idea of 
rational action in order to derive an idea of irrational action. This is another 
advantage of the permissive conception which depends only on an understanding of 
irrational actions. It reflects the fact that for everything we understand about 
irrational actions, we thereby know something about rational actions too. 
Secondly, since the ways things can fail form a heterogeneous set, the same 
can be said of irrational actions. We can expect a plurality of ways in which actions 
can be said to be irrational, each one corresponding to a kind of explanation (or 
pointing to how an explanation might go) of what the failure consisted in. But there 
need be no common feature, or systematic connection of any kind between them. 
Unlike our concept of rational actions, irrational actions need not be unified in any 
way. 
There is a limit on what can count as an irrational action, and that is that they 
must be actions, in the sense described in the previous section. If it is genuinely the 
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case that an agent could have done nothing about a supposed irrational action, then it 
is not an action. So there will also be a class of irrational behaviours, which will 
include the results of brain seizures, involuntary muscle spasms, and many bodily 
reflexes. The question of how much control an agent has over a particular piece of 
irrational behaviour, is, however, a delicate issue, and we can expect it to be varied 
and contested in particular cases. 
There are some very familiar kinds of irrational actions. Akratic or weak-
willed action, when an agent acts against her better judgement, has received a good 
deal of discussion. 7 Self-deceiving actions and actions which exhibit wishful-thinking 
are have also received attention. These phenomena are all philosophically interesting 
because they generate paradoxes, and paradoxes are the philosopher's favourite food. 
If we look at what the agent says, she seems to believe or desire one thing, but when 
we look at what she does, she seems to believe or desire precisely the opposite. The 
irrationality in these actions, then, is understood in terms of a problem with the 
coherence of the agent's psychological make-up. 
But whilst I have no objection to including the above categories of irrational 
actions in our definition of permissive rationality, and I would refer the reader to the 
literature on the topics for a fuller understanding of these ideas, they will not suffice. 
For they look to the agent's reasoning capacities to understand the particular mistakes 
exhibited in actions, and hence exhibit an intellectualist bias. The problem is that 
since we are supposing habitual actions to be free from direct intellectual 
involvement, the above features of irrationality cannot be used to show how habitual 
actions might be irrational. In habitual action there may be no contrast between what 
an agent says and what she does, since she may have nothing to say which is relevant 
to what she does. And that does not mean her action is not irrational. 
But not all forms of irrational action are of the above kinds. Davidson suggests 
that it might be "irrational, given the dangers, discomforts, and meagre rewards to be 
expected on success, for any person to attempt to climb Mt. Everest without oxygen 
(or even with it)" (1982, p. 450). The irrationality exhibited here cannot be understood 
7 See Walker (1989) for a survey of the issues surrounding weakness of the will. 
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in terms of the agent's incoherence, but rather in terms of the kind of activity in 
question. When it comes to Everest assaults, Davidson thinks the negative 
considerations always outweigh the positive ones, so it is always irrational. The agent 
who does it anyway evidently does not properly appreciate the relevant facts and 
their respective weights, and is for that reason irrational. 
Now this sort of irrationality could be given an intellectualist interpretation. 
We could say that an Everest summiteer is irrational because she made a mistake in 
her reasoning prior to the attempt. In other words, she knew all the relevant facts, but 
just hadn't, for some reason, worked out that some facts should weigh more heavily, 
either positively or negatively, than others. Thus it was her thought processes that 
were at fault. 
But we need not foist that sort of interpretation on the idea. For we can say 
instead that her failure was to see (or "appreciate") which considerations were 
relevant, and thereby important, to her planned assault. This is a failure in 
perception, and not in deliberation. For if the failure happens at this perceptual stage, 
the deliberative processes don't get the chance to go to work on the relevant subject 
matter. This perceptual form of irrationality is in this way prior to deliberative 
irrationality. And this is one sort of irrationality which can be exhibited in habitual 
actions. 
I now want to list three ways in which this "perceptual" irrationality can 
manifest itself in habitual actions. 
(i) Inattentiveness 
When an agent fails to notice some salient feature, or features, of a situation which are 
not only relevant to some prospective action ~' but would make it the case that she 
should not ~' I shall say that she is inattentive. This might sometimes be called 
"absent-mindedness", but it is characteristically a perceptual failure. Inattentiveness 
is a failure in the watchfulness required for rational intervention control. That doesn't 
mean that behaviours over which one is inattentive are thereby disqualified from 
being actions, on the grounds of lacking rational intervention control. For one still has 
such control, even though one is not exercising an aspect of it. 
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The simplest cases of inattentiveness involve missing something that is either 
literally "right in front of the agent", or at any rate, very easily available to the agent's 
perceptual faculties. For example, whilst typing at my computer I fail to notice that 
the screen, right in front of me, has frozen. This is a reason to stop typing, but my 
inattentiveness prevents me from responding to that reason. 
There are more complex cases of inattentiveness in which the sort of action in 
question requires the agent to investigate, that is, to engage in supplementary actions 
in order to establish whether a salient feature is present. For instance, if Robin is 
driving to work by his usual route, he had still better keep an eye out for cars pulling 
out of side streets, or pedestrians unexpectedly crossing in front of him. Such 
vigilance will typically require specific acts of looking to see. If he fails to do these 
things, his driving is reckless, culpable, and irrational. 
The requirement to investigate should not be overplayed. For, on pain of 
violating the conceptual constraint, it cannot be a failure of rationality to omit to carry 
out a "complete" investigation into all the considerations relevant to a particular 
action.s Indeed, if we can make sense of the idea of a "complete" investigation, the 
attempt to carry one out would tend to degenerate into a kind of irrational action of its 
own, a kind of obsessive behaviour. Nevertheless a case of inattentiveness might 
involve a failure to investigate any one of a number of important features that might 
be relevant to a given action. 
Other more familiar kinds of irrationality such as weakness of the will, self-
deception, and so on, all depend upon the absence of inattentiveness. That is, they 
presuppose that some feature of a situation has already entered the agent's purview. 
But there is always the possibility of breakdown prior to any kind of epistemic 
relation between agent and feature, being established. This kind of irrationality 
cannot be expressed as a paradox because there is no inconsistency, as it were, 
"within" the agent, that is, between what she does and what she thinks and feels. 
From the agent's point of view everything is fine. But inattentiveness deserves to be 
s The suggestion that rationality entails "full information" is made by Brandt (1979), and criticised as too 
demanding by Gibbard (1990, pp. 18-22). 
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thought of as a breakdown in our rational capacity because without it our very ability 
to respond appropriately to reasons to do otherwise is compromised. 
(ii) Failure to Deliberate 
We saw in §4 that even with permissive rationality the capacity to act for reasons 
remains a necessary constituent of agency, whether or not we actually exert that 
capacity in a particular action. An exertion of that capacity involves deliberation, 
even if it is sometimes deliberation of a very rudimentary kind. What is crucial to 
agency, then, is that agents can judge when it is appropriate to deliberate about 
something, and when it is not. This capacity cannot itself be understood as the result 
of a process of reasoning, since any such process presupposes a judgement to begin 
reasoning. It is another sort of pre-intellectual capacity that is presupposed by any 
process of deliberation. 
I think it is helpful to think of this capacity in an Aristotelian idiom, that is, as 
a virtue of rationality. As with other Aristotelian virtues, this virtue comes with a pair 
of vices which the rational agent avoids. These vices are respectively too little 
deliberation, and too much. 
An agent deliberates too little when she perceives circumstances which are 
unusual, important, dangerous, or otherwise challenging, she has time to deliberate, 
but she does not. She instead acts automatically. This might be the exercise of a habit, 
but might be an automatic action of some other sort, such as an "instinctive" action, 
which unlike habit, is unlearned. In such circumstances, given that she had time to 
think and did not, we might say that she acts in a foolhardy way. Of course if the 
agent left it to instinct, she might get lucky and take the best course of action. If the 
challenging circumstances were normal for some habit, exercising that habit might 
increase her chances of doing the best thing. But whether she acts habitually or in 
some other automatic way, given that the circumstances are of this kind, and she has 
time to deliberate, she would give herself the best chance of acting well by doing so. 
A failure to deliberate when deliberation is appropriate constitutes a failure of 
rationality. As for inattentiveness, this is not a failure within reasoning, but is a failure 
to deploy it. 
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(iii) Excessive Deliberation 
An agent exercises the rational vice of deliberating too much when she perceives 
circumstances with which she is familiar, and to which she has a natural, perhaps 
habitual, response, and she has a limited amount of time at her disposal, yet still 
deliberates before she acts. Those who hold the reasons theory might resist the 
suggestion that this kind of behaviour is irrational, arguing that if the agent 
fastidiously considers what reasons there might be, she only increases her chances of 
getting things right. But I think that on the contrary, deliberation in some 
circumstances can be a privation of rationality. 
Some good examples of when deliberation can be excessive are the skilled 
actions required for sports. If I am in the middle of a sculling race, possibly the worst 
thing I can do is to think about which movements to make with my arms, hands, 
shoulders, back, or legs. Notoriously too much in the way of detailed deliberation on 
particular movements would cause me to lose my rhythm, and typically, fluff a stroke. 
This is the difficulty of only being able to think about one or two things at a time. I 
would do better to think about more general things like relaxation, my position in the 
race, and so forth, and trust my habits, or even my instincts, to take over the details of 
my bodily movements. It might of course be helpful to focus my attention, from time 
to time, on some particular aspect of my rowing technique in order to improve it- and 
indeed I shall do lots of this in training when there is sufficient time - but such 
deliberation must be used sparingly when there is limited time (as in a race) and is 
anyhow only possible if I trust my many other habits to look after the rest of my 
stroke. When there is limited time, excessive deliberation on familiar techniques, 
then, is irrational in the sense that it is a poor means to an end. 
This rational vice of excessive deliberation on automatic actions comes up 
again and again. For instance, it would be a rational vice to think about how I am 
going to pronounce every word when I am speaking. Most likely, I would lose my 
sense of what I was saying. Of course such deliberation could be helpful were I in 
some abnormal circumstances, such as being coached in my pronunciation by a 
speech therapist. But in normal circumstances, such a procedure would be irrational. 
Another example comes from ethics. If I see somebody in urgent need of my help, say 
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they are in a life-threatening situation, and they need me to call an ambulance, 
pausing to deliberate might well be a matter of life and death. Thinking about 
whether I should really help them, or about how to dial the numbers on my 
telephone, would both cause unnecessary delays. Circumstances, then, to a large 
extent, determine not only whether it is rational to deliberate, but also what it is 
rational to deliberate about. Some self-awareness is also required, that is a kind of 
confidence in what one can do without deliberating. Nevertheless, deliberating too 
much is a failure in the rational capacity to judge what is appropriate in the 
circumstances. 
That concludes this brief survey of what might be included as the irrational 
actions upon which (PC) depends. I make no claims about the survey's adequacy, 
since I am sure there are many other ways in which rationality can break down. 
Indeed I shall suggest another way of acting irrationally in the next section once I 
have introduced the idea of an "irrational habit". However, this short list gives us 
some grasp of forms of irrational actions which are classified in a way that is not 
entirely within the agent's point of view. In this way they contrast with the 
intellectualist classifications of irrational actions with which we are more familiar. 
This then completes the outline of the idea of the permissive conception of 
rational action. The key test for the permissive conception, however, and one which it 
will have to pass if opponents are to be persuaded to accept all this, is whether it can 
accommodate enough habitual actions to satisfy the conceptual constraint. 
6. Accommodating Habitual Actions 
I think that according to permissive rationality, some habitual actions count as 
rational whilst others will not. Take the example of Killian who has the habit of 
walking the same way to work. One completely ordinary morning, with nothing 
whatever remarkable about it, Killian exercises this habit, and unsurprisingly gets to 
work as usual. I think that permissive rationality allows us to count such actions as 
rational, since Killian's action is not irrational. But I think we can develop this 
thought into a more general criterion for when exactly habitual actions are rational. I 
propose that the specifically rational habitual actions are those which are exercises of 
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rational habits which take place in non-defeating circumstances. Here I am introducing 
two new terms. 
First, the idea of a rational habit. We noted in Chapter 5, §8, that some habits 
seem to be good, others bad. Having the habit of washing up after mealtimes is a 
good one to have, whereas leaving the dishes dirty for days is a bad one. Doing 
regular exercise is a good habit, whereas watching several soap operas every day is a 
bad one. So we have an intuitive sense of which habits are good and bad, prior to 
speculating on what might make such habits good or bad (something which I do not 
intend to do, though it might be an interesting avenue to pursue). 
The idea of a rational habit, as opposed to a good one or a bad one, is easier to 
define, since we are already working with a notion of the rational, as it pertains to 
actions. A natural extension of the permissive conception of rational action, would be 
a permissive conception of rational habit. The proposal would be: 
(RH) A habit is rational if and only if it is not irrational. 
Analogous to the conception of rational action we have been discussing, the idea of a 
rational habit is parasitic on the idea of an irrational habit. This way of defining 
things prevents us from looking for a rationality-maker for habits themselves, and 
avoiding the criticisms of essentialism discussed earlier. Irrational habits, in turn, can 
be defined as follows: 
(IH) A habit is irrational if and only if its exercises are irrational. 
This means we can include the bad habits mentioned above in the class of irrational 
habits. So there are good reasons not to have the habit of leaving the dishes dirty, for 
instance, that the food hardens on, it looks untidy, and it means there is nothing clean 
for others to use. Somebody failing to notice these reasons could be guilty of either of 
the irrationality of inattentiveness, or, if not, the irrationality of failing to deliberate 
when it is appropriate (they will not have deliberated too much since the actions in 
question are assumed to be habitual). We could give a similar account of the 
irrationality of the habit of watching soap operas, though using different reasons. 
Could it ever be rational to exercise an irrational habit? One might think so. 
There might be, for example, a large charity donation being offered for a person to 
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watch soap operas for weeks on end. So the person who has the otherwise irrational 
habit is instead doing something not irrational, but even rather admirable. 
But I think there are problems with this claim. For a start, in such cases we 
need to be sure that the habit is still the same one given this new piece of information. 
In particular we need to know that the normal circumstances for the habit do not 
include the possibility of the donation. This would admittedly depend on the truth of 
various counterfactuals, so is difficult to verify. But even if the habit was judged to be 
the same one, there is good reason for thinking that its exercise is still a result of 
inattentiveness, and/ or a lack of deliberation on the part of the agent. For given that 
the habit is irrational in the first place, there is always reason to say that the agent 
exercising the habit is inattentive or failed to deliberate appropriately, since its 
exercises are by definition irrational. So in exercising a normally irrational habit, the 
agent is always failing in rationality in this respect. Of course following a 
deliberation, the agent might come to see that this is a habit worth having, but that 
transition could give us reason to think that the normal circumstances have changed, 
and this would in turn lead us to think that the habit is now a rational one. So it is 
hard to see how exercising an irrational habit could ever be rational. 
If the above is right, it gives us a fourth way in which an action could be said 
to be irrational, to add to the three listed in the previous section, namely, if it is an 
exercise of an irrational habit. So if we know that the habit being exercised is 
irrational, we need not enquire further about the circumstances, or the ends being 
served. We know that the action is irrational under its description as an exercise of a 
habit of that kind. 
Rational habits form a large and heterogeneous group, and include good 
habits like doing the washing up and taking regular exercise, as well as Killian's walk 
to work, which has nothing much to be said in its favour. We can also include going 
sculling every other day, shaking hands when meeting people, using the word "dog" 
to refer to dogs, and getting up at the same time every morning. The innumerable 
routines that form the background to our everyday lives, some of them idiosyncratic, 
others shared, are rational in this sense. 
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I see no reason also not to include the three varieties of habit considered in 
Chapter 2. Aristotelian moral virtues such as courage, temperance and patience, are 
rational habits, though of course more can be said in their favour, since their 
possession is taken to constitute a flourishing human life, eudaimonia. Ryle's 
behavioural dispositions and Wittgenstein' s learned responses would also fall into 
this category of habits. 
The fact that a given habitual action is the exercise of a rational habit, is, 
however, insufficient to guarantee that the action itself is rational. For a rational habit 
can be exercised in circumstances perfectly normal for that habit, but it could still turn 
out that doing so was irrational. For it could be that there are what I call "defeating 
circumstances". These obtain when there are reasons not to exercise the habit as one 
normally would. In the terms used in Chapter 4, §7, defeating circumstances are 
reasons for major interventions. 
To clarify. From our definition of repetition back in Chapter 3, we know that 
all habits have normal circumstances. They are part of the identity of a particular 
habit. But an agent could still be in normal circumstances, yet there could be other 
facts that obtain, which fall outside our understanding of normal circumstances, 
which mean that to exercise the habit on this occasion would be irrational. In the 
example of Killian's walk to work, defeating circumstances would include unexpected 
eventualities such as there being flooding or noisy road-works which would disrupt 
his habitual action, or Killian having made a decision to go a different way today. 
These would all be reasons for him not exercise the habit on this occasion. If such 
defeating circumstances obtained, and Killian still did what he usually does 
habitually, and at least begins his journey, it would seem right to say that insofar as he 
does that, he is exercising the same habit that he usually does. This is usually a 
rational thing to do, but today it is not, and today he is inattentive to, or fails to 
respond appropriately to, the defeating circumstances. In such circumstances we can 
say that Killian acted irrationally, even though he exercised a rational habit. 
As long as defeating circumstances do not obtain, the agent exercising a 
rational habit cannot be charged with inattention or lack of appropriate deliberation, 
since there is nothing to be attentive to, or deliberate appropriately on. Hence, we can 
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conclude that whenever a rational habit is exercised in non-defeating circumstances, 
by the permissive conception of rational action, that action is rational. 
7. Accommodating Actions for Reasons 
If the permissive conception could accommodate only exercises of rational habits, that 
may already be enough to meet the conceptual constraint since the bulk of our actions 
seem to be habitual. However, if it can also accommodate actions for reasons, it 
would meet this constraint more fully. And the better it meets the constraint, the 
more powerful and plausible the permissive conception is. 
It may seem obvious that the permissive conception will allow us to count 
actions for reasons as rational. After all, what better way of avoiding irrationality is 
there than to reflect on the reasons that present themselves to one? However, to think 
that just by invoking her rational capacity, an agent can guarantee that an action is 
rational, is to credit the individual with more power than she has. We all make 
mistakes in our reasoning some of the time. What is more, individuals are not 
immune to making mistakes in their assessments of their own mistakes. The regress 
could go on indefinitely. Of course that is not to deny that we get reasoning right a 
good deal of the time. Indeed, the very possibility of something counting as 
"mistake" in reasoning presupposes a background of successful reasoning. The 
problem is that whether a particular instance of reasoning is successful is not 
completely in the hands of the individual agent who is engaged in that reasoning. 
Luck is also sometimes involved. Whether an agent reasons successfully prior to 
acting is an objective matter, settled by such things as whether it survives criticism 
from others. 
This is a parallel thought to one used in epistemology to support "externalist" 
conceptions of propositional knowledge (see for example, McDowell1995). Whereas 
an individual can be sure about what she believes, the question of whether that belief 
amounts to knowledge is out of her hands. Knowledge is, if you will, successful belief, 
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and success is an objective matter, which is to say that it survives communal 
criticism.9 
Given all this, the claim that actions for reasons can be accommodated by the 
permissive conception can be qualified as follows. Insofar as "acting for reasons" is 
thought of as what Ryle (1949, pp. 143-7) calls an "achievement" notion, picking out 
only successful deliberations leading to the right actions, then it immediately follows 
that the action meets no standard of irrationality, for success just is the avoidance of 
this, as well as other, failures. This seems to be the understanding of actions for 
reasons Davidson has, as his analysis applies only "when the reason explains the 
action" (1963, p. 3, my italics). It follows that all actions for reasons in this sense will 
be rational according to the permissive conception. 
But insofar as "acting for reasons" is thought of as what Ryle calls a "task" 
notion, that is, the agent's attempting to secure success in action by deliberation, then 
all sorts of things could go wrong. When something does go wrong, it will be due to 
some sort of irrationality on the part of the agent, and accordingly the permissive 
conception will deny the action rational status. What may seem surprising is that the 
action would be irrational even though there may have been deliberation on the part 
of the agent, and from the agent's point of view, at the time of action, that deliberation 
could be flawless. We can expect these sorts of occasions to be relatively rare, since 
one will learn from ones' mistakes, but the possibility remains. 
I am not saying that any philosophers actually conceive of actions for reasons 
as a task notion, as opposed to an achievement notion. But what is crucial here is that 
if we are to include actions for reasons as rational under the permissive conception, 
9 In the cited paper McDowell points out that it is not mandatory to conclude from this that all 
knowledge amounts to belief plus some extra ingredient which makes it successful, an "internalising" 
move which encourages scepticism. Rather, some beliefs just are successful, and hence do not fall short 
of knowledge. The parallel with actions for reasons is that we should not think that all actions for 
reasons amount to the agent's "trying" to act for reasons plus some extra success ingredient. Rather, 
many attempts at acting for reasons just are successes. We can say this without the sorts of revisions 
proposed by O'Shaughnessy and Hornsby, discussed and rejected in Chapter 3, §7. 
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we must understand this idea as indicating a success in reasoning and action from an 
objective viewpoint. 
8. Meeting the Conceptual Constraint 
If the permissive conception of rational action is right, that may seem to make 
available a quick way of meeting the conceptual constraint. As a matter of empirical 
fact, it could be said, agents do not act irrationally very much of the time, so it follows 
from the permissive conception that whatever we do for the remainder of the time, 
must be rational. But whilst I have some sympathy with this move, I think it may owe 
too much to the assumed truth of the conceptual constraint. Hence I think it is 
intellectually healthy to be sceptical about the supposed scarcity of irrationality. For, 
it could be that we act irrationally rather more of the time than we would like to think, 
and particularly when we act habitually. I want therefore to consider some 
arguments which support the idea that we act rationally more of the time than we do 
not. This will give us independent reasons for thinking that the conceptual constraint 
should be met. 
I want first to sketch two kinds of argument that may be available to support 
the idea that we have more rational habits than irrational ones. A first kind of 
argument appeals to human nature and facts about cultural evolution. We are 
reflective creatures who can detect irrationalities in what we do. Once we have 
detected an irrational habit, perhaps by having had it pointed out by somebody else, 
or by self-observation, we can often modify such habits, or lose them altogether. Of 
course some habits are difficult for us to change or lose, no matter how irrational we 
think them. But it is in our nature to do all we can to make sure that future 
generations do not inherit such habits. Knowing our children naturally copy us, we 
refrain from exercising them in their presence; if we see them doing such things we 
persuade them against it, with carrots or sticks, and so forth. Because of this, agents, 
who have a long history of self-criticism, spanning many generations, tend to have 
rather few irrational habits. We will of course often notice the irrational ones in 
others, but that is not because they are common, but because they are so unusual. 
Arguably, as long as they are relatively harmless, some such idiosyncrasies are to be 
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encouraged because they are what distinguish us from each other. But in virtue of the 
contingencies mentioned, unusual they nevertheless are. 
A second kind of argument for the claim that we have more rational habits 
than irrational ones mirrors a style of argument used by Davidson (1984). He argues 
that in order to interpret an individual of whom we currently have no understanding, 
we must begin by assuming that she has mainly true beliefs about the world. We 
make this assumption as part of what Davidson calls the "principle of charity". 
Without this principle, Davidson thinks, we could not begin to interpret what such an 
individual is doing. In this way we can say that a condition of agency is the 
possession of beliefs which are mainly true. 
We might say that an assumption similar to that about beliefs is necessary with 
respect to an individual's habits. In order to interpret an individual, we must assume 
that she has mainly rational habits, on pain of her being opaque to us. If, for example, 
she exhibited weakness of the will more often than she did not, if we could interpret 
her at all, it would be with extreme difficulty. The more of her actions that were 
weak-willed, the less we would be convinced that she had any rational control over 
what she did, and our willingness to consider her an agent capable of responsible 
action would be undermined. Persistent exhibitions of other kinds of irrationality, 
would, I think, present similar difficulties for an interpreter. And the exhibition of a 
number of different kinds of irrationality could make things almost impossible: 
imagine trying to make sense of the unfortunate individual who exhibited either 
weak-willed or self-deceiving behaviour most of the time. 
The suggestion is that the assumption that most of an individual's habits are 
rational habits would have to be part of a Davidsonian principle of charity. Indeed, I 
suspect that we may be able to say that all there is to the principle of charity is the 
assumption that an agent has mainly rational habits, the possession of true beliefs 
being one such habit.10 Whether or not this suggestion can be carried through, we can 
still press the analogy: just as rationality can be said to necessarily involve mainly true 
1o Similar things might be said of the rational habit of honouring modus ponens. See further n. 11 below 
and Chapter 8. 
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beliefs, so agency can she be said to necessarily involve mainly rational habits. Of 
course the Davidsonian approach is not without difficulties, and the specific claim 
about true beliefs is not beyond criticism.11 But it would nonetheless seem to be a 
promising line of argument to support the claim at hand. 
But even if it is true that we have more rational habits than irrational ones, that 
is not enough to meet the conceptual constraint. Even though we rational agents may 
have a set of (mostly rational) habits, we may not actually encounter normal 
circumstances for those habits very often. And even when we do, we may not act 
habitually in those circumstances all of the time, due to defeating circumstances 
(though we must for a majority of the time on pain of undermining our claim to have 
that habit). So it could still be that most of the time we do not exercise rational habits. 
But I want to put forward some considerations which count against this conclusion. 
I shall first suggest that we encounter normal circumstances for some habit or 
other most of the time. Second, I shall suggest that even when we opt out of habitual 
actions for defeating reasons, we often act rationally. And third, I shall suggest that 
even in abnormal circumstances, we tend to act rationally too. 
First, then, why should we think that we encounter normal circumstances for 
some habit or other a good deal of the time? Here I appeal to the way in which 
human life is conducted, that is, in surroundings that are generally stable. We tend to 
live in the same kind of environment for protracted periods. In the West, we tend to 
live in the same town, amongst the same people, who consistently do the same kinds 
n One difficulty with the Davidsonian principle is with specifying exactly which beliefs we should count. 
We would presumably not have too much difficulty interpreting a scientist from three hundred years 
ago, altl1ough a good many of his scientific beliefs might be false, and those beliefs could outnumber his 
true ones. Replacing the Davidsonian principle witl1 a principle involving only rational habits (seen. 10) 
could help here. In holding the beliefs he does the scientist is not irrational. In particular, he is not 
inattentive to the facts, and nor is he making any error in reasoning. That modern-day facts are not 
available to him is not a problem with his rationality. He may arguably be termed "irrational" once our 
thought experiment propels him into a modern-day context, when we can (perhaps unfairly) accuse him 
of inattentiveness to the present-day facts. So we have no difficulty in interpreting an individual who has 
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of things. Even nomadic people have a great stability in their immediate 
surroundings, in the group of people around them, their carried equipment, and 
stable practices. Our daily needs are also stable: we need to eat, drink, exercise, do a 
job, support a family, enjoy what leisure we have, and so forth. A result of these two 
kinds of stability is that in meeting our needs we interact with our home environment 
in ways that we find that, in a broad sense, works. What is more, it is easier for us to 
do things in ways that have worked before than to keep re-inventing new ways of 
doing things. Whether we like it or not, we become, as we say, accustomed to our 
home environment. In other words, we acquire a set of habits tailored to that 
environment. What seems true, then, is that the more we live in a place, the more 
habits we acquire for living in that place. Virtually every place becomes associated 
with some habit or other. Some examples from my own life include: the sitting room 
is where I relax; the kitchen is where I cook or eat; a jar is what I open to get at its 
contents; the banister is to be held on to; and the step-daughter is to be welcomed 
back from school. There are very few contexts around my home in which there is not 
some habitual way for me to act. The same thing could be said for some contexts 
around Durham, around the Philosophy Department, and so on. These contexts are 
normal circumstances for my habits. It seems reasonable to say, then, that when 
agents are in a home environment, they encounter the normal circumstances for some 
habit or other most of the time. 
Of course, an agent's being in normal circumstances for a habit is not enough 
to guarantee that they will act rationally. The habit may be irrational, though for 
considerations given above, we can expect such habits to be in the minority. But even 
when the habit is rational, an agent's simply being in normal circumstances for that 
habit is not sufficient for her to act habitually, and hence rationally. Because agents 
have rational intervention control over their habitual actions, they may, on any 
particular occasion, decide, for defeating reasons, to do something other than act 
habitually. She can only do this on a minority of her encounters with normal 
circumstances, otherwise it will become doubtful whether she has the habit at all. But 
the rational habit of doing what he can to establish the truth. But it is too strong to say that this habit 
always results in true beliefs, or even mainly true beliefs, which is what Davidson requires for rationality. 
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even when she does opt out in this way, she will often still be acting rationally. This is 
because exerting rational intervention control is rational, and as we are currently 
understanding things, that involves acting for reasons, and when this is successful, as 
it usually will be (see §7 above), the agent avoids irrationality. It follows that opting 
out will generally avoid irrationality, and so according to permissive rationality, 
opting out will be rational. 
Agents encounter plenty of abnormal circumstances too. Somebody I have 
never spoken to before telephones me; there is a new problem in my research; the bath 
tap is dripping; we are going out to dinner with friends tonight. Although the more 
such things occur, the more likely it becomes that my associated response, if it is 
similar each time, will become habitual, there need be no habits that go with such 
circumstances at present. Because even the most predictable home environments will 
be disrupted at some points, we can say that there must be some such abnormalities. 
When I am in circumstances for which I have no associated habit I am forced 
back onto other resources for determining how I shall behave. One possibility here is 
that I act instinctively, that is, I act automatically but unlike in habitual action, 
instinctive actions bear no necessary connection to what I have done before. 
Instinctive action is sometimes all we can do when time is limited. However, as we 
saw in §5, leaving things to instinct may result in irrational behaviour. If time allows, 
it is better to temper instinct with deliberation. As time often does allow, we tend to 
be rather good at avoiding irrationality in this way. So even when we are in abnormal 
circumstances, we generally act rationally. 
In summary, it seems that there is good support for the claim that permissive 
rationality allows us to meet the conceptual constraint. I have sketched why I think 
we have more rational habits than irrational ones. I have also suggested first, that we 
encounter normal circumstances for some habit or other a good deal of the time; 
second, that even when we opt out of habitual actions, we often act rationally; and 
third, that even in abnormal circumstances, we will tend to act rationally. These 
considerations all provide independent support for the intuitive idea that most of the 
time, rational creatures act rationally. Because the permissive conception of rational 
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action makes available such support, that, in turn, gives us an argument in favour of 
that account of rational action. 
9. The Reasonableness of Habitual Actions 
Some may still not be satisfied with the permissive conception of rationality as an 
account of the rationality of habitual actions. The problem, they may say, is that it just 
does not do justice to the normativity of rational actions, that is, the sense in which we 
should do them. The reasons theory at least gave us a positive account of that, and 
surely we can do better than saying that rational action is merely a matter of avoiding 
irrational action. 
I agree. I think we can give more substance to the normativity of rational 
actions, and without returning to the reasons theory or any other sort of essentialism. 
This will require a supplement to the permissive conception. What is more, I think 
that this supplement will give us some ways of saying, positively, that habitual 
actions in particular, should be done. 
The idea here is to pick up on one of the everyday uses of the term "rational" 
when it is applied to actions and other things. When we apply the term in this way 
we sometimes mean nothing more than that the action is a "sensible", or, to use a term 
I prefer, a reasonable, thing to do, as opposed to its being actually reasoned. Thus, an 
action's being reasonable need not imply anything about what the agent actually saw 
in the action at all. That is to say, it is possible to construct what I called in Chapter 4, 
§6, a post hoc rationalization, that is, a justification or rationale for the action, which 
makes explicit what is good about doing it, without implying that the agent had any 
sense at all of what that good is. The agent might think that there is something 
completely different that is good about it, may think that what is good about it makes 
it a bad thing to do, or may have no thoughts about it all. Thus an action can be 
reasonable without being done for reasons. Indeed agents are not the only creatures 
capable of reasonable behaviour. A rationale can be given for a much broader class of 
behaviours than human actions: the dog buries the bone to keep it safe from 
scavengers; the plant bends towards the sun to get more light. 
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This sense of rational says something more about an action than that it is not 
irrational. And whilst an action could not be both irrational and reasonable, for being 
irrational is a way for an action to fail to be reasonable, an action which is not 
irrational may or may not also be reasonable. So a non-irrational action might be 
reasonable, say, because it aimed at some good end. But a non-irrational action may 
also not be reasonable. Examples could include the one-off actions of idly twiddling 
my fingers, or moving my tongue inside my mouth. So being reasonable is a third 
sense in which an action can be said to be rational. As a result we now have three 
senses of rational action: (i) that which is done for reasons (reasons theory); (ii) that 
which is not irrational (permissive); and (iii) that which is reasonable. 
Exercises of rational habits, I want to claim, are not only non-irrational, as I 
have already argued, but they are reasonable too. We have already seen one sense in 
which this might be true, and that is when the habit in question is a good habit. 
Exercising a good habit will always be reasonable since there is always something to 
be said for doing it, such as the beneficial outcome, even though on occasions, there 
may be better reasons not to do it. 
But there is another sense in which even exercises of rational habits which are 
not good can count as reasonable. Such actions are reasonable because of certain 
considerations which could always feature in a rationale in virtue of the special 
features of their habituality. First, habitual actions always build on the absence of 
past failure. This arises from the fact they are repeated. And second, habitual actions 
are always a more efficient way of performing the same behaviour than the 
alternatives. That arises from their being automatic. Neither of these rationales 
depend upon the habitual actions in question having any particular outcome. 
That habitual actions can always have such things said in their favour sets 
them clearly apart from finger-twiddling or tongue-moving in terms of their 
rationality. There is no past success to build on in the finger-twiddling and tongue-
moving cases, so the first kind of rationale is not available. And whilst it is difficult to 
see what is being achieved by finger-twiddling and tongue-moving (a feeling of 
satisfaction?), it is unlikely that not doing these things will be an any less efficient way 
of achieving anything, since there really is no point to them anyway. I don't want to 
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put too much importance on how we class activities like finger-twiddling and tongue-
moving. For it may be possible to argue that they too are reasonable, and intuitions 
may go either way here. However, to simply say that an action is rational because it 
lacks irrationality is not going to be all that can be said in favour of its rationality. 
Also saying what is reasonable about it supplements that story. And for habitual 
actions just such a supplement is available. 
That is not to say that acting habitually is always the best thing to do, or the 
most reasonable thing to do all things considered. In particular situations there may 
be defeating considerations which would mean that acting habitually would be 
disastrous. However, that does not affect the fact that in general, there are some 
things to be said for acting habitually, even though for some habits (the irrational 
ones) and in some situations (defeating circumstances) these considerations are 
outweighed. The reasonableness of habitual actions is now secured. 
Questions arise about how we might incorporate this result into our theories. 
One possibility is that somebody will want to co-opt this new sense of rationality into 
a modification of the reasons theory and thereby take up the suggestion of Chapter 5, 
§9. The idea is that we understand "reasons" in a more radically external sense than 
reasons externalists have thus far given. "Reasons" then are the considerations in 
virtue of which an action is reasonable, and whilst they can be understood as states or 
possible states of the world, they are not required to be within the agent's purview at 
all. They are not the agent's reasons in the reasons theorist's usual sense of that term. 
If what I have said about all habitual actions being reasonable is right, this could 
mean that we no longer need the permissive conception. 
However, whilst I have some sympathy with this proposal, there are reasons 
to resist it. The most obvious is that in adopting it, we are departing from the 
terminology accepted by reasons theorists. "Reasons" in this new sense, are now 
things of which the agent may be totally ignorant, so will be unrecognisable even by 
reasons externalists. In a recent book Stephen Toulmin (2001) supports keeping such 
terminology separate: he argues that it is often useful to hold apart our sense of what 
is rational from our sense of what is reasonable. 
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More seriously for present purposes, externalist theories of actions for reasons 
which depend upon reasons being in view, such as those of Dancy (2000) and Stout 
(1996), would have to be discarded. This would leave us without an account of 
actions for reasons with which to deal with the counterfactual scenarios which 
underpin authorship.12 
A third, I think decisive, reason to resist the suggested modification of the 
reasons theory is that the anti-essentialist considerations discussed in §2 of this 
chapter deprive us of any grounds for thinking that reasonableness constitutes one 
common feature of all rational actions. It seems that all exercises of rational habits do 
share this feature, and indeed, it may be that successful actions for reasons (on the 
traditional interpretation) may do also. But for all we know, there may other sorts of 
action, not considered here, which we would want to count as rational, yet which 
could not be considered reasonable. So we should resist the essentialist proposal. The 
idea of rationality may have too many overlapping threads to it to be pinned down in 
a single formula. 
Nevertheless, we have done enough to show that if we allow that one of the 
threads of which the idea of rational action consists, is that of actions which are 
reasonable, then saying that an action is reasonable can only add to our confidence 
that it is rational. As far as the rational status of habitual actions is concerned, that 
can only help. 
10. Conclusion 
The failure of the reasons theory to accommodate habitual actions as a kind of rational 
action yields the paradoxical result that most of the time, rational agents do not act 
rationally. The reasons theory thus violates the conceptual constraint on accounts of 
rational action. In this chapter I have identified an unjustified assumption made by 
reasons theorists, namely, that all rational actions share a common feature which 
makes them rational, a rationality-maker. Rejecting this assumption allows us to 
12 In Chapter 8 I shall suggest that there may be an alternative to these views. 
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adopt an alternative account of rational action, the permissive conception, which 
shows the phenomenon to be unified without positing a rationality-maker. 
I then argued that according to the permissive conception of rational action, 
not only can actions for reasons count as rational, but so can many habitual actions, 
namely, those that are exercises of rational habits in non-defeating circumstances. I 
have further argued that if we adopt the permissive conception, this allows us to meet 
the conceptual constraint. This gives further support to the permissive conception as 
an account of rational action. The corollary is that if the permissive conception is 
right, most habitual actions are rational actions. 
Finally, I have sketched how habitual actions can further be said to be rational 
in their own right, in virtue of being reasonable things to do. Insofar as we might 
want to allow that the rationality of an action involves its being reasonable, this 
supplements the permissive conception, and strengthens the case for thinking 
habitual actions are rational. 
The idea of a rational habitual action is not oxymoronic, as reasons theorists 
might think, but rather, it makes good sense. An action's habituality and its 
rationality are not only compatible with one another, but the fact that an action is 
habitual can actually support the claim that it is rational. 
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1. Humeans and Anti-Humeans 
There is a controversy in current meta-ethics concerning the nature of moral 
motivation. An account of moral motivation aims to explain what it means to say that 
an agent is "motivated" to act morally. This idea of motivation has two aspects, 
normative and causal. From a normative perspective, an account of moral motivation 
will explain the sense in which an agent should act morally. From a causal 
perspective, such an account will say what brings such an action about. 
David Hume (1740) unwittingly set the terms for the contemporary debate. 
Michael Smith (1987, 1994) and Simon Blackburn (1984a, 1998) are leaders in this 
movement. Both writers call their accounts of moral motivation "Humean", and their 
accounts deserve this epithet in at least two respects. First, following Hume, they 
hold that agency can be divided into two distinct components: "reason" and 
"passion". On the "reason" side of this divide lie our cognitive faculties such as 
beliefs, and belief-forming mechanisms; whilst non-cognitive states such as desires lie 
on the "passion" side. Second, Humeans follow Hume in thinking that reason is "the 
slave of the passions" (1740, p. 415). Accordingly, Humeans deny that beliefs alone 
could show how an agent is motivated to act. For that we need a contribution from 
the passions: a desire. Humean accounts of moral motivation, then, hold that to 
explain what motivates an agent to act morally, we need to mention both a belief and 
a desire. Affinities with Hume' s own view may end there. 
The Humean view of moral motivation has not gone unchallenged. 
Opposition has come particularly from writers who think Aristotle provides the best 
understanding of moral agency, in which the idea of a virtue plays a central role. John 
McDowell has been a key player in promoting this Aristotelian view. In a number of 
papers McDowell (1978, 1979, 1981, 1985, 1987) has put forward arguments in which 
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he tries to show the Humean position to be mistaken. But whilst some aspects of the 
anti-Humean alternative are reasonably clear- for instance, McDowell (1978) denies 
that desires are required for moral motivation - other aspects of the position he 
prefers remain, at best, rather obscure. I shall be in a position to offer some 
clarification by the end of this chapter. 
It will not escape the reader's notice that we have come across these two sets of 
writers before, in Chapter 5 in the discussion of whether habitual actions could be 
actions for reasons. I argued there that neither the reasons internalists, which include 
Smith and Blackburn, nor the reasons externalists, which include McDowell, could 
accommodate habitual actions as rational actions. Whilst I briefly rehearsed two 
arguments supporting externalism as a view of reasons (§6), there was no assessment 
of internalist defences. The arguments for the Humean position on moral motivation 
can be seen as part of such a defence. 
What turns on this disagreement about moral motivation? Perhaps the most 
important related issue is that which divides moral cognitivists from moral non-
cognitivists.1 According to moral cognitivists, when, in our everyday discourse, we 
discuss ethical questions, such as what should and should not be done, or which 
things have or lack moral value, we are debating matters of fact. When we assert, for 
instance, that the woman should be allowed to choose whether she aborts her foetus, 
or that chimpanzees should be accorded some of the rights normally reserved for 
humans, we are saying something which is not just important, but also true. In 
contrast, moral non-cognitivists hold that these apparently factual claims are not 
genuinely factual, but are something else; perhaps, as Blackburn has it, sophisticated 
expressions of emotion. They are no less important for that, but according to the non-
cognitivist, it is a mistake to think of these assertions as reflecting the way the world 
genuinely is, by some standard of genuineness. 
The question of whether moral cognitivism or non-cognitivism is a correct 
view of our moral talk is intimately connected to the question of what it is to be 
1 I follow Wiggins (1991) in here preferring "cognitivist" (vs. "non-cognitivist") terminology to the 
"realist" (vs. "anti-realist") one. 
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morally motivated. If one thinks with the Humeans, that an agent always needs a 
desire to be morally motivated, it cannot be facts that motivate. Hence one will be 
hard-pressed to defend cognitivism. This is not to say that this has not been tried-
indeed Smith attempts to do precisely this. But as we shall see in §2, his attempt fails. 
If, on the other hand, one denies that desires are essential for motivation, cognitivism 
follows much more naturally.2 
It seems then that by offering an anti-Humean account of moral motivation, 
McDowell is making available a simple route to moral cognitivism. Unfortunately, 
however, he has yet to convince the Humeans that they have got it wrong. In recent 
books, both Smith (1994, Chapter 4) and Blackburn (1998, Chapter 4) have offered 
separate defences of their Humean views against McDowell's attacks. I think that if 
we approach the debate even-handedly, we will find that the Humean defences 
against McDowell's arguments are by and large successful, as I shall argue in §3 and 
§7. But if McDowell's arguments can be strengthened, whilst the Humeans might 
have won the battle, but they may yet lose the war. 
In this chapter I suggest that the idea of a habit developed in earlier chapters 
could be the ingredient needed to make the anti-Humean case stronger in the face of 
these recent Humean defences. I shall consider the distinctive defences of Smith and 
Blackburn in turn. In each case I shall first describe the current Humean defence and 
its merits, before spelling out how, equipped with the idea of a habit, the anti-
Humean can now respond. 3 
2 Other theoretical motivations might also be at work. For if one is attracted by cognitivism, one will look 
first for an account of motivation that does not depend upon non-cognitive extras; and if, for some 
reason, one finds non-cognitivism attractive, one will not have any difficulty with the claim that such 
motivational items are necessary. 
3 I shall not be discussing the pair of defences of Humeanism by David Lewis (1988, 1996). Not only does 
he not engage directly with McDowell's arguments, but his defences are based on controversial 
mathematical models of belief and desire. As a result, I think that the version of anti-Humeanism I shall 
recommend will be immune to his arguments, since we can reject any reduction of habitual actions to 
such models. 
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As we shall see, the meta-ethical implications are significant. In particular, I 
shall be in a position to suggest that attention to habits promises to deliver a novel 
resolution to the cognitivism/non-cognitivism debate. 
Finally I shall briefly discuss whether we can read McDowell as working with 
a notion akin to habit, in which case what I offer is merely a further (though 
necessary) articulation of what McDowell has already said; or whether he is working 
with a different notion, as Smith and Blackburn think. This discussion will show how 
the idea of a habit can shed light on how we should understand the work of this 
influential thinker. 
2. Smith's Moral Problem 
In The Moral Problem (1994) Smith formulates, and claims to resolve, what he takes to 
be "the central organising problem in contemporary meta-ethics" (p. 11).4 The 
problem consists in the apparent incompatibility of three independently plausible 
propositions, as follows: 
1. Cognitivisnz. Moral judgements of the form 'It is right that I ~~ express a subject's 
beliefs about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what it is right for her to do. 
2. Intemalism. If someone judges that it is right that she ~s then, ceteris paribus, she is 
motivated to ~-
3. Hunzeanism. An agent is motivated to act in a certain way just in case she has an 
appropriate desire and a means-end belief, where belief and desire are, in Hume's 
terms, distinct existences. (p. 12) 
Smith's solution is to propose a theory which allows these three propositions to be 
reconciled. He does this by combining Humeanism (3) with what he calls an "anti-
Humean theory of normative reasons". According to the anti-Humean theory, 
statements such as "it is right that I~", which Smith calls "normative reasons", are 
factual, and hence his position can be regarded as cognitivist, honouring (1). 
4 In this section and the next page numbers refer to this work unless otherwise stated. 
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However, these normative reasons according to (2), only motivate ceteris paribus. 
Smith claims that the Humean and anti-Humean theories can be joined together by 
employing the notion of a "fully rational agent", for which ceteris is paribus. He 
writes, "to say that we have a normative reason to ~ in certain circumstances Cis to 
say that, if we were fully rational, we would want that we~ inC" (p. 181). Thus, if the 
"fully rational agent" has a normative reason to ~' a desire to ~ is generated, and at 
which point the Humean theory can explain how the agent is motivated to ~· If all 
this were right, the three premises would be reconciled and the moral problem solved. 
Objections to Smith's position could take many forms, and I leave most of 
them to others.s I here merely note that his position has two undesirable features. 
First, it is highly theoretical. It requires interlocking theories, each making substantive 
claims, and each with accompanying technical terms, for each of its three aspects. Of 
course, such theories might be justified if non-theoretical solutions cannot be found, 
but I am not convinced that such solutions have been fully explored. 
Second, Smith's account relies heavily on "psychological states", specifically 
beliefs and desires, conceived as elements of an "inner" reality; in Smith's terms, they 
are "psychologically real" (p. 96). Not only are there familiar anti-intellectualist 
doubts about such states so conceived, but we have already seen in Chapter 5, §6, how 
they are of doubtful use in rationalizing actions. These difficulties do not however 
mean that Smith's position can be dismissed, for he offers it in full awareness of a 
number of anti-Humean moves. 
I shall have more to say later about how Smith formulates cognitivism in 
proposition (1), and about how the idea of a "fully rational agent" is supposed to 
resolve proposition (2). Smith's claims regarding both of these issues turn out to be 
controversial in the context of what I have to say about habits. For now, we shall 
focus our attention on Smith's defence of proposition (3), Humeanism. 
s Critical notices include Dancy (1996) and Dreier (1996). Brink (1997), Copp (1997) and Sayre-McCord 
(1997) put their objections in an Ethics symposium, to which Smith (1997) replies. 
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3. Humeanism Defended I 
Smith's defence of Humeanism is necessary in the face of anti-Humean moves made 
by McDowell (1978, 1979, 1981), amongst others.6 For if the anti-Humeans were right 
and proposition (3) turned out to be false, there would be no inconsistency to 
reconcile, no moral problem, and no need for Smith's theoretical apparatus to save 
cognitivism. What, then, are the anti-Humean moves Smith is worried about? To see 
this we have to first learn something about Smith's initial position. 
Smith's argument for Humeanism depends upon there being two, and only 
two, different kinds of psychological state. These are distinguished by having 
different directions of fit, a distinction attributed to Anscombe (1957, p. 56).7 Roughly 
speaking, some states, the paradigm of which is belief, aim at fitting the world. As 
Smith wants to cash that out, 11 a belief that p tends to go out of existence in the 
presence of a perception that not p" (p. 115). In contrast, other states, the paradigm of 
which is desire, aim at the world fitting them. In Smith's terms, II a desire that p tends 
to endure, disposing the subject in that state to bring it about that pll (p. 115). There 
are complications with this distinction.8 For instance, a desire that p normally entails 
a belief that not p, so is at least dependent on a state of the other kind. But let us 
accept with Smith that the distinction captures something important about the kinds 
of psychological states there can be. If we further assume, as I take it Smith does, that 
the direction of fit distinction is exhaustive, then a desire, or any other state which 
aims at the world fitting it, will be a necessary component of any explanation of what 
motivated an agent. For if we accept the distinction, it seems that only those states 
6 Smith also objects to anti-Humeans Nagel (1970) and Platts (1979, 1981), but since, by Smith's lights, 
McDowell represents the most convincing anti-Humean, I here focus on Smith's treatment of his 
arguments. 
7 The attribution to Anscom be may be unfair as she never uses the phrase. 
s Humberstone (1991) discusses difficulties with characterising the distinction. 
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which aim at the world fitting them could account for an agent being motivated to do 
anything, speaking both normatively and perhaps also causally.9 
Smith's concern, however, is that McDowell suggests that there may be states 
which have both directions of fit. Because such states would be both belief-like and 
desire-like, Smith follows J. E. J. Altham (1986) in calling them besires. Smith's 
example of such a state is "the besire that ~-ing is right" (p. 118). This is belief-like 
because if ~-ing turns out not to be right, the besire would be in error. It is desire-like 
because, I take it, it disposes the subject to bring something about.1° If there were such 
states, this would undermine the direction of fit distinction upon which Smith's 
defence of Humeanism rests. 
Now it is not entirely clear where in the McDowell paper Smith cites 
(McDowell 1978) the idea of a besire is to be found. McDowell certainly doesn't use 
the term in that paper, or in any other I have seen. However, I want to postpone 
exegetical matters until §10, and for now allow that Smith is justified in saying that 
McDowell posits besires. Hence Smith reads McDowell as holding what I call the 
besire theory. 
Note that as it is specified here, the besire theory does not specify when a besire 
might be present. Hence the besire theory can come in various strengths: one might 
say that besires are expressed in all moral judgements, or one might say that besires 
occur rather less often than that. As long as one insists that there could be at least one 
possible case in which a besire is expressed in a moral judgement, one holds a besire 
theory. If it were right, and there are not just two kinds of psychological state, but 
three, this would undermine the direction of fit distinction. 
Smith claims that the Humean can give the following" quite simple" response: 
9 In fact, this last only follows if we make the common assumption that direction of fit goes together with 
the causation of these states, which runs in the opposite direction. See e.g. Searle (1983, pp. 7-9, 96). 
10 Strictly, by Smith's characterisation, it disposes the subject to bring it about that rf>-ing is right, whatever 
that could mean. I take it that Smith intends that the agent with such a state is disposed to bring it about 
that ~-ing is done (or even more simply, the agent is disposed to$). 
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it is always at least possible for agents who are in some particular belief-like state not to 
be in some particular desire-like state; ... the two can always be pulled apart, at least 
modally. (p. 119) 
Smith tries to drive this point home by appealing to what Michael Stocker (1979) calls 
"depressions" in the following passage: 
Through spiritual or physical tiredness, through accidie, through weakness of body, 
through illness, through general apathy, through despair, through inability to 
concentrate, through a feeling of uselessness or futility, and so on, one may feel less 
motivated to seek what is good. One's lessened desire need not signal, much less be the 
product of, the fact that, or one's belief that, there is less good to be obtained or 
produced, as in the case of a universal Weltschmerz. Indeed, a frequent added defect of 
being in such 'depressions' is that one sees all the good to be won or saved and one lacks 
the will, interest, desire or strength. (Stocker 1979, p. 744; quoted by Smith on p. 120) 
Smith suggests that this is decisive, according to the following reasoning: 
It is a commonplace, a fact of ordinary moral experience, that practical irrationalities of 
various kinds- various sorts of 'depression' as Stocker calls them- can leave someone's 
evaluative outlook intact while removing their motivations altogether. The anti-
Humeans' claim that moral judgements are expressions of besires is incompatible with 
this. The Humeans' claim that they are expressions of beliefs is not. The anti-Humeans' 
view must therefore be rejected in favour of the Humeans'. (pp. 120-1) 
Smith's argument is not conclusive. The besire theorist can deny that the cases of 
depression should be explained in the same way as cases of motivated action, and 
claim that it is only the latter that are to be explained by means of a besire. However, 
as Smith points out, whilst this manoeuvre is "technically available" (p. 124) to 
McDowell, it does not provide good support for anti-Humeanism. Certainly, it is 
theoretically possible to claim that whenever an agent acts this is explicable not by a 
belief and a desire but by a besire, but whilst there might be independent grounds for 
attributing the belief and the desire to the agent (independent, that is, from the fact 
that the agent acts), it is quite unclear how grounds for attributing to her the hybrid 
state of besire could differ from these. McDowell offers no guidance on this matter. 
Indeed if a besire is just defined in terms of belief and desire, no such guidance could be 
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given. Of course McDowell's grounds might indeed be purely theoretical, as besires 
promise to deliver a way of defending cognitivism, but as Smith also offers a 
cognitivist position, this should not by itself persuade us. McDowell may have other 
theoretical benefits in mind. But whatever they are, they must outweigh the 
immediate explanatory benefits of the belief plus desire story of depressions over the 
besire story. McDowell has offered us precious little in this respect. 
In sum, if McDowell's anti-Humeanism depends upon besires, and we lack 
distinct criteria of application and theoretical reasons to prefer such states, we should 
not be persuaded to adopt it. In contrast Humeanism is in good shape. 
In the next two sections I want to describe how habits could do better than 
besires in presenting the anti-Humean case. In particular, I want to suggest that 
habits allow us to reply to Smith's objections to the besire theory. 
4. Can Habits do the Job? 
Recall that according to the anti-Humean position sketched above, besires were worth 
considering because they were items with both directions of fit. But they turned out 
to be indefensible as psychological entities because there were significant explanatory 
costs, and no clear explanatory benefits. But besires may not be the only states which 
straddle the direction of fit distinction, and other such states may not be subject to 
these objections. A habit may be just such a state. 11 
There is an initial difficulty with this suggestion. In Chapter 5, §4, I argued 
that habits, whilst they are states of the agent, are not psychological states. In 
particular, I denied that habits can have propositional contents, as beliefs and desires 
do. So since Smith's characterisation of the direction of fit distinction depends upon 
n There may be others. For instance, Ruth Millikan's (1995) idea of a "Pushmi-pullyu representation" 
(PPR), so called because they face both ways at once. According to Millikan, "PPRs have both a 
descriptive and a directive function, yet they are not equivalent to the mere conjunction of a pure 
descriptive representation and a pure directive one but are more primitive than either" (p. 145). I here 
merely note that insofar as this idea is one of a "representation", it may suffer from intellectualism, from 
which the idea of a habit is free. 
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the states in question having propositional content, it is unclear how we can even 
understand the question of whether habits have one or the other directions of fit. We 
can't, for instance, ask whether a habit "tends to go out of existence in the presence of 
a perception that not p", or whether it "tends to endure, disposing the subject in that 
state to bring it about that p" (p. 115). 
There seem to be two ways to go. The first possibility is to adopt Smith's 
characterisation of the distinction as it stands. Here it seems we have a state of the 
agent with neither direction of fit. Of course this will not worry Smith if the state is 
not psychological, but if habits have a role to play in the agent's motivation, as I think 
they do, this should worry him. The existence of such items could be significant in 
undermining Smith's assumption that the distinction is exhaustive. It must be 
admitted, however, that a state with neither direction of fit would not help the anti-
Humean establish the kind of cognitivism expressed in Smith's proposition (1). 
The second possibility is to be more flexible in our interpretation of the 
direction of fit distinction, and not restrict it to psychological states. Smith's 
understanding of the distinction is contentious, since it is not only habits that lack 
propositional content, but some psychological states lack it too. Consider, for 
example, a state of dizziness, a psychological state if ever there was one, but it does 
not have propositional content. I could of course be said to believe that I am dizzy, 
but my being dizzy does not entail my believing it. I could have been dizzy before I 
came to believe it. What is more, if asked, I could describe my state in many different 
ways. To think that a belief with a determinate content can always be attributed to an 
agent in such a state, would be to credit them with more reflective thought than is 
justified. The same thing could be said of many other psychological states: my 
experiences of the objects around me; upwellings of emotion; feelings of dizziness. It 
is a prejudice to say that these states come over us, as it were, already in propositional 
form. Though that is not of course to say that such states could not be expressed 
propositionally given a suitable requirement to do so. 
If we drop the propositional requirement on the idea of a state of the agent, 
then, we can give some understanding of how habits could be said to have both 
directions of fit, rather than none. What could it mean to say that "a habit aims at 
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fitting the world"? I have two suggestions. The first is that habits, like beliefs, are a 
way of the agent being sensitive to the way the world is. A perceptual belief, for 
example, is gained by the agent entering into some epistemic relation with what is 
presented to her. Similarly, a habit is exercised when the agent is in some epistemic 
relation with normal circumstances. There is also an analogous idea of these states 
being "mistaken". The perceptual belief is mistaken insofar as the facts are not as the 
agent takes them to be. Similarly, the habitual action is mistaken insofar as the 
circumstances are not in fact normal, as the agent takes them to be. In this sense, then, 
a habit aims at fitting the world. 
The second suggestion of how habits could be said to aim at fitting the world 
is that habits must "mesh" with the agent's usual environment. This is the idea that 
behaviours which do not fit in with the world I tend to come into contact with will not 
be repeated, so any habit of performing such things will tend to be lost. For instance, 
when I worked in an office, I had the habit of putting on a suit and tie every weekday. 
Now I no longer work in an office, I have lost that habit. My habit is in that sense 
responsive to the world around me, and in being so responsive, it can be said to share 
the direction of fit of belief. 
What could it mean to say that "a habit aims at the world fitting it"? This can 
be understood by drawing a parallel with desires of a non-propositional kind. As we 
have seen, it is often said of desires that they dispose the agent to act in some way. 
Indeed Smith himself adopts a "dispositional" account of desire, according to which 
desires dispose the agent to bring about some definite outcome (pp. 104-11). It can 
analogously be said of habits that they dispose the agent to act in certain ways, 
though no particular outcome need be sought. Just as desires need the right 
conditions to obtain before they are indulged, so habits need the right conditions to 
obtain before they are exercised. When an agent is presented with a situation -
normal circumstances - she engages herself in the world in a way which is, in virtue of 
her having that habit, automatic for her. It is in this sense that habits share the 
direction of fit of desire. 
I don't want to suggest that much hangs on habits having both directions of fit. 
If I am right that they can be understood to have either neither or both directions of 
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fit, the point is to undermine the claim that the distinction is exhaustive, and so 
compromise its usefulness as a way of classifying states of agents. If the distinction is 
not useful, it hardly matters whether habits lie on neither side, or both. But for the 
argument against Smith, it is helpful to see that whichever way we go, habits show his 
interpretation of the distinction to be suspect. 
The next question is, how do habits furnish replies to Smith's objections to the 
besire theory? 
5. Replying with Habits 
Recall that Smith makes two objections to the besire theory: that besires were 
incompatible with Stocker's depressions and that besires are merely a technical 
device, lacking distinctive criteria of application. I shall first show how habits furnish 
replies to these objections. I tackle them in reverse order. 
Smith complains that there are no clear criteria of application for besires which 
are distinct from those for applying a belief plus a desire, so the idea is merely a 
technical device to save a theory. Unlike besires, however, habits do have clear and 
distinctive criteria of application. Habits are attributed on the basis of the agent's 
history of doing the same kind of thing in the same kind of context. 
What is more, there is a difference in the sort of authority associated with 
besires when compared with habits. The difference between psychological states and 
habits in terms of an asymmetry in authority is something I described in Chapter 5, 
§4. The point here is that if beliefs and desires are not going to turn out to be purely 
theoretical in the way that besires were charged with being purely theoretical, then 
even if we do not expect an agent to self-ascribe such states, we must acknowledge 
some authority on the part of the agent to at least deny their presence. We will usually 
withdraw the attribution of a belief or a desire that the agent denies (after taking into 
account the possibility of insincerity or self-deception). Habits in contrast are, as I 
described in Chapter 5, second-person authoritative. So protestations from the agent 
of whatever kind will not affect the truth of the attribution to her of a given habit. 
Positing a habit as an explanatory item is not, then, a dogmatic technical 
stipulation conceived only to rescue an otherwise doomed theory, but, as I have 
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argued, a reasonable and familiar explanatory strategy which locates the action in the 
agent's behavioural history. In this respect, then, appeal to habit is a clear advance on 
appeal to besires in making the anti-Humean case. 
Recall now the first part of Smith's argument against the besire theory. Smith 
argues that whereas beliefs and desires can make sense of one of the facts of" ordinary 
moral experience", namely, Stocker's "depressions", besires cannot. I want to argue 
that habits are not vulnerable to this charge. 
Smith claims that it is "a fact of ordinary moral experience" that Stocker's 
depressions "can leave someone' s evaluative outlook intact while removing their 
motivations altogether" (pp. 120-1). Now we can acknowledge that in the course of 
our everyday lives we from time to time come across people who suffer from the 
kinds of complaints Stocker lists. Indeed most of us would admit to having first-hand 
experience of a number of these. If these are "facts of ordinary moral experience", we 
can probably all agree that any account of moral action must at least be consistent 
with the existence of these. However, that is not to say that the kind of motivation (or 
lack of it) that is going on in the depressive cases is in any sense "ordinary". 
The idea of a habit provides us with a clear understanding of what ordinary 
moral motivation is like. When one acts both morally and habitually, one's 
motivation is ordinary. Of course we have a term for such actions from the 
Aristotelian tradition, virtuous actions, which we first met in Chapter 2, and I shall say 
more about them later on. Let us for now accept that at least some ordinary moral 
actions are habitual, and restrict our comments to those. 
Thinking in this way gives us an account of moral motivation. Habits, as we 
have seen, have what I have called "normal circumstances", in which they are usually 
exercised. When this happens we can explain the action in terms of the habit, and, if 
the argument of Chapter 6 is right, provided the habit is rational, we need look no 
further - to beliefs, desires, or to any other psychological item for that matter - to 
understand how the action is rational. If we need reassurance on this matter at all, we 
should look instead to the action's lack of irrationality, and to it's reasonableness. 
This is the normative aspect of motivation. 
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What is more, if the suggestion of Chapter 6, §4 about how the etiology of 
habitual actions could be developed, is right, it follows that in saying that an action is 
habitual we have thereby specified what causes it, namely, the agent's having the 
habit, which is "triggered" by her encounter with the normal circumstances. If we 
understand ordinary moral motivation like this, we can see why there is no 
explanatory need for beliefs or desires at all. 
But do habits help us to understand Stocker's depressions? The short answer 
is that they don't. But this is not a problem because it is a mistake to think they 
should. It is of course true that an agent with a given habit will not always exercise it 
in normal circumstances. What is doubtful is whether, when she does not exercise the 
habit, the habit must feature in the explanation of her (in)action. After all, in such 
cases, the agent does not act habitually, but does something else, or perhaps nothing 
at all. In such cases we look not to the habit to explain what she does; we seek a 
special explanation by looking for other factors. Indeed, it is the fact that this is an 
exceptional case - that the agent did not do what we expected her to do, that is, act 
habitually- that motivates our search for an explanation. That there is a way of acting 
habitually in this situation is a presupposition of this special explanatory enterprise, 
and therefore the habit has no place within the resulting explanation. 
If we see ordinary moral motivation as habitual, then, there is no 
incompatibility between this and the claim that other factors might, on occasion, be 
needed to explain depressions. There is no a priori constraint on the kinds of special 
explanation which might be appropriate for any given instance of depression. So 
there is nothing to rule out the possibility that a given failure of a habitual action 
might best be explained in terms of a lack of "will, interest, desire or strength", whilst 
leaving cognition, where "one sees all the good to be won or saved", intact.12 So 
whilst the besire theory may be incompatible with such an analysis- if, that is, "moral 
judgements" (in the sense of Smith's proposition (1)) are thought always to entail a 
besire - if we employ the idea of habit instead, we can see why there need be no such 
incompatibility. For the one thing that we will not expect to feature in the special 
12 The phrases in quotation marks are from the Stocker (1979, p. 744) passage quoted in §3 above. 
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explanation is the habit which is not now being exercised. What is more, if we 
employ habits in place of besires, it becomes questionable why we should accept that 
any "moral judgements" entail the presence of such items. Moral judgements have 
propositional form, and as we saw above, any "cognition" in habitual action will not 
be propositional. Hence the supposition that the agent who has the belief that it is 
right that she ~s, must also be acting habitually, actually needs support,13 
We can go further and subject Smith to a version of his own criticism. For if 
we substitute habits for besires, we can see that in Smith's attempt to refute the besire 
theory, he falls foul of his own criticism of that thesis, which is that in adopting it we 
lose analytical resources. Smith's attempted refutation depends on the assumption 
that understanding depressions essentially involves our being able to distinguish 
beliefs from desires, which then allows him to reason that desires are missing whilst 
beliefs are in place. Only by showing this to be true can he hope to refute the besire 
theory which does not allow such an analysis. But as a claim about the general form 
of an analysis of depressions, Smith's assumption is contentious. 
Just as there was nothing to unify the plurality of explanations of irrational 
behaviours described in Chapter 6, §5 (some of which are on Stocker's list), there need 
be nothing to unify the different ways in which habits can be said to fail. So, to take 
one of Stocker's depressions as an example, when an agent is suffering from "inability 
to concentrate", it would seem highly misleading to explain their lack of motivation as 
mere lack of desire, with beliefs intact. If the inability to concentrate is to be 
understood in terms of belief and desire at all, it is more plausibly understood as a 
failure not of desire, but of belief. Smith's preferred form of analysis actually 
prohibits this understanding. 
But even this analysis is not mandatory. For a failure to concentrate would 
seem to be an instance of the irrationality of inattentiveness, which was also described 
in Chapter 6, §5. I characterised that idea without reference to the notion of belief, 
and for good reason. For we can admit that inattentiveness is an epistemic failing, 
without conceding that this must be understood as a failure to acquire some 
13 I shall say more about the effects of habits on the thesis of moral cognitivism in §8. 
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propositional attitude. To insist on that would be another example of intellectualist 
prejudice. But Smith's preferred form of analysis obscures this difficulty. 
The above merely outlines how we might explain one of Stocker's depressions. 
But it also clearly demonstrates that Smith's insistence on the belief-desire model, 
with only beliefs in place, to capture the diversity of complex states that play a role in 
understanding such maladies, grossly oversimplifies them. 
Smith's defence of Humeanism might have succeeded against McDowell 
interpreted as a besire theorist. But this defence is ineffective against the anti-
Humean who instead employs the idea of a habit. 
Where does all this leave Smith's moral problem? Assuming that habits are a 
way of articulating a viable anti-Humeanism, proposition (3), for habitual moral 
actions at least, can now be rejected. Arguably also, some progress has been made 
towards rejecting the intellectualist way in which Smith characterises cognitivism in 
proposition (1). 
In addition, I think that there is some promise for understanding proposition 
(2), internalism, non-propositionally, and in terms of normal circumstances, though I 
have not mentioned this so far. The idea is that a habitual action does not involve the 
agent in a "judgement that it is right that she ~s", which, insofar as she is "fully 
rational", in turn generates her desire to ~' and, finally, her action. A much simpler 
story can be told. We can say that given the agent has a habit of ~-ing inC, and that 
she has encountered such circumstances, ceteris paribus, she automatically ~s. Ceteris is 
paribus not when she is "fully rational", but when she exhibits no irrationality, and 
does not decide to opt out of the habit on that occasion. We need not spuriously 
attribute a judgement that it is right to ~ to the agent, which only displays an 
intellectualist prejudice. And we can drop the similarly intellectualised character, the 
"fully rational agent". But we can still, I think, do justice to the central internalist 
thought, that coming into contact with certain things just does motivate us. 
I cannot claim to have completely dissolved the moral problem, because I have 
not given an argument for the claim that all moral actions are habitual. I merely note 
that by drawing on Aristotelian materials, some of which were sketched in Chapter 2, 
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§3, there may be a case for thinking of them as the paradigms of moral action. Indeed 
one may be able to argue, in the spirit of Aristotle, that if the question occurs to one of 
whether to, say, act courageously, even if one still does it, one's action nevertheless 
falls short of being fully moral. But in the absence of such an argument more work 
needs to be done to show that Humeanism is false for non-habitual moral actions (if 
there be such) as well. If some moral actions are habitual, the moral problem does not 
arise in explaining those actions, and there is accordingly no longer any need to wheel 
in Smith's complex theoretical apparatus. 
6. Blackburn's Expressivism 
Blackburn's overall position, which he has developed over a couple of decades 
(Blackburn 1984a, 1994, 1998) is a version of moral non-cognitivism. Blackburn believes 
that moral facts are not genuine features of the world, according to some standard of 
genuineness, and in this respect it contrasts with both Smith's and McDowell's views 
which both purport to be cognitivist. According to Blackburn, when we say things 
like "you should not kill innocent people", whilst we appear to be saying something 
that importantly reflects the way the world is, we are in fact doing nothing of the sort. 
What we are in fact doing is "expressing" our moral emotions towards the world, 
which includes innocents and potential killers. Because of the centrality of this notion 
of expression, Blackburn calls his position expressivism.14 
Blackburn denies that expressivism leads to Mackie's (1977) conclusion that 
talk of moral facts is an error (Blackburn 1998, p. 301; 1984a, p. 180). He offers a 
theory of how our expressions of emotions come to have propositional content, which 
Blackburn calls quasi-realism. Roughly the idea is this. We all have moral attitudes 
towards things, many of which we tend to share. We also have attitudes- such as 
admiration or disapproval - towards each other's attitudes. Hence the attitudes 
14 Although in his early statements of the position (e.g. 1984a), Blackburn used the term "projectivism" 
for this component of his position, in recent work he has dropped this term. The term "projectivism", he 
writes, "can make it sound as if projecting attitudes involves some kind of mistake, like projecting our 
emotions onto the weather, or projecting our wishes onto the world by believing things we want to 
believe." He adds, "This is emphatically not what is intended" (1998, p. 77). 
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themselves become subject to our rational criticism. This in turn means that we end 
up with moral talk which is couched in terms of moral"beliefs", which are capable of 
"truth" and "falsity", in virtue of representing the moral "facts". And because 
Blackburn thinks we can be "minimalists" about truth, this talk about facts does not 
fall short of the real thing. Thus, Blackburn claims, quasi-realism can give us 
everything the cognitivist could want, without actually being cognitivist. This 
represents a distinctive and challenging position in meta-ethics, and one with which 
any aspiring moral cognitivist must engage. 
There are problems with Blackburn's position, not least of which is the tension 
apparent in saying that it is very like cognitivism without really being cognitivism.JS 
A preferable position would at least avoid such talk, if it didn't simply accept moral 
truths at face value. Another difficulty is that the only genuine cognition that 
Blackburn allows involves an idea of reality stripped of all influence from the human 
mind, which science will ultimately reveal. But this idea of mind-independent reality 
is notoriously difficult to defend. And whilst Blackburn's project is nothing like as 
theoretical as Smith's, the quasi-realist construction may be based on a contentious 
picture of human nature and human practices. 
Blackburn's position, like Smith's, has at its core a Humean division between 
reason and passion, and a Humean account of motivation. Blackburn's Humeanism 
differs in some details, and in particular is rather less precisely specified than Smith's 
proposition (3) (see e.g. Blackburn 1998, pp. 238-41). Nevertheless, like Smith, 
Blackburn holds that desires are the only things that can motivate agents to act, and 
are not the right kinds of things to disclose how the world is arranged. This Humean 
view does not, for Blackburn, motivate a theoretical project like Smith's to rescue 
cognitivism. Rather it drives Blackburn's quasi-realist construction and his denial that 
genuine cognition in ethics is achieved. Blackburn's position, if it works, supports the 
Humean theory. But equally, if the Humean theory fails, Blackburn's position is 
15 The stability of Blackburn's position in this respect has been challenged by Crispin Wright (1985), to 
which Blackburn (1993) replies. For a fuller discussion see Pollard (1998, pp. 50-53), in which, whilst 
expressing other reservations, I deny there is an instability. 
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undermined. Blackburn's repeated attempts to defend Humeanism against its critics, 
amongst whom McDowell has been prominent, show he recognises this 
vulnerability.16 
7. Humeanism Defended II 
On the assumption that Blackburn's most recent defence of Humeanism against 
McDowell's objections is his best to date, let us look at his arguments, which appear in 
Ruling Passions (Blackburn 1998, pp. 92-104).17 This will enable us to show, in the two 
subsequent sections, how the notion of a habit can provide better replies to 
Blackburn's objections than those more readily available from McDowell. 
Blackburn objects to McDowell in two ways which he summarises as follows: 
The bad things [about McDowell's account] include the unearned emphasis on 
'receptivity' or the belief that some kind of cognitivism has been established, and the 
unfortunate hostility to the essential business of factoring out the inputs and the outputs 
of our evaluative practices. (p. 104) 
Blackburn's first criticism is that McDowell thinks that "some kind of 
cognitivism has been established". This turns on the question of whether what we 
call "moral properties", say, the cruelty of a certain action, are genuine features of the 
world. Blackburn denies it; McDowell (at least as Blackburn reads him) asserts it. 
Blackburn contrasts the two explanatory stories as follows ("where the arrows 
indicate some explanatory story"): 
Cognitivisnz: Shapeless underlying class ~ shapely property M ~ perception of it by 
those with proper affective dispositions = perception of a reason for action ~ action 
Non-cognitivisnz: Shapeless underlying class ~ attitudes in those with specific affective 
dispositions ~ action. (pp. 98-9) 
16 Criticisms are found in McDowell (1981, 1985, 1987); and replies in Blackburn (1981, 1985, 1998). 
17 In this and the next two sections, page numbers refer to this work unless otherwise stated. 
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Blackburn then asks "what extra explanatory weight is added by the mention of the 
shapely property at the moral level, and by the talk of perception?" (p. 99). He thinks 
that "there is no evident answer" (p. 99). 
Blackburn's second criticism is of McDowell's "unfortunate hostility to the 
essential business of factoring out the inputs and the outputs of our evaluative 
practices" (p. 104). The idea of inputs and outputs is an idiom employed throughout 
Blackburn's book. He introduces the notion as follows: 
we can usefully compare the ethical agent to a device whose function is to take certain 
inputs and deliver certain outputs. The input to the system is a representation, for 
instance of an action, or a situation, or a character, of being of a certain type, as having 
certain properties. The output, we are saying, is a certain attitude, or a pressure on 
attitudes, or a favouring of policies, choices and actions. (p. 5) 
Blackburn goes on to insist that "It is only by thus 'splitting' the input and the output 
that the reaction can be seen sufficiently clearly for what it is. And this is important 
because only then can the reaction itself be intelligently discussed, and perhaps ... 
seen as highly questionable" (p. 7). Blackburn develops this theme later in the book in 
his objection to McDowell, who he reads, as Smith does, as positing besires (p. 97). 18 
Blackburn gives an example in which it is "morally vital" to "split" if we are to correct 
a pernicious chauvinistic use of the word "cute". Speaking critically of the besire 
theory in this regard, Blackburn writes, 
if the last word is that these people perceive cuteness and react to it with the appropriate 
cuteness reaction, whereas other people do not, we have lost the analytic tools with 
which to recognize what is wrong with them. (p. 101) 
So for Blackburn, it counts against an explanatory theory if the materials required for 
moral criticism are inconsistent with it. This is the case with the besire theory. We 
want to be able to say what is wrong with the chauvinists who call women "cute", 
18 Like Smith, Blackburn finds besires in McDowell, but in McDowell (1981), rather than McDowell 
(1978). I take up this exegetical issue in §10. 
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and we want to be able to do so by pointing both to their mistaken attitudes as well as 
to various facts about women that they seem to have got wrong. Blackburn writes: 
What is wrong with them is along these lines: they react to an infantile and 
unthreatening appearance or self-presentation in women, or overt indications of 
willingness to be subservient to men, with admiration or desire (the men) or envy and 
emulation (the women). Cute things are those to which we can show affection without 
threat, or patronizingly, or even with contempt. Children and pets are quintessentially 
cute. Applied to women, this, I say, is a bad thing. (p. 101) 
Hence Blackburn thinks that McDowell's purported failure, disguises "a conservative 
and ultimately self-serving complacency" (p. 102). According to Blackburn, then, 
positing besires is not just a theoretical problem, but also a moral failing. 
This criticism is an advance on Smith's criticism of the besire theory discussed 
in §3 above, which was based on Stocker's depressions. It's one thing to say what is 
wrong with somebody who is not motivated: the depressives. But it's quite another to 
say what is wrong with somebody who is motivated, but in the wrong way: 
Blackburn's chauvinists. If a theory can satisfactorily deal with the first disorder, it 
doesn't follow that it can deal with the second. 
Let us concede that Blackburn's objections may be fair given McDowell's 
rather limited articulation of anti-Humeanism. Still Blackburn's objections may be 
insufficient to defend Humeanism. In the next two sections I shall show how habits 
can provide replies to both of Blackburn's objections. 
8. Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism: A Way Out 
Blackburn's objection to cognitivism depends upon construing cognitivism as 
entailing the idea that we must always be able to locate a moral property to which 
every moral action can be seen as a response. This may be a reasonable construal and 
one with which we need not quarrel here. However, the idea of a habit shows how 
cognitivism thus understood is more than we need to oppose non-cognitivism. For I 
think we can oppose non-cognitivism without making any claims about moral 
properties. 
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Recall from Chapter 5, §9, that the notion of a habit that I have developed 
allows habits to be acquired without any intellectual awareness of the kinds of 
circumstances that the corresponding habitual actions are a response to. That is to 
say, an agent might have the habit of ~-ing in C without being able to describe C or 
even ~- She need not have the conceptual or otherwise intellectual resources to 
disclose these things. This means that if we are explaining such a habitual action it 
will be a mistake to include the property under which C might fall, as if the agent 
herself had "recognised" that property in this intellectualised sense. So we get an 
explanatory picture that looks like this: 
(HE) Agent with the habit of ~-ing inC + encounter with normal circumstances C ~ 
habitual action~-
The first thing to note is that there is no mention either of moral properties, or 
of a "shapeless underlying class". The only "worldly" items in explanatory scheme 
(HE) are normal circumstances C. However, because there is no commitment to any 
particular description of C, we can be neutral on the question of whether (HE) 
represents cognitivism or not. We might specify C in terms of moral properties such 
as cuteness, so one of Blackburn's chauvinists can be said to have the habit of 
responding to cute things by calling them "cute". Or we might specify C in much 
more neutral terms, so the chauvinist has the habit of calling women who present an 
unthreatening appearance "cute". Whether this latter specification is "shapeless" I am 
not sure, but presumably we could specify, albeit in rather broad terms, what these 
men are reacting to without mentioning the objectionable moral properties, and hence 
not be committed to the cognitivism of which Blackburn is critical. 
But to call explanatory schema (HE) non-cognitivist would be equally 
misleading. For unlike Blackburn's own schema, there is no mention of a non-
cognitive attitude of the agent. Whilst we do not need to deny that the agent has such 
attitudes, they need not feature in an adequate explanation of her action either to 
show it to be rational, or to show how the agent is motivated. Habits can do that on 
their own. We saw in §3 how habits can be construed as sharing the direction of fit of 
beliefs, and hence equip the agent to respond to genuine features of the world. As we 
are not committed to any particular description of C, we can adopt whatever 
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description satisfies our craving for genuineness. And we can do this without 
implying that the agent is aware of the world under that description when she acts, 
though we might be able to convince her of the appropriateness of such a description 
in the future, if this were important to us. 
What the notion of a habit gives us is a clear distinction between responding to 
features of the world, and specifying what those features are. The cognitivist and 
non-cognitivist alike are hung up on committing themselves to just one description of 
the world to which the agent can be said to be responding: respectively, the world as 
it appears in the agent's reasons; and the theoretical idea of mind-independent reality. 
But if we accept that moral actions are habitual, we need not commit ourselves either 
way. We can reject the intellectualist assumption that all actions are actions for 
reasons, without committing ourselves to the dubious notion of a mind-independent 
reality. When an agent acts habitually, she can be understood as responding 
rationally to the world. The temptation to add to that description may well arise from 
a flawed philosophy of action. 
Understanding moral actions as habitual, then, allows us to side-step the 
debate between cognitivists and non-cognitivists, at least as these positions have been 
conceived so far. However, a version of cognitivism is arguably still available in 
which habits, being rational responses to the world, play a cenh·al role. The 
cognitivism that is available is not conceived propositionally, as in Smith's construal, 
or in terms of moral properties, as in Blackburn's, but in terms of the agent being 
disposed to respond to the world in certain ways, one such disposition being a habit. 
Viewed in this way, the traditional debate between cognitivists and non-cognitivists is 
a result of a shared, intellectualised conception of rational actions, which we can now 
avoid. 
If this is right, there is no need for the anti-non-cognitivist to supply an 
account of the "extra explanatory weight" provided by talk of moral properties, as 
Blackburn claims there is. For the anti-non-cognitivist can be ambivalent about the 
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role of such talk in action explanations anyway.19 However, as we shall soon see, it 
would be a mistake for him to deny that such talk is ever useful. 
9. Splitting and Habits 
We turn now to Blackburn's second objection, namely, the moral failing implicit in 
McDowell's refusal to "split" inputs from outputs. As I have said, I think that this 
objection might indeed be telling against an anti-Humean case built around the notion 
of a besire. But again the idea of a habit improves the anti-Humean case. I want to 
show that we can reply to Blackburn's second objection by making this substitution. 
Indeed, I want to go further, and suggest that by making this substitution, we can turn 
Blackburn's criticism against him. For, in a move similar to that made against Smith 
in §5, it is the Humean picture, and not the alternative, that is left wanting when it 
comes to the criticism of moral failures. 
Blackburn's criticism of the be sire theory is that we lose materials which are 
essential to the proper criticism of morally pernicious behaviour. However, if the 
anti-Humean employs a habit rather than a besire, it is not clear that any critical 
materials are lost. When an action is explained by a besire, this involves the denial of 
separable belief and desire components which may be of use in later criticism. 
However, when an agent acts habitually, however bad her habit may be, we can 
consistently maintain that her action is best explained by a habit without denying the 
existence of any beliefs and desires which might be helpful in criticising what she did. 
To say this we must maintain a distinction between the best explanation of an 
action on the one hand, and the best materials with which to criticise that action on 
the other. This should not be problematic. Explaining an action and assessing it 
morally are different kinds of activity, and it would be a coincidence if the two 
happened to employ the same concepts. Blackburn's own example of the chauvinistic 
use of the term "cute" illustrates this. The actions are criticised not on the basis of 
beliefs and desires, which are Blackburn's preferred explanatory materials, but on the 
basis of how the chauvinists react, what they associate women with, and facts about 
19 Though this is not to say that such weight cannot be supplied. See, for instance Wiggins {1996). 
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children and pets. ~It seems highly implausible that any or all of these materials will 
feature in Blackburn's best explanation of the action. But even if this could be argued, 
it remains the case that we need not criticise an action on the basis of its best 
explanation, and nor need we explain an action in the terms that are best going to get 
across what is morally wrong with it. Of course, as Blackburn recognises, the two 
cannot be inconsistent, but other than that, there need be no a priori limit on their 
respective contents. 
The idea of a habit also suggests how we can turn Blackburn's criticism against 
his own account. For if the Humean looks to his explanatory theory for his only 
source of critical materials, as Blackburn seems to, and thereby restricts himself to 
attitudes and attitude-independent facts, he will miss another kind of critical material 
that is made available through the notion of a habit. For whilst we might want to say 
that what is objectionable about the chauvinists application of "cute" to women is the 
attitude it expresses, we might also, and more importantly, want to say something 
else. Namely, that what is objectionable is that they don't just do this once, which 
would be bad enough, but they do it repeatedly, automatically and responsibly. In 
other words, they do it habitually. An occasional bad action is bad enough; a bad 
habit is much worse. 
If the role of moral criticism is to say what is wrong with such actions with a 
view to correction, criticising a bad action as habitual will be importantly different 
from merely pointing out how disgusting we find the attitude expressed by that 
action. In fact, if we are just criticising the attitude expressed in a single action, it 
becomes puzzling why our concern is so great, and what we would hope to achieve 
by such criticism. For as yet we have no reason to think that the agent will ever 
express the same attitude again. In contrast if we criticise somebody' s bad action 
whilst acknowledging that it is habitual, the likelihood of future transgressions makes 
criticism more urgent. 
Not only that, but treating this kind of action as habitual suggests various 
corrective strategies which would not be visible were the materials for criticism 
restricted to attitude and fact, as Blackburn's account assumes. A first stage might be 
to make the agent aware of their habit, which might be enough on its own suffice to 
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motivate corrective strategies to lose the habit.2° Harder cases might involve other 
kinds of criticism, such as reminders about what women are like, and indeed 
recommendations of more exposure to them, and rather less to groups of men in their 
locker rooms. Again change in lifestyle is what is suggested, not merely a change of 
mind. Thus any account of critical resources which leads to such suggestions would 
seem to be preferable to one that limits those resources to mere attitude and fact. The 
Humean who looks to action-explanatory concepts as the only source of critical 
resources is in danger of imposing just such a limit. Insofar as Blackburn does so, he 
is subject to a version of his own criticism intended for the besire theory. 
This point is relevant to the issue of moral properties raised above (§7). For a 
similar criticism can be made of Blackburn's refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of 
moral property talk. For this may be a helpful critical resource in some cases, as in, for 
instance, "it's wrong to call women 'cute' because they are not cute". Just who the 
criticism is directed at will affect the terms in which we put it, but it would be a 
mistake to rule out property talk a priori, as Blackburn does. And we can say this 
without making any claim about a specifically explanatory role for moral properties. 
In sum, the notion of a habit can be used to make a stronger case against 
Blackburn's Humeanism than is readily available in McDowell's writing. This places 
Blackburn's version of moral non-cognitivism in doubt, though it may do nothing to 
improve the prospects for moral cognitivism if it is understood as essentially 
involving moral properties. This way of responding to Blackburn's defence of 
Humeanism, then, is a second use for habits in meta-ethics. 
10. But is this McDowell? 
I have suggested above that McDowell's rejection of Humeanism would fail to survive 
Humean replies if he holds a besire theory, which is how the Humeans read him. It 
also follows from what I have argued that if McDowell had exploited the notion of a 
habit defended in this thesis, my arguments would be not a corrective to McDowell, 
2o A brief account of habit loss can be found in Chapter 3, §8. 
198 
Habits in Meta-Ethics 
but rather a fuller articulation of he says. I will now discuss briefly which of these 
two views is the right reading of McDowell. 
First, the evidence Smith cites is from McDowell's "Are Moral Requirements 
Hypothetical Imperatives?" (1978). The only portion of this paper that Smith actually 
draws on is the following passage: 
A view of how things are is a state or disposition of one's cognitive equipment. But the 
psychological states we are considering are to suffice, on their own, to show how certain 
actions appeared in a favourable light. That requires that their possession entails a 
disposition of the possessor's will. (McDowell 1978, p. 82; partially quoted by Smith 
1994, p. 121) 
Here there is clear evidence that McDowell is putting forward the idea of a 
"psychological state", and, for reasons that I have given earlier, this would seem to 
conclusively rule out the possibility that he is referring to a habit. We get more 
information about the kind of psychological state later on in that paper. 
"What is questionable", writes McDowell, "is whether there need always be an 
independently intelligible desire to whose fulfilment a virtuous action, if rational at 
all, can be seen as conducive" (p. 84). The suggestion is that virtuous agents have 
"special way of conceiving situations" (p. 84), and that how they conceive a given 
situation might at times be enough to explain their motivation for the resulting 
virtuous act. In such cases, whilst we may be able to attribute a desire to such an 
agent, that, argues McDowell, would merely be a reflection of how she conceives of 
the situation, and is hence ascribed "in a purely consequential way", which is 
contrasted with being "independently intelligible" (p. 84). 21 This then is where, I take 
it, Smith finds the idea of a besire. We have the idea of a cognitive state of the agent, 
namely, how she conceives the situation, and the possibility that a desire might be 
ascribed only as a logical consequence of her being in this state, rather than that desire 
being "independently intelligible", as it would have to be were it a Humean "distinct 
existence". Combined with the claim that we are here talking about psychological 
21 This is a contrast McDowell attributes to Nagel (1970, pp. 29-30). 
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states, this would seem to give excellent support to Smith's claim that McDowell is in 
this paper positing besires. 
Blackburn does not find the besire thesis in the same McDowell paper. He 
instead cites McDowell's "Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following" (1981): 
The suggestion involves thinking of exercises of our affective or conative natures as 
themselves in some way percipient, or at least as expanding our sensitivity to how things 
are; and the eighteenth-century philosophy of and would purport to exclude this a priori 
(McDowell1981, p. 200; partially quoted by Blackburn 1998, p. 97). 
Now it is far from clear what McDowell means by "our affective or conative natures", 
but in view of the fact that McDowell is here trying to loosen our grip on "eighteenth-
century philosophy of mind" - i.e. Humeanism - I think it is again reasonable for 
Blackburn to suppose that he means some state of desire which is at the same time 
cognitive. Certainly, McDowell's suggestion that such a state would be ruled out a 
priori by such a philosophy of mind would seem to be good evidence that he wants to 
leave room for nothing less than a besire. 
However, whilst I think that these early writings of McDowell give good 
support for the besire reading, I think that in later work we find more evidence that 
this may be a mistake. In "Might there be External Reasons?" (1995b), for instance, 
McDowell distances himself from the view that possession of psychological states is 
all there are to being morally motivated. In his Mind & World (1996) McDowell 
emphasises what he calls Bildung, that is, the process of acquiring rational (and moral) 
natures through upbringing into a tradition. And in "Two Sorts of Naturalism" 
(1995a) McDowell makes a clear commitment to the Aristotelian idea that virtue is 
"second nature" to moral agents. McDowell writes, 
The practical intellect's coming to be as it ought to be is the acquisition of a second 
nature, involving the moulding of motivational and evaluative propensities. (1995a, p. 
185) 
I think this can be read as entailing the suggestion that trained-up moral agents 
exercise the virtues (as well as other rational habits) automatically. Not only that, but 
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there is also evidence that for McDowell that the exercise of second nature is also 
under the agent's rational control, through the capacity to "step back": 
moral education enables one to step back from any motivational impulse one finds 
oneself subject to, and question its rational credentials. (1995a, p. 188) 
This would correspond to the capacity to opt out of a given habitual action, and act 
otherwise for reasons. These papers suggest that McDowell is less committed to the 
idea of a psychological state like a besire, and more committed to that of a rational 
habit, of which the moral virtues would be instances, as the crucial ingredient in his 
anti-Humean philosophy of mind. 
Our conclusions must be tentative. McDowell leaves the question of whether 
he posits besires or habits rather open. Going by some of the earlier portions of 
McDowell's writings, the Humeans seem justified in reading him as positing besires. 
But other, later, textual evidence suggests that this reading is unjust, or that McDowell 
has revised his view. For in later work the idea of a virtue, as a kind of habit, plays a 
central role for McDowell. 
If McDowell leaves this matter open, he should not have done. Doing so only 
invites spurious attacks by the Humeans, giving their position more credibility than it 
deserves. McDowell might have done better to distance himself from those early 
remarks, and oppose Humeanism in the manner developed here, by giving habit a 
central role in an anti-Humean philosophy of action. In clarifying the views of this 
important, though sometimes rather inscrutable, writer, habits contribute to current 
meta-ethical debate in a third way. 
11. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have outlined how the idea of a habit might contribute to 
contemporary debate in meta-ethics. So long as Smith and Blackburn remain 
influential proponents of Humean philosophy of action, this is a significant result. 
For without an understanding of habits they may with some justification think that 
Humeanism survives the attacks on it led by McDowell. However, I think that 
Humeanism remains vulnerable. Equipped with the idea of a habit, the anti-Humean 
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can mount new attacks on their positions. This opens up new avenues not only for 
accounts of moral motivation, but also to moral internalism and cognitivism. It also 
provides us with a fresh understanding of McDowell's work. 
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For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the model 
as what it is, as an object of comparison - as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a 
preconceived idea to which reality must correspond. (The dogmatism into which we fall 
so easily in doing philosophy). 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §131 
1. The Role of Habits 
In this thesis I argue that habits should play a much more significant role in analytic 
philosophy of action than they currently do. This is because, just like Aristotle, Ryle 
and Wittgenstein before us, we are once again up against intellectualism, and habits 
can help us, like they helped them. Contemporary intellectualism is there in our very 
understanding of what an action is. The mistake is thinking that our actions are better 
thought out than they in fact are. As a result, our paradigms of action are those 
involving deliberation, and we think we always have a reason when we act. 
But if we turn our attention to the actions which make up the majority of our 
active lives, in particular, to the things we do habitually in our most familiar 
surroundings, the mistake becomes clear. Deliberation and reasons do not play a role 
in such actions. So long as we are gripped by the intellectualist mistake, if we notice 
habitual actions at all, we will be liable to distort the true nature of such actions by 
fitting them into the intellectualist mould, to which they are ill-suited. We have, in 
Wittgenstein's terms, "a preconceived idea to which [the] reality [of action] must 
correspond" (1953, §131). Whether we ignore habitual actions, or distort them, we 
lose touch with the phenomenon of ordinary action that is recognisable to 
philosophers and non-philosophers alike. 
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This thesis has wider implications within philosophy too. Not least of these 
are the exegetical possibilities opened up, in particular for the three writers mentioned 
earlier. Aristotle's idea of action can now be examined in a new light.l Ryle's idea of 
a behavioural disposition can now be compared with the notion of a habit developed 
here. And the implications for interpreting Wittgenstein as offering habits as an 
account of rule following can be followed up, and contrasted with the views of 
commentators such as Winch (1958) and Pettit (1993). 
Hume might be thought to have had a rough deal. But if he has, that is only 
insofar as he is a Humean. I think he may have much to contribute to our 
understanding of habits, though it is presented quite separately from his thoughts on 
motivation. For Hume was well aware that "Custom or Habit" is essential to 
understanding how we can make inferences from experience, "without any process of 
reasoning" (1777, pp. 42-3). He writes: 
For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to 
renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of 
the understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of Custom (Hume 
1777, p. 43). 
Perhaps Hume' s writing could be illuminated by a proper understanding of the idea 
of habit presented here. And equally perhaps there is much to learn from Hume on 
its applications. 
In the rest of this final chapter I want to bring some themes together from the 
thesis, and indicate directions in which they might be developed. In §2 I say where I 
think this thesis leaves accounts of action. In §3 I describe the emerging importance of 
the role of normal cases. In §4 I suggest how, as a result, we might develop accounts 
of rational action. In §5 I draw out some implications for moral motivation. And 
finally in §6 I deliver on the promise made in Chapter 1, of saying how the idea of 
habitual action can enhance a naturalism of second nature. 
1 A recent paper by Mikael Karlsson (2002) makes a start in this direction. 
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This is not to deny that there may be a class of actions which can be 
understood as being done for some purpose, or as, in some sense, as goal-seeking, as 
has been proposed by Collins (1987, Ch. 6) and Stout (1996). But we can now see 
some of the challenges which such teleological views will have to meet. For if such 
theories are to apply to all actions, they had better not determine the purpose with 
reference to the agent's reasons (or they had better conceive of reasons rather 
differently to the ways considered here). And in the light of the idea of habitual 
action, I rather doubt we could say that all expressions of agency aim at something 
without strain. But perhaps the greatest challenge presented here is that we now have 
reason to doubt that conceiving of actions teleologically is the only, or the best way of 
making sense of their normative character. We should act habitually not because its 
means and ends are justified, but because there is no justification for not doing so. 
3. The Priority of Normal Cases 
There is a theme running through this thesis that I think it would be helpful to bring 
out. It not only reveals links between some of the arguments, but it also suggests how 
a number of issues might be taken forward. I trace the theme back to some moves 
made outside the philosophy of action altogether. 
In the philosophy of perception a view called disjunctivism is becoming 
popular. It is a kind of reply to a certain use of the argument from illusion, the classic 
statement of which is made by Grice (1961). That argument is intended to establish 
that since our subjective experiences of illusions are indistinguishable from veridical 
experiences, there must be some factor common to both veridical and illusory 
experiences. The common factor is supposed to be that of "appearance", or sense 
data. Such items are then supposed to mediate between us and the objects we 
perceive even in veridical experience. 
Disjunctivists such as J. M. Hinton (1973), Paul Snowdon (1981) and McDowell 
(1982) resist this conclusion. They argue that the similarity of appearances are 
insufficient grounds for positing anything common to the two sorts of occurrence. We 
can instead say that either an experience is veridicat which does not fall short of 
genuine contact with its object; or it is a mere appearance, which of course does. This 
206 
Conclusions and Future Work 
sort of disjunction is where the response gets its name. Just because veridicality 
breaks down at times, we need not conclude that appearances mediate in veridical 
appearance. 
Dancy (1995a) has noticed something of the generality of the disjunctive move. 
But I don't think he sees just how general the scope of its application can be. For as I 
read the disjunctive move, it asserts the right to a view of a phenomenon as it 
normally occurs, and refuses to regard aberrant cases of that phenomenon as 
informative on this matter. That would be as misguided as trying to understand 
veridical perception as an illusion that just happened to go normally. In other words, 
disjunctivism recognises the priority of normal cases. 
We can understand why normal cases are prior to abnormal ones by 
considering how explanations work.2 One might have a perfectly good explanation of 
why something behaves abnormally. But this would be a special explanation. The 
reason that such explanations will not be applicable to normal cases is that the very 
search for a special explanation presupposes some (perhaps inchoate) grasp of what 
normally happens. What we seek is an explanation of what is presupposed, and that 
cannot be given by an explanation of why it did not happen. 
There is a second reason why normal cases are prior to abnormal cases, and 
that is because they are fundamental in the order of explanation. If the job of an 
explanation is to present some problematic phenomenon in terms which are less 
problematic, we have every reason to expect that explanations will stop when we 
reach truths which are both obvious and familiar. Relative to abnormal cases, normal 
cases are like this. Explanations stop at normal cases because there may be nothing 
more obvious or familiar with which could explain them. These two points, then, give 
something of a explanation for why disjunctivism as a strategy is promising in action 
theory. 
I used a variation of a disjunctive argument in Chapter 3, §7. There I said that 
we should reject the arguments for saying that an agent always "tries" when she acts, 
2 I used a more specific form of this argument in opposing Smith in Chapter 7, §5. 
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since those arguments trade on intuitions about contexts which are abnormal, in 
which we would say that an agent "tries", and then persuade us to say the same thing 
in normal cases. But this is asking us to understand successful actions as failed 
actions that just happened to go well. And I rejected these as grounds for denying 
that habitual actions involve trying. 
I also employed a kind of disjunctive argument in my rejection of Frankfurt-
type cases in Chapter 4, §6. Frankfurt uses cases of alien manipulation in which 
agents "cannot do otherwise", yet still appear responsible for their actions, to try to 
persuade us that the idea of doing otherwise is quite generally irrelevant to 
responsibility. It is another case of inferring from features of abnormal cases to 
conclusions about the normal. The disjunctive move shows us that we need not draw 
any such conclusions. We should instead give priority to the normal cases. 
In the light of the above two arguments I think there is potential here for a 
quite general critique of certain sorts of thought experiment. Engagement with Grice 
(1961) and others would undoubtedly be profitable in this respect. That is an avenue 
of future research. But I want to make further suggestions here about how the above 
kind of move might be applied to a possible difficulty with my account of rational 
actions. 
4. Rational Actions 
In Chapter 5 I rejected the orthodox view that all rational actions are actions for 
reasons, on the grounds that our understanding of this idea is too intellectualised to 
accommodate habitual actions. My solution, in Chapter 6, was to suggest two ways in 
which a good many such actions might be accommodated as being rational, and that 
is, either by adopting the permissive conception of rational action, or by 
understanding "rational" as meaning something closer to "reasonable". I have 
intended both conceptions of rational action to be inclusive, so that actions for reasons 
can still be regarded as rational whichever we adopt. That way, it is easy to retain the 
natural intuition that rational agents act rationally most of the time. 
But left with this duality, the question remains of just how actions for reasons 
and rational habitual actions are related to one another. I now want to make a 
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suggestion about how this might go, by drawing on the principle of the priority of 
normal cases. The thought would be that habitual actions should be regarded as the 
normal cases of rational actions, whereas actions for reasons should be considered to 
be a kind of aberrant case. This reverses the orthodox view, which makes actions for 
reasons central. I think there is much to be said for the reversal. 
Rational habitual actions deserve to be regarded as our normal expressions of 
agency, since they are perfectly in order when our surrounding are familiar. In such 
surroundings, when there is a normal thing to do, we don't ask "why?"; more likely, 
that question would occur to somebody else, and we could justifiably reverse the onus 
by replying "why not?" It is only when things go awry, that is, when the world 
presents itself to us in a new way, or perhaps when more than one natural course 
suggests itself that a question arises. We find ourselves unsure about what to do, and 
resort to deliberation before we act. Any resulting action will still, we hope, be a 
rational action (either not irrational or reasonable), but insofar as it is, it is a rational 
action of a rather more difficult and risky kind. Deliberation, reflection, decision, 
trying, and reasons themselves, have their home in such abnormal circumstances, for 
it is only in such circumstances that our rational habits give out. 
The status of normal and abnormal is not fixed, but dynamic. If an agent 
comes across these same sorts of circumstances again, less thought will be required, 
and before long she will have added to her repertoire of habits. Previously abnormal 
circumstances will become normal for that agent with the new habit. Similarly, if she 
were to lose a habit, what would have been normal circumstances would become 
abnormal. A full picture of rational action will capture this interplay of habit and 
deliberation. 
What is striking in this picture is that the role of deliberation and reasons is 
seen as marginal. Their role is to deal with the abnormalities as and when they arise, 
and to allow us to respond appropriately. But when things are normal, deliberation 
and reasons have no role at all to play in our actions. Viewed in this light, the reasons 
theory, as a general account of rational action, seems deeply misguided. The reasons 
theory involves trying to understand all rational actions as responses appropriate to 
abnormal circumstances. The picture is of a somebody pathologically unable to resist 
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reflecting on everything she does; somebody strangely alienated from her 
surroundings, rather than somebody well attuned to them. 
Making habits central as I propose offers a fundamental challenge to the way 
the philosophy of action is currently conducted. For it may be that at the bottom of 
the reasons theory then lies a failure to recognise the priority of normal cases. When it 
comes to understanding rational actions, habitual actions could be more fundamental 
than actions for reasons in the order of explanation. 
5. Moral Motivators 
The priority of normal cases might also allow us to make progress on two issues that 
arose in Chapter 7, both of which concern how we should understand the idea of 
moral motivation. 
First, in Chapter 7, §5, I left open the question of what proportion of moral, or 
virtuous, actions are habitual. If they could all be shown to be habitual, this would 
completely get rid of the moral problem with which Smith is concerned. But there it 
seemed unlikely that this could be done since it appeared plausible that deliberation 
should be no bar to an action's moral status. Indeed it would seem to be a moral 
failing if some deliberation did not take place in certain kinds of context. An example 
would be when the consequences of a putative action would be of great moral 
significance. One thinks of paradigm moral dilemmas of our age, such as abortion 
and euthanasia. A lack of deliberation in these contexts would be reckless. 
But if the reversal suggested in §3 above is right, there is scope for 
investigating the following possibility. For one could still maintain that the 
paradigms of moral action are habitual, but it is just the hard cases that are not. In 
normal moral contexts, such as a situation requiring courage, the person with the right 
moral habits, in this case courage, just habitually acts courageously. In normal 
contexts, nothing further is required to show how she is motivated. 
But in the hard cases, where it is unclear what virtue requires, since our 
current virtues either clash, or are not up to the task, we must deliberate. And here 
our motivations will be properly explained by the reasons we ultimately act upon. 
And here, of course, the moral problem might still arise. But there are now two sorts 
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of response available. First, the moral problem only arises in marginal cases of moral 
actions. So its claimed centrality is only a result of an intellectualist bias. And second, 
since the cases when the moral problem may still arise are hard cases, the question to 
press would be, does the Humean picture capture anything of the subtlety and 
complexity of the sorts of reasons which it would be appropriate to consider? I have 
argued it falls far short of this. 
The second way in which the reversal might allow us to make progress on the 
topic of moral motivation is by engagement with some very recent writing. Jonathan 
Dancy (1995b) and Richard Norman (2001) have argued, in different ways, against the 
suggestion that we need a "theory of motivation." Such a theory is supposed to fill a 
putative "gap" between the agent's knowing what is good about doing the action, and 
her actually doing it. The Humean fills this gap in the familiar way, buy positing a 
belief-desire pair, which together both justify and cause the action. But Dancy and 
Norman claim that the "gap" which is supposed to be filled by such a theory actually 
presupposes the discredited Humean picture. Whilst I am sympathetic to this 
conclusion, I don't think they go far enough, and that is ultimately due to their 
intellectualism, which is itself a remaining vestige of Humeanism. 
Norman gets closest to what I think should be said. He claims that "we do not 
need any further explanation of why, in the normal case, human agents act on their 
beliefs about what they have good reasons to do. They just do it" (2002, p. 11, my 
italics). He considers the possibility that this sort of explanation might be 
"dispositional". "This may be so", he writes, "but the 'theory of motivation' is not a 
plausible candidate for a further explanation at this level. I doubt whether any 
uncontentious view is available as to what would count as an appropriate explanation" 
(p. 11). 
Norman is right about this, but he has no way of explaining why he is right. I 
think that is because of his residual intellectualism. What he needs to appreciate is the 
significance of the "normal case" of action. For if we understand such cases as those 
in which agents act habitually, we can see that reasons drop out of the picture 
altogether. There is no appropriate explanation in such cases, because there are no 
reasons that relate to the action. But that is not to say that there is no appropriate 
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explanation of why the agent does something. For the appropriate explanation is 
dispositional: "just doing it" is acting habitually. And as we have seen, the fact that 
this is not an explanation in terms of reasons does not mean that the action is not 
rational. 
So I can agree with Norman (and Dancy) that insofar as the theory of 
motivation requires an explanation for the "gap" between belief and action, it is 
unnecessary. But we need not restrict ourselves to this intellectualised way of seeing 
the problem. There may be some gap between an agent's (inarticulate) apprehension 
of the world and her response to it. We can reasonably ask why she responded both 
at all, and in this particular way. And this is a gap that can be filled by habits. In that 
sense, we can regard habits as motivators. 
This chimes with some other things Norman says. For earlier in the same 
paper he suggests that we can be '"motivated by pity' or 'motivated by ambition' or 
'motivated by a sense of justice"' (2001, p. 7). If these character traits can be thought 
of as habits, we may be able to capture Norman's intuitions that they are motivators, 
without understanding them, as he does, as "ways of characterising the kind of reason 
for which the agent acts" (p. 7). Clearly there are implications here for the way virtues 
can be said to motivate.3 But these matters must be taken up elsewhere. 
6. Action Naturalism Enhanced 
In Chapter 1, §4, I said I would return to the issue of action naturalism, and 
specifically, to the question of how McDowell's "naturalism of second nature" might 
be helped by this thesis. We saw there that McDowell thinks that our upbringing 
instils in us a second nature which consists in "habits of thought and action" (1996, p. 
84). And I suggested that whilst I applaud McDowell's general naturalistic strategy, 
some of the details of how this transition, during which our "eyes [are] opened to 
3 I think the suggestion would be compatible with what Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) has recently 
concluded: "what is both necessary and sufficient for a virtuous act to be 'morally motivated' is that it is 
done from a state of character that adequately resembles the state of character from which the perfectly 
virtuous agent acts" (pp. 159-60). I am however uneasy about the idea of a "perfectly virtuous agent". 
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reasons at large" (p. 84), remain obscure. We are now in a position to make some 
headway in this respect. 
The most obvious thing to say is that having defended the claim that many 
exercises of habits are rational actions, it is now much clearer how acquiring habits 
can result in rational actions. Hitherto, intellectualism in our theory of rational action 
has prevented us from understanding how habitual actions can be rational. Thus my 
claim that habitual actions can be rational makes McDowell's naturalism more 
plausible. 
But there is a difficulty with reading McDowell's "habits of thought and 
action" in this way. For according to the account of responsible actions presented in 
Chapter 4, an agent's personal responsibility for a behaviour crucially depends upon 
the possibility that she could have acted otherwise for reasons. Without a naturalistic 
account of how that capacity came about, the only "habits" we in fact have a 
naturalistic story about are merely proto-habits, as we might call them, which enable 
habitual behaviours, but these fall short habitual actions proper. As things stand, then, 
the above proposal may not be as much help for McDowell's naturalism as we might 
have hoped. 
I want to suggest a possible solution: the capacity for acting for reasons just is a 
rational habit which is acquired like all the others.4 Admittedly, the capacity to act for 
reasons must be a particularly sophisticated kind of habit, in the sense that it will 
depend upon the agent's having a host of other rational habits, such as the habits 
constitutive of language use, and reasoning. But this should be no bar to it's being 
thought of as itself a special sort of habit. 
The proposal is that the capacity for acting for reasons is the habit of 
deliberating in novel circumstances. It fulfils our criteria for being a habit. It is 
repeated, since we do it often in novel circumstances; we do it automatically, since it 
does not require deliberation about whether to do it, and does not require us to try to 
4 The possibility of an alternative understanding of this idea was mooted earlier in footnotes, see Chapter 
4, §7, and Chapter 5, §6. 
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do it; and since it is possible for us not to deliberate at our choosing, we are 
responsible for exercises of this habit. 
The idea of a habit such as this may seem paradoxical given the definitions 
with which we are working. After all, I have ruled out any sort of deliberation, which 
includes reflection on reasons, from what can count as a habitual action, so the idea of 
a "habit of deliberation" may seem paradoxical. However, this I think is to confuse a 
habitual act of deliberation with the content of such an act, or what is being deliberated 
upon. Just because a given behaviour is one of deliberating, it can still be the case that 
the agent does not deliberate upon whether to perform that very deliberation. And it 
is only a deliberation with that sort of content that could not be habitual. So 
deliberation, like other "mental" actions, can be said to be habitual. This would be 
one understanding of what McDowell means, in the quotation mentioned above, by 
"habits of thought". The habits involved in deliberation operate at a higher level than 
other habits, since all habits depend upon these habits if their exercises are to produce 
actions. Indeed the habits of deliberation would depend upon themselves, in the 
sense that it is always possible to opt out of it, and ask whether deliberation is the 
thing to do here. But high-level habits are habits nonetheless. 
To fill out the picture just slightly we can identify particular habits upon which 
the habit of deliberation will depend, for instance, the habit of employing modus 
ponens in our reasoning. The employment of modus ponens deserves to be termed 
habitual because in all but the most unusual circumstances, when we do it, we do not 
think about whether to. Thus, in normal circumstances, which are that we think p and 
p--..; q, we habitually think q. We might be thinking of both p and p--..; q before or at 
the time of this transition, but we shall not be also thinking about whether to perform 
the inference and conclude q, which would be the kind of deliberation which would 
disqualify it from being habitual. Rather, we find ourselves thinking that q, and that is 
an indication that the transition was habitual. In fact those who have never come 
across the idea of modus ponens (which will include those who have not studied logic) 
are unlikely to even realise that there is a question here. But that does not mean that 
even for them, there is no possible deliberation about whether to make the transition 
to q. The fact that it is unclear what sort of reasoning would lead to anybody deciding 
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to do otherwise just shows how fundamental to rational thought this particular habit 
is. 5 
So the naturalistic story would be one of an individual's acquiring first a set of 
proto-habits, which would eventually include more sophisticated proto-habits of 
reflection, deliberation, justification and criticism. Once these latter proto-habits are 
acquired, the individual can be said to be capable of actions proper, both habitual and 
otherwise. For it is now true to say that she can act otherwise for reasons, and thus 
that she has rational intervention control. 
The striking difference between this and what I have said previously, 
however, is that the rational capacity to intervene when appropriate, hitherto glossed 
as acting for reasons, is now itself understood as consisting in a mutually supportive 
set of rational habits. This is how, as McDowell following Aristotle suggests, the 
acquisition of second nature can be seen a matter of habit acquisition. Agency itself is 
habits all the way up. 
s This connects with the suggestion made in Chapter 6, §8, about certain rational habits being constitutive 
of agency, and thus a necessary part of a Davidsonian "principle of charity". 
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(R) An agent A's behaviour ~ in circumstances C is repeated if and only if A has on 
numerous prior occasions encountered circumstances similar to C ("normal 
circumstances"), and when in such circumstances, A usually, and on most of 
the recent occasions, behaved in a similar way to~· (p. 61) 
(A) A behaviour~ is automatic if and only if the agent performing~ engages in no 
process of conscious deliberation about whether to ~' either before ~ is 
performed, or during its performance; and the agent does not try to~· (p. 73) 
(HB) A behaviour ~ is habitual if and only if it is repeated according to (R) and 
automatic according to (A). (p. 77) 
(RIC) An agent has rational intervention control over a behaviour if and only if she has 
both a capacity to notice when an intervention on that behaviour is rationally 
appropriate, and a capacity to intervene appropriately on such occasions. (p. 
96) 
(HA) A behaviour ~ is a habitual action if and only if it is repeated according to (R), 
automatic according to (A), and the agent has rational intervention control 
over~· (p. 101) 
(H) An agent has a habit of ¢-ing in C if and only if the agent performed habitual 
action~ on most of her recent encounters with C. (p. 102) 
(PC) An action is rational if and only if it is not irrational. (p. 144) 
(RH) A habit is rational if and only if it is not irrational. (p. 158) 
(IH) A habit is irrational if and only if its exercises are irrational. (p. 158) 
(HE) Agent with the habit of ~-ing inC + encounter with normal circumstances C ~ 
habitual action~· (p. 194) 
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